The Attorney General's Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a CMS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official.

Operational Payment Justification narrative:

Submitted By
First Level Approved By
Second Level Approved By
The Attorney General's Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI Agent to be the only witness to the payment.

Period covered for this payment:
Begin: 06/30/2015
End: 09/30/2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substantive Case File Number</th>
<th>Financial Program</th>
<th>Financial Subprogram</th>
<th>Payment Request Amount</th>
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<td>800H-RQ-CS402086</td>
<td>RG</td>
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Payment Description:
Expenses incurred by: [Name]
Payment Amount: $0.00
Other Miscellaneous:
CHS Expense: $0.00

Operational Payment Justification narrative:
From the end of June through November 2015, the CHS employee a sub-source who is a full-time employee of a major corporation. The sub-source has knowledge of the company's hiring practices and has access to confidential information. The sub-source is also a frequent traveler and was able to facilitate the travel and accommodation expenses for the CHS employee. The CHS employee was able to attend meetings with the sub-source and discuss business-related matters. The meetings were held in September and November 2015. On occasion, the CHS employee also accompanied the sub-source on trips. The CHS employee was able to facilitate the travel and accommodation expenses for the meetings. The meetings were held in September and November 2015.

Total CHS Services: $0.00
Total CHS Expenses: $0.00
Total Agent Expenses: $0.00

Submitted By
First Level Approved By
Second Level Approved By

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO 1370340-13
On Monday, 18 September 2017 and Tuesday, 19 September 2017, CHRISTOPHER STEELE, ORBIS Business Intelligence, was interviewed at The Grosvenor Hotel, London, England, by FBI [redacted] and FBI [redacted]. The following information was provided by STEELE over the course of the two-day interview. On 18 September 2017, in the initial part of the interview, STEELE was accompanied by his fellow ORBIS executive, CHRISTOPHER BURROWS. After about 45-60 minutes on 18 September 2017, BURROWS departed, and STEELE remained with [redacted] and [redacted] for the duration of 18 September 2017 and for the entirety of the interview on 19 September 2017.

On 18 September 2017, BURROWS opened the interview by expressing concern over loose business ends with the FBI. BURROWS explained that he and STEELE were still pretty upset about how the relationship with the FBI concluded because of the time and effort that had been taken to get information to the FBI. BURROWS explained that we had a contract with [redacted] adding that maybe the contract had been put together with STEELE serving as the “face” of ORBIS, but that there had been a contractual relationship.

STEELE and BURROWS apologized for going to the press back in the fall of 2016, but STEELE explained that as the election season went on, they as the company were “riding two horses” — their client and the FBI — and after FBI Director James COMEY’s reopening of the Hillary Clinton investigation, they had to pick “one horse” and chose the business/client relationship over the relationship with the FBI. They followed what their client wanted, and they spoke to the press. STEELE and BURROWS described the overall situation as being one where it was “your [FBI] fault” and “our fault.” STEELE commented that it was not about the money owed, but BURROWS remarked that STEELE might not be that concerned about the money, but BURROWS was.

Reason: 1.4(c)
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20421231
SECRET/URGENT/NOFORN

Investigation on 09/18/2017 at London, United Kingdom (In Person)

File # [redacted] Date drafted 11/09/2017

by [redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
STEELE and BURROWS were confused over whether [redacted] and [redacted] represented the FBI or the Office of the Special Counsel. BURROWS made the point, in his former career, he "knew [Robert] Mueller." They wanted to make sure that they were talking to the Office of the Special Counsel.

STEELE and BURROWS indicated frustration by the inclusion of their company’s reporting in the United States (US) Intelligence Community’s Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) of Russia interference in the 2016 election, particularly the ICA “annex” as reported in the media. STEELE and BURROWS felt that they should have had advance warning that the company’s reporting was going to be used in the annex. The inclusion of the company’s information and the subsequent public leak of the annex put STEELE’s name out there and had a “massive impact on our lives.” STEELE and BURROWS wanted to know how the US [redacted] governments had worked all of this out, and also wanted to know was told that the information was going in the ICA.

STEELE and BURROWS described President TRUMP as their “main opponent” and indicated that they were fearful about how TRUMP’s presidency negatively impacted the historical UK-US alliance and the US-UK special relationship.

STEELE said that GLENN SIMPSON of Fusion GPS was knowledgeable that STEELE was sharing reports and information with the FBI.

STEELE explained that, in the run-up to the 2016 US presidential election, they provided material to BRUCE OHR and were pushing OHR to do something about the reports.

STEELE said that he had been unsure to whom [redacted] he could provide the election-related reports.

STEELE said that his primary subsource for the election reports – who he would not identify by name for the entirety of the interview – had also provided information used in earlier, non-election related reporting provided to the FBI.

STEELE’s primary subsource met with [redacted]. The primary subsource had shared a photo with STEELE depicting [redacted]. STEELE tried to have his primary subsource record a meeting between the primary subsource and [redacted] but it was not successful. [redacted] has lost contact with STEELE’s primary subsource. STEELE said that [redacted] is the
Continuation of FD-302 of

individual who originally provided the primary subsource with the Ritz Carlton-related information about TRUMP. STEELE's primary subsource followed up information with three people. ORBIS has the names of the three people with whom the primary subsource followed up.

STEELE said that he had never heard of CARTER PAGE or MICHAEL COHEN or GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS before this whole thing. He had heard of PAUL MANAFORT which STEELE said got the whole thing started. He had heard of [redacted] before this, and told interviewers that he would describe this in greater detail later in the interview.

