| 1 | IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CLARION COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA | | | | | | |
|----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
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| 3 | CONTONUES EN OF DEWNONTHS * | | | | | | |
| 4 | COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA * * CRIMINAL | | | | | | |
| 5 | vs. * * 86 CR 2016 | | | | | | |
| 6 | DAROLD WILLIAM PALMORE * * * * | | | | | | |
| 7 | | | | | | | |
| 8 | TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS had in open court in | | | | | | |
| 9 | the Clarion County Court House, Clarion, Pennsylvania, on | | | | | | |
| 10 | Tuesday, March 12, 2019, commencing at 3:18 p.m. before | | | | | | |
| 11 | the Honorable James G. Arner, President Judge of the Court | | | | | | |
| 