When asked by interviewers about his vetting and validation of his primary subsource, STEELE said that he knew the primary subsource's background and the current positions of his primary subsource's sub-subsources. STEELE said that his primary subsource's reporting was consistent over multiple projects, which STEELE used as a vetting and validation point of reference. STEELE also confirmed his primary subsource's reporting through other sources.

STEELE said that ORBIS has four discrete, "hermetically-sealed" main agent networks. The biggest of these was the network involved with his primary subsource, which isn't as active now. For one of the older networks, the main agent had died. Another main agent network is up and running and is now starting to get good information. It is based on a new main agent - not the primary subsource for the election reports - and it is being redirected to collect on Russia. STEELE also said that he has a source

STEELE said that his primary subsource feels like it is about time to engage with the Office of the Special Counsel. STEELE spoke with his primary subsource last night, and the primary subsource is coming along with the idea of talking with Special Counsel, but was not there yet. STEELE is still very concerned to protect his primary subsource. The primary subsource has a very special story, especially how [redacted] came to work for ORBIS. The primary subsource was introduced to STEELE and ORBIS by FIONA HILL in or around 2011. Emphasizing the sensitivity, STEELE explained that HILL now worked for the White House on the National Security Council. HILL has a very high opinion of the primary subsource, and she told STEELE that he and ORBIS should take a look at him. HILL is one of STEELE's close friends - STEELE later described in the interview
that his wife went to university with HILL, and that HILL's daughter is named after a now-deceased mutual college friend of HILL and his wife.

STEELE said that his primary subsourse was [redacted]. STEELE added that someone who was Ukrainian could possibly have the type of access his source has.

STEELE trained up his primary subsourse, and STEELE described him as a prolific asset. The primary subsourse's motivations include the fact that he considers [redacted]. The primary subsourse uses [redacted] prior university contacts, and [redacted] reporting has become better over time. STEELE was asked by interviewers if his primary subsourse had anything happen to [redacted] while collecting for ORBIS. STEELE indicated that his primary subsourse had reported being hauled in front of immigration authorities [redacted]. The primary subsourse was shaken down for money - [redacted] was forced to go to an ATM and withdraw money and paid the bribe. STEELE took this as a good sign for validation purposes, remarking that things haven't gone smoothly for his primary subsourse all the time.

STEELE said that his primary subsourse took [redacted] trips in 2016 for collecting information for the election-related ORBIS reports. STEELE said that he was working on memory for some of this, as ORBIS destroyed materials for legal reasons. STEELE said that his primary subsourse took trips in [redacted] and [redacted] and [redacted] and [redacted] during these trips. STEELE also said that STEELE took three trips himself in 2016 and talked with his primary subsourse. STEELE dated his trips [redacted] after STEELE had met with [redacted] representatives in Rome.

STEELE said that his primary subsourse used [redacted]. There was a push to get an audio capture of [redacted]. There was a push to get an audio capture of primary subsorce's conversations with one of [redacted] own sub-sub-sources, and they were successful in obtaining audio of a conversation between the primary subsourse and [redacted] sub-sub-sourcse regarding MICHAEL COHEN's meeting in Prague. STEELE told interviewers that he did not have that audio capture in its original form. STEELE explained that he had to be careful regarding legal issues, but they had audio capture and a transcription of the audio capture. There may be an opportunity to obtain more on this because this particular sub-sub-sourcse [redacted] and in an accessible place. STEELE's primary subsourse is having dialogue with that particular subsourse, and that individual may be thinking of "coming in."
STEELE described this particular sub-subsource in greater detail. He said that another, different sub-subsource had provided information on cyber. This particular sub-subsource talked about how the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) was able to turn an individual who had been caught money laundering and get him/her to work cyber operations for the FSB. STEELE commented about how this is a typical operating procedure for the FSB.

In reference to a question posed by interviewers about the primary subsource's reporting, STEELE said that his primary subsource had traveled to [redacted]. The primary subsource could not recall exactly which of his primary subsource's 2016 trips involved a trip to [redacted], but it may have been on the [redacted] one.

STEELE said that the primary subsource's [redacted] trip involved [redacted] being [redacted]. The [redacted] trip occurred at the time that STEELE was meeting with FBI representatives in Rome. This was why STEELE couldn't contact the primary subsource during that time - the primary subsource had said not to contact because [redacted]. This is the event, STEELE added, during which time the primary subsource collected information about EDWARD SNOWDEN and also a senior FSB officer.

STEELE explained that, when collecting information for ORBIS, his primary subsource plays up overt, academic interests. The primary subsource does favors for people.
In fact, STEELE explained that STEELE had helped to recommend the best English language school for one of his primary subsourc's sub-subsources.

With respect to the election-related reports, STEELE said that it did not take much effort early-on for his primary subsourc to collect information because the whole thing was an "open secret" in Moscow. People would start talking in bars, and the primary subsourc could easily elicit information. Later, as 2016 progressed, sources of information started shutting down and it became harder to obtain information.

STEELE said that the primary subsourc has sub-subsources with serious access to named people in tight circles.

According to STEELE, the primary subsourc had traveled to [REDACTED]. The primary subsourc has contacts in different cities - for example, the primary subsourc is close to, or has sub-subsources close to, [REDACTED]. STEELE commented that his primary subsourc has collected information for many of ORBIS' litigation clients in the energy and mining sectors. For the election-related reports, the primary subsourc had about [REDACTED] trips in

STEELE explained that ORBIS' initial interest in the US election-related material stemmed from a litigation-related issue. It involved potential litigation with PAUL MANAFORT, and ORBIS' interest started around May 2016. MANAFORT had disappeared for multiple years and appeared to be hiding from creditors. MANAFORT owed money -- $100 million to oligarchs and more money to Russians (NFI). STEELE explained that FUSION GPS had a different client for whom it was already doing research on MANAFORT. Around June 2016, STEELE met with FUSION GPS and they decided to start swapping notes. Soon thereafter, the decision was made to have FUSION GPS hire ORBIS on the election-related stuff - FUSION GPS would "take [ORBIS] on for the bigger issue." In June 2016, ORBIS took its own crack at the election-related stuff. STEELE said that it wasn't the only politically-sensitive investigation ORBIS was working at the time. For example, ORBIS was handling an English Football Association (FA) matter regarding a competitor for the bid process. STEELE also said - and emphasized the extreme sensitivity of this example -- ORBIS was also involved in doing work regarding the election campaign for the UN Secretary General post -- a client wanted them to work up material on possible voting intentions.
In [Redacted], ORBIS got election-related reporting from the primary subsource, as well as from a different subsource. In [Redacted] STEELE indicated that they got a debriefing about RYBOLOVLEV and the sale of property in Florida. STEELE remembered that the material on RYBOLOVLEV was received before STEELE took a holiday trip to Cyprus.

STEELE said that his primary subsource did a bit of work on election-related collecting. The primary subsource talked to [Redacted] and one or two others. Regarding [Redacted] STEELE said that the primary subsource was introduced, and the primary subsource met [Redacted]. The primary subsource had discussed a [Redacted], and [Redacted]. STEELE recalled seeing some documentation about [Redacted]. STEELE described it as a [Redacted].

STEELE described his primary subsource's sub-subsource networks. While doing this, STEELE drew a diagram for interviewers. See attached.

On reporting regarding CARTER PAGE, STEELE said that it stemmed from Page's speech in Moscow in July 2016. The reporting about PAGE's meetings with IGOR SECHIN and IGOR DIVEYKIN all came from the same sub-subsource. 

On reporting about OLEG GOVORUN, STEELE identified this stream of reporting as stemming from a different sub-subsource. 

On reporting involving DMITRIY PESKOV's office, this reporting stems from a "friend of a friend" of the primary subsource. Later, STEELE gave the identity of this individual. 

On reporting about Prague and ROSSOTRUDNICHESTVO, STEELE said that STEELE talked in more detail about his decision to talk to the press. STEELE said that after COMEY's letter reopening the HILLARY CLINTON investigation, FUSION GPS felt like the gloves had come off. STEELE said that he had previous discussions earlier with BRUCE OHR about getting the
election-related material out, but OHR had explained to STEELE about US Department of Justice policy about needing to be hands-off prior to elections. FUSION GPS put pressure on ORBIS to talk to Mother Jones. STEELE initially said that his interview with Mother Jones was supposed to have been off-the-record, but then he added that the interview was a combination of off-the-record and on-the-record. STEELE said that, in the end, he should not have given the interview. STEELE said that, subsequently, with the rift that the interview had caused with the FBI, they had no way of getting this information into the hands of people who they believed needed it. That is when they decided to go the route of Senator JOHN MCCAIN and DAVID KRAMER. In the end, however, STEELE believes that the decision to go the MCCAIN and KRAMER route is how Buzzfeed got the material and is why, now, STEELE has the legal problems he has.

BRUCE OHR is aware that STEELE is currently in touch with the FBI. OHR knows about this meeting. STEELE said that he has reached out to OHR and GLENN SIMPSON about the primary subsource.

STEELE believes that his primary subsource is coming around to the idea of meeting with the Office of the Special Counsel. STEELE only wants that to happen if the primary subsource agrees to it. It needs to be carefully handled. For instance, STEELE said that the primary subsource has been doing a bit of work for ORBIS recently. It has been reaching out to some of the same subsource. ORBIS has had an interest in the "propylactic efforts" by the Russian government following the publicity of the dossier.

When asked what type of tradecraft STEELE's primary subsource has used when collecting information for ORBIS, STEELE said that his primary subsource uses [REDACTED]. The primary subsource takes very few written notes. The primary subsource is very thorough when it comes to preparing to be debriefed; it takes time before being debriefed to get thoughts and recollections together. STEELE said that the primary subsource uses [REDACTED]. The primary subsource has used this approach in the past - STEELE mentioned trips that the primary subsource has taken on behalf of ORBIS' due diligence and legal work, including for [REDACTED]. The primary subsource has a very good memory.

STEELE said that only four or five people in ORBIS' office have dealt with the primary subsource. The primary subsource was debriefed the first time
in the office, but not after that. STEELE said that ORBIS is now very concerned about bugging, so they wouldn't debrief sources in their office.

STEELE has had substantive debriefings with the primary subsource. STEELE explained that the primary subsource was not just working on election-related collection during the primary subsource's 2016 trips to Russia. He was working on multiple projects at the same time. That said, STEELE indicated that the primary subsource definitely collected on election-related materials during [REDACTED] in 2016.

STEELE said that the primary subsource is currently working through obtaining [REDACTED]. The primary subsource hasn't been back [REDACTED] since his 2016 trips.

STEELE said that he is close enough to the primary subsource that the primary subsource would have told him that [REDACTED] been interviewed (NFI).

STEELE said FIONA HILL knows that the primary subsource was involved in the dossier. When the primary subsource went to ground in January and February 2017, STEELE contacted HILL and told HILL that he was worried about the primary subsource. STEELE said that she probably guesses that the primary subsource was involved. STEELE remembered seeing HILL in the UK in early 2016, while STEELE's wife was abroad. HILL was still at Brookings. STEELE does not recall the last time he saw HILL.

STEELE said that the primary subsource [REDACTED]

When asked about STEELE's own validation and/or assessment of hostile control for the primary subsource, STEELE mentioned a number of things which he took to be positive signs. First, there was the incident involving the primary subsource being shaken down for money. Second, the primary subsource exhibits behavior indicative of someone who is scared - the primary subsource would not be talking about coming to the talk to the Special Counsel if there was a problem. STEELE does not believe that the primary subsource exhibits signs or behavior of someone who is under control. STEELE cannot guarantee that the primary subsource's sub-subsources aren't under control. STEELE said that it hasn't been easy for the primary subsource to get information - [REDACTED] had to dig for it. Moreover, STEELE said that he is not sure why the primary subsource would still be hanging around or be [REDACTED] if [REDACTED] was under foreign control.

STEELE gave details of a REX TILLLERSON-related report from the primary subsource - a report that STEELE is unsure the FBI possesses because
STEELE didn’t provide it to the FBI. STEELE said that in order to explain the report, he has to first talk about earlier ORBIS reporting from approximately 3 years ago, circa 2014. At that time, ORBIS was working on a hydrocarbon project for a client. It became clear from reporting during that project that Exxon-Mobil was well-placed in Russia and that TILLERSON had an atypical type of relationship with SECHIN. It was odd, STEELE said, to the point that STEELE thought that something was going on, particularly with SECHIN. There was more between TILLERSON and SECHIN than just shared hobbies like Harley-Davidsons. STEELE said that the reporting on this subject died down, the client moved on, and the sanctions regime kicked in. Then, circa December 2016, following the election, President-Elect TRUMP was initially flirting with MITT ROMNEY as a possible candidate for US Secretary of State. There was a long hiatus during which time there was general speculation about whether the position would go to ROMNEY or not. STEELE’s primary subsourse picked up information from sources in Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) that Washington, DC had received messages from Russia indicating that ROMNEY was an unacceptable candidate and that Russia wanted someone who was more acceptable and who might lift sanctions. TILLERSON’s name, according to STEELE, isn’t in the report from the primary subsourse, but what happened in the end was, to STEELE, surprising given the reporting. STEELE said that this report may have been shared with DAVID KRAMER - STEELE sent it to GLENN SIMPSON with the idea of having it shared.

STEELE explained how he shared the election-related reports with [REDACTED]. He knew [REDACTED] from his previous career. STEELE was trying to figure out the best way of sharing this information with his own government, but wasn’t completely comfortable.

STEELE is hesitant about sharing his information [REDACTED], as well as with CIA and NSA. He is concerned about the existence of hostile penetrations and his primary subsourse’s security. STEELE says that his information needs to be handled in a need-to-know way.

STEELE said [REDACTED] was not given as much information regarding the primary subsourse’s network as he has given to the FBI.
STEEL was asked about his primary subsource’s physical security. STEEL said that the primary subsource had someone over. Someone in the primary subsource’s

When asked about STEEL’s knowledge of the primary subsource’s contact with Russian establishments, STEEL said that the primary subsource had someone over. STEEL said that it was strange, but nothing alarming. That was how the primary subsource knew that KALUGIN had been withdrawn from the United States. When the primary subsource asked about KALUGIN’s leaving the United States, KALUGIN did not explicitly say that he was withdrawn because of the election controversy.

When asked about STEEL’s knowledge of any journalists who have approached the primary subsource, STEEL said that in the primary subsource that he had heard that the primary subsource might have some information about the dossier. STEEL said that the primary subsource gave a bland answer, but the entire situation caused the primary subsource some consternation. The primary subsource took it as a warning that was found out. This is why, explained STEEL, the primary subsource went to ground timeframe and is why STEEL reached out to FIONA HILL to check on the primary subsource’s whereabouts and safety.

When asked about STEEL’s knowledge of whether any of the primary subsource’s sub-subsources knew that their information was used in the dossier, STEEL said that some of the primary subsource’s sub-subsources
have talked to [redacted] in a cryptic manner about the reports. In one case, specifically the individual who provided the information to the primary sub-source about GUBAREV, STEELE believes that the primary sub-source’s sub-sub-sources have an idea that their information was used in the dossier.

STEELE said that the primary sub-source’s [redacted] STEELE understands that the primary sub-source [redacted]. They did not indicate that they’ve had any problems or have experienced any harassment.

STEELE talked about the EROVINKIN situation. EROVINKIN was the former top aide to SECHIN in ROSNEFT who was found dead in December 2016. STEELE said that some people and the press have mistakenly tied EROVINKIN to the dossier – namely as a possible sub-source on the SECHIN material. STEELE does not believe that EROVINKIN was one of the primary sub-source’s sub-sub-sources; nevertheless, STEELE takes this whole situation very seriously and gives him pause. It reminds him of another, recent situation involving [redacted] whose reporting is in the dossier. STEELE described [redacted] as “out there” engaged with Westerners. STEELE believes that there is a general feeling [redacted] has been cultivated by Western intelligence. On this note, about three or four months ago, there was a shooting in the restroom of the Moscow restaurant named KOSMOS. The shooting was in broad daylight and an individual named KOSTYA MYASKI or MYANSKIY (sp) was the victim. STEELE believes that this was a warning shot [redacted]. The incident occurred in the May 2017 timeframe.

STEELE was asked about ORBIS’ business security procedures since the public release of the dossier. STEELE said that they had a situation arise where someone tried to spoof or impersonate the outside contractor who does ORBIS’ IT security. There was an attempt to change the password for their internal system, which was detected. The IT security contractor was contacted to determine if the attempt was legitimate. If this had been successful, it could have exposed clients, but not sensitive reporting as that is kept offline.

STEELE was asked if ORBIS has had any situations, post-dossier, where ORBIS thought that it was being offered dangles or was the object of operational games. STEELE said that this question reminded him about the CODY SHEARER situation and the offer of tapes, which STEELE said he would talk about later. STEELE commented that the existence of tapes have been played out of proportion, adding that just the fact that the Russian government has leverage on President TRUMP is a problem. It would be difficult to know if a tape has been doctored. STEELE said that there is a
Concern, following the public release of the dossier, that any situation involving the provision of tapes can be a dangle or a controlled operation. STEELE has heard, and it is his understanding, that the situation involving CODY SHEARER and the tapes parallels something that the US Government has been involved with, but he plans on talking about that in more detail (see below). STEELE added that there are some “dark web” aspects to this, and STEELE asked about who was handling or analyzing “dark web” issues for the FBI.

STEELE did not provide funds to his primary subsource for payment to sub-subsources. STEELE said that he provided a monthly retainer to his primary subsources, and said that a primary subsource might, in turn, pay for food or drinks while collecting information from his or her sub-subsources, but the sub-subsources are not paid for information. STEELE also advised that he sometimes paid for his primary subsources' trip expenses, save for the primary subsource's

The fact that sub-subsources are not paid for their information was, to STEELE, an important point when it came to the issue of reporting quality -- STEELE advised that the lack of payment meant there was no incentive for sources to exaggerate their information. In one situation, STEELE advised that his company and/or FUSION GPS were involved in obtaining [redacted] for one of his primary subsource's sub-subsources, [redacted]. STEELE recalled that ORBIS may have provided money, which were then procured by FUSION GPS. [redacted] were wiped for prints before being provided to the source (NFI).

STEELE provided some overall comments regarding the election-related dossier reports. The time between ORBIS’s receipt of information to report publication was generally quick -- the time could vary, but often a report was generated two days to one week after the debriefing of the primary subsource. In some cases, where the difference between the date of information and the date of published report was within a day, the information for the report had most likely been received [redacted], rather than through an in-person debriefing with the primary subsource.

In the election-related dossier reports, STEELE said that the commentary labeled "Company Comments" was generated by FUSION GPS. The first report from ORBIS to FUSION GPS was sent via direct courier; however, reports were typically encrypted and sent via email.
and STEELE went over each of the election-related dossier reports, with STEELE providing additional information on each report, as appropriate. STEELE explained that he intentionally left sequential gaps in the numbering of his election-related reports to obscure the actual number of reports being produced on the subject as well as to obscure the timing of the reports:

Company Intelligence Report 2016/80 (dated 20 June 2016)

Under "Detail," STEELE identified the "trusted compatriot" as his unnamed primary subsourse. In the same report, Source A was , while Source B . STEELE said that his primary subsourse who was in direct contact with the primary subsourse. This had been a major subsourse for a long time on other matters.

In the report, STEELE identified Source D as who, according to STEELE, was in direct contact with the primary subsourse. Sources E and F, according to STEELE, . STEELE said that his primary subsourse personally visited the hotel .

Source G was , a "friend of a friend" of his primary subsourse. During the primary subsourse's trips , the one who advised the primary subsourse that because things were heating up, there had been a directive given advising that they (NFI) should not speak to anyone regarding Russia's interest in, or involvement with, the 2016 US Presidential Election.

STEELE indicated that the primary subsourse collected the information for this report (2016/80) during a trip

Company Intelligence Report 2016/94 (dated 19 July 2016)

STEELE indicated that the information in this report was collected by the primary subsourse .

In paragraph 3 of the report, according to STEELE, the "compatriot" is a . STEELE's primary subsourse's sub-
Interview of Christopher Steele

The information in this report was not collected during an interaction by STEELE's primary subsource.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/100 (dated 5 August 2016)

STEELE referred to this reporting as being derived his primary subsource's interaction with [REDacted].

[REDacted] STEELE was not sure about the sub-subsource's identity, adding that he [STEELE] had destroyed all of his notes. STEELE offered to try and find out the identity of the unidentified sub-subsource.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/95 (handwritten date 29 August 2016)

STEELE said that Source E in paragraphs 1 through 5 in this report was [REDacted] who was speaking to the primary subsource. It was [REDacted] who told the primary subsource the information in this report about MANAFORT, WIKILEAKS, and Russia's use of diplomatic staff and the emigre pension program as "cover."

In paragraph 6 of the report, the "separate source with direct knowledge" was an unidentified individual who was involved in [REDacted].

STEELE could not remember the exact identity of the individual, but [REDacted].

Company Intelligence Report 2016/97 (dated 30 July 2016)
STEELE said that the "trusted associate" in the first paragraph was his primary source, and the "Russian emigre figure close to the Republican US presidential candidate," was...

STEELE said that...provided the entirety of this report. He provided this information directly to STEELE's primary source, including the information in the report about how the "intelligence exchange" between the TRUMP team and the Kremlin went back at least 8 years.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/101 (handwritten date 29 August 2016)

STEELE advised that paragraphs 1-3 of this report involve the primary source's obtaining of information...

STEELE described this report as dealing with "fallout information" -- that is, information about how the Russian government was dealing internally with the publicity surrounding Russian involvement in the US election.

STEELE indicated that the "Kremlin official involved in US relations" noted in paragraph 4 of the report...

Company Intelligence Report 2016/102 (dated 10 August 2016: handwritten date 29 August 2016)

STEELE believed that the information in paragraphs 1 and 2 in this report -- though he was not 100% sure -- was derived from...

Based on the date of the report and on the information in the report, STEELE believes that the report was generated through personal contact between...and his primary source. It also appears to STEELE that the report was generated...

Because there is only one day between the date of Information (9 August 2016) and the date of the report (10 August 2016), STEELE said that it doesn't appear that the report was generated following one of his primary source's trips...

Instead, it appears that his primary source made contact while [the primary source] was...and could therefore report the information to STEELE right away.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/105 (dated 22 August 2016)

STEELE advised that this report was based on a unique reporting stream. His primary subsouse has a relationship with sub-subsource,
According to STEELE, the "American political figure associated with Donald TRUMP and his campaign" noted in paragraph 3 of this report could be [redacted], speaking directly to STEELE's primary subsource.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/111 (dated 14 September 2016)

STEELE described this report as another "fallout" piece -- that is, a report about the Russian government was dealing internally with the public accusations and news stories regarding Russian interference in the 2016 election. The information in this report was derived from his primary subsource's direct contact with multiple sub-sources. These sub-sources included [redacted]. STEELE explained that his primary subsource had [redacted]. STEELE's primary subsource had direct contact with all of these sub-sources -- contact with them was not brokered.

The "former top level Russian intelligence officer and Kremlin insider" referenced in the "Company Comment" for this report was [redacted].

Company Intelligence Report 2016/112 (dated 14 September 2016)

This report is derived from the [redacted] STEELE indicated that he had no doubt that [redacted] was the source of the reporting for this entire report. Even though this person travelled, and talks to STEELE's primary subsource via [redacted], STEELE advised that the information for this particular report was obtained during one of his primary subsource's trips [redacted].

Company Intelligence Report 2016/113 (dated 14 September 2016)
STEELE advised that the information in this report was derived from his primary subsource's visit in 2016. The primary subsource had

STEELE reiterated that his primary subsource traveled.

Reflecting on the content of this report, STEELE commented that he had never heard of AGALAROV prior to this report, save for EMIN AGALAROV's music. STEELE did not know much about AGALAROV as he had not crossed paths with him professionally.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/130 (dated 12 October 2016)

STEELE believed that the information in this report was derived from his primary subsource's interaction with one of [redacted]. STEELE was not completely sure.

STEELE believes that this report was produced after STEELE's meeting with FBI representatives in Rome, which had happened the week prior, and after [redacted] attended by his primary subsource.

STEELE's primary subsource [redacted].

During [redacted], the primary subsource also spoke to a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer at a party. One of the topics brought up during the primary subsource's conversation with the FSB officer was EDWARD SNOWDEN. This contact with the FSB officer was direct -- it was not brokered through another individual.

For the final paragraph of the report (paragraph 4), STEELE was unsure if the information was derived from the "SNOWDEN source" but thought it was unlikely to have been the FSB officer.

STEELE advised that his primary subsource had not had official contact with the FSB, though STEELE believes that his primary subsource may have talked to a local FSB officer [redacted].

Company Intelligence Report 2016/132 (dated 13 October 2016)

STEELE indicated that [redacted] was the source of the information in this report. This information was collected during the primary subsource's visit [redacted] 2016 -- the same trip
Company Intelligence Report 2016/134 (dated 18 October 2016)

STEELE indicated that this information in paragraphs 1-3 of this report is derived from his primary subsource's communication with about CARTER PAGE. The primary subsource spoke to more individuals than just about this particular subject. STEELE believes that the primary subsource spoke with, who STEELE described as a person who had a possible surname of and was either from the

Company Intelligence Report 2016/135 (dated 19 October 2016)

STEELE said that the information about MICHAEL COHEN in the fourth paragraph was derived from his primary subsource's interactions with sub-subsources in the above-mentioned

Company Intelligence Report 2016/136 (dated 20 October 2016)

STEELE indicated that his primary subsource received this information from
Reflecting on the "Company Comment," STEELE emphasized that the information was obtained directly rather than by any of the brokered, reporting chains. STEELE's primary subsource obtained the information directly from his third-country sub-subsource.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/137 (dated 24 October 2016)

STEELE believes that this report was derived from his primary subsource's communication with [REDACTED], but he was not 100% sure. Logically, STEELE said, since [REDACTED] is the one who reported on IGOR DIVEYKIN in an earlier report, it would follow that this report's material on DIVEYKIN also came from [REDACTED]. STEELE said that SECHIN would have told this sub-subsource about DIVEYKIN. STEELE added that SECHIN originally met through professional interaction. STEELE believed that professional work can be confirmed through open sources.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/139 (dated 27 October 2016)

STEELE indicated that the "senior Russian journalist working in the United States" in this report is [REDACTED]. STEELE believed that

STEELE noted that, at this point, [REDACTED] had disappeared. STEELE believes that [REDACTED]. However, STEELE also knows that

Intelligence Report, Information Dated 29 November 2016

This report was not included in the material STEELE provided to the FBI; he believes that it was provided to the FBI from Senator JOHN MCCAIN. The information in this report was generated through his primary subsource's communication with a senior MFA official. Reflecting on what he said earlier about some of the 2014 background of this particular report (see above), STEELE indicated that the earlier, 2014 information has been obtained from his primary subsource's communications [REDACTED].
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STEELE advised that this was his "favorite" report, involving MICHAEL COHEN, WEBZILLA, and ALEKSEJ GUBAREV. The information on MICHAEL COHEN was obtained by the primary subsourse's direct communication with

Company Intelligence Report 2016/086, dated 26 July 2015

First, STEELE was asked about the date of this report, specifically the year. Upon reflection, STEELE said that he believes this is a typo, and that the year was actually 2016 versus 2015.

STEELE advised that this cyber-related report in the dossier had been tasked by the FBI. It had been tasked by and was passed to the FBI.

Company Note, dated 19 October 2016

This is the CODY SHEARER and JON WINER report. STEELE advised that this was not an ORBIS report. STEELE received this report from JON WINER. The report pre-dates the dossier, and was produced circa April 2016. STEELE advised that SHEARER was an associate of SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL. SHEARER is also friends with a Turkish-American businessman with the last name of KHAN (NFI). KHAN was in touch with RUSLAN MANSIMOV, aka ASLAN TURAN, aka ASLAN TURANCI. According to STEELE, MANSIMOV was a "Southern Caucasus mongrel" -- Armenian/Azeri/Russian -- and worked in Turkey and Rome. KHAN brokered contact between SHEARER and MANSIMOV in New York and Istanbul. MANSIMOV worked for the FSB -- STEELE said that MANSIMOV's affiliation with the FSB was not a secret.

STEELE advised that this SHEARER/WILER report was not related to the dossier and was based on long-standing relationships among the identified individuals. STEELE said that the report had pluses and minuses. The "plus" of the reporting was that it chimed with the Miss Universe reporting, the Ritz-Carlton reporting, and the AGALAROVs. The "minus" of the reporting was the fact that MANSIMOV was, according to STEELE, neither the most sophisticated nor impressive person. MANSIMOV's Russian language skills were not that great, as it was not his first language. STEELE opined that MANSIMOV's first language may be Azeri.
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After the dossier was published, MANSIMOV was not an active contact. MANSIMOV had claimed to be part of a faction in Russia, along with some other FSB officials, who were shocked at the attacks on the US election. MANSIMOV thought that the "crazies" (NFI) were out of control, and that it would blow up in their faces (NFI).

Recently, MANSIMOV has recontacted KHAN and was offering to provide tapes of President TRUMP. At least one of those tapes was related to the Miss Universe event and involved urine. KHAN brokered contact between SHEARER and MANSIMOV. SHEARER and MANSIMOV were actively discussing a deal for the tapes. MANSIMOV wanted money and "good standing" (NFI). MANSIMOV also claimed that an FSB technical officer with the rank of colonel was interested in defecting and wished to speak to them. The FSB officer had difficulty traveling; therefore, it was suggested that they meet in Kazakhstan.

SHEARER and MANSIMOV met in Istanbul and are considering an upcoming meeting in Spain within the coming weeks.

STEELE advised that he wished to keep this interaction "at an arm's length," as he does not want to fall into a trap. STEELE opined that this could be genuine, or a fabrication, or a set-up -- suggesting that it could involve a faction of the Democratic Party and he feared a possible FCPA violation. STEELE advised that WINER was aware of the situation, and was the one who informed STEELE about it. STEELE opined that SHEARER was not acting discreetly. STEELE said that the media was "sniffing" around MANSIMOV.

Additionally, STEELE advised he believed it was doubtful that IVANKA TRUMP was collecting large amounts of money. STEELE was complementary of IVANKA TRUMP and considered her a good friend. STEELE further advised that his colleagues believed he was being naive about this, but he was surprised by the reporting on IVANKA. STEELE said he was skeptical about the IVANKA part of the reporting, but he could believe the rest of the report.

STEELE advised that there was a rumor that a video existed of President TRUMP "roughing up" his wife, MELANIA TRUMP, in an elevator. The rumor further insinuated that the Russians had purchased this tape.

STEELE said that another rumor had also surfaced that an unidentified American who had witnessed an argument about prostitutes at a hotel involved in the earlier-mentioned Miss Universe incident. The desk
clerks wanted the prostitutes to sign in because of health and safety reasons, but the women refused. STEELE advised that the press could be in touch with the American witness.

STEELE discussed in greater detail DMITRIY RYBOLOVLEV and the property sale in Sunny Isles, Florida. STEELE said that RYBOLOVLEV had a client relationship with a Mongolian female who had been educated at MGIMO. This female worked in the United States with a PR/GR [public relations /government relations] firm. STEELE met her approximately 6 years ago and they worked together. She was very close to SERGEY LAVROV and RYBOLOVLEV. This female spoke with RYBOLOVLEV about the sale of the Sunny Isles property and the TRUMP connection with the sale. RYBOLOVLEV told her that he did not know anything about TRUMP, but the female did not believe him. STEELE sent this information as a report to FUSION GPS, but STEELE was not sure if he passed it to DAVID KRAMER, which is why STEELE believes it was not published publicly. STEELE added that there was a new person working for RYBOLOVLEV until very recently. There was information about this individual in a LE MONDE article. This individual had been kicked out of Monaco and had been involved in bribing officials. STEELE said there was also current reporting involving art fraud -- specifically, paying too much for art, reporting it lost, and laundering money (NFI).

STEELE talked about his other, newly-up-and-coming main agent network and that network’s reporting on PAUL MANAFORT. ORBIS received reporting dated circa March-April 2017 regarding MANAFORT’s involvement in the plot to elbow out PETRO POROSHENKO. This reporting also talked about the Ukraine peace plan, provided by a pro-Russian deputy - the material that was provided to MICHAEL COHEN and MICHAEL FLYNN. ORBIS pitched the circa March-April 2017 report about MANAFORT to

STEELE said there are two memos regarding MANAFORT that were received by this newly-up-and-coming primary subsourse. This individual understands that two entities, including the FBI, have received a larger amount of information or a bigger memo on MANAFORT based on access to MANAFORT’s Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) file. The information in the FBI’s possession talks about how MANAFORT has always been a Russian agent, about how he’s always been with the FSB and how he’s been run by named Russian case officers. STEELE says that this information is written in an exaggerated way (NFI). ORBIS believes the SBU file on MANAFORT itself has been doctored. The source claimed to know that the file had been doctored. STEELE said that the file has been doctored because that way, Kyiv is able to justify why it had MANAFORT under investigation. STEELE commented that, in Ukraine and all over Europe, they feel pressure from the White House to be able to justify any investigations that have been done.
This information was collected recently - within the last few months - and was post-election. STEELE believes that the new agent network reporting has a mixture of truth and falsehood. The new primary subsourse has a good view into things and has reported on things with which he has directly been involved - in the actual room at the time. The new primary subsourse is good when being interviewed to state whether he thinks something is right or something sounds wrong. STEELE said that the source is critically assessing another memo regarding MANAFORT -- a memo which is approximately three paragraphs long. STEELE said that ORBIS is receiving more information about this next week. STEELE planned to sit down with his source soon to go over all of the information and the source's assessment of the bigger SBU memo (NFI). When the assessment is complete, STEELE advised he would like to share it with the FBI. STEELE described his source in Ukraine as "top-notch" and advised he has a significant, 3-4 year reporting record. STEELE advised that MANAFORT was still active in Ukraine after the 2017 US Presidential Inauguration.

STEELE has heard separately that two US agencies (NFI) were working together in Germany and that it involved the offer of tapes and other documents. STEELE advised that a Volga German by the name of BITNER (NFI) was an FSB agent under business cover. A US agency was involved in an exchange involving BITNER, but CIA Director MIKE POMPEO pulled the plug at the end of last year. It was unclear to STEELE if this Germany-related information was connected to the earlier-referenced SHEARER-MANSIMO information. STEELE also said that this was related to information in the "dark web" where, STEELE added, there has been talk that STEELE and the NSA are competing for the same materials (NFI). As with the MANSIMO information, the media is also "sniffing" around the Germany situation. It is not the same media outlets who are "sniffing" around both stories, however. STEELE said that the media was not asking questions per se, but facilitating (NFI).

STEELE discussed two significant robberies that occurred in villas in the south of France. A total of up to two billion dollars in cash had been stolen from Ukrainian oligarch PINCHUK. PINCHUK'S son-in-law had been using a villa. Part of the stolen money originated from a defrauding of Delta, a Ukrainian bank. PINCHUK'S son-in-law embezzled hundreds of millions of dollars from Delta. The Chechens (NFI) subsequently stole that money, which went back into Russia. STEELE noted that the Chechens are often used by the Russians for such activity. If true, STEELE opined, this whole situation could create a huge slush fund for Russia.

ORBIS has also been getting reporting regarding Russian influence in the French and German elections. Regarding the 2017 French election, STEELE
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said that things got perilously close to working for the Russians. STEELE said that it wasn’t just about LE PEN, but that there was only one candidate who wasn’t untainted by the Russians, and that was MACRON - the person who actually won. All three right-leaning candidates in France were held by the Russians. FILLON was compromised by Russia. One of the candidates was non-competitive. STEELE said the Russians attempted to change their support back to LE PEN at the end of the campaign period. STEELE advised that the Russians were now working on her niece.

Regarding the 2017 German election, STEELE said that the Russians were working on many influence campaigns, but had scaled back. The plan included propaganda about ANGELA MERKEL's health, but reportedly, MERKEL pushed back and spoke to PUTIN personally, warning him not to interfere with the election. PUTIN reportedly scaled back Russia's efforts.

STEELE advised that NIGEL FARAGE had been observed entering the Ecuadorian Embassy in London -- presumably to speak with JULIAN ASSANGE. STEELE believed that Russian funding had been funneled through the United Kingdom to promote Brexit. STEELE said that a young American -- possibly with the name of COTTRELL (NFI) -- had been caught laundering money. STEELE also said that EKATERINA PADERINA and her husband, AARON BANKS were two individuals involved in Russian influence and Brexit. FARAGE, TRUMP, and BANKS go back approximately four years. STEELE further advised that there was a Belize link with this, and that money was being laundered through Belize.

STEELE said that ORBIS was involved in some Kazakhstan-related and Cyprus-related business work, and some of the material from that work obviously falls within the bounds of the Special Counsel. STEELE was working on a Kazakh-related project involving an individual by the name of ABLYAZOV, embezzlement from BTA BANK, pyramid schemes, and connections to FELIX SATER and TRUMP SOHO. STEELE said that they want RICO up and running in the United States (NFI). STEELE brought along a Power Point presentation from the company ARCANUM explaining the SATER connection. STEELE provided a copy of this Power Point presentation to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (see attached). This information was slated to be provided to the US Department of Justice and the FBI as it involves a corrupt American official (NFI). SATER is also involved with the daughter of ABLYAZOV (NFI).

Regarding Cyprus, STEELE discussed a casino and golf complex. The GOLDEN LADY CONSORTIUM was attempting to put a casino in Cyprus circa 2015-2016. TRUMP, NAVIGANTE and SCENOPLUS (sp) were all involved, but the project failed. TRUMP tried to get a resort deal worth 450 million through RCB, a subsidiary of VNESHTORGANKBANK (VTB). The deal was submitted to regulators. STEELE said that there were some references to this deal in the Cypriot
STEELE was available for recontact, and advised that he wished to remain in contact with the FBI. Although STEELE believed the FBI owed money to STEELE and ORBIS for services and travel provided, STEELE believed it was more important that the United States government receive the information. STEELE was willing to provide the information to the FBI regardless of payment. STEELE advised that he would keep the same communication line open for future contact with [REDACTED], as necessary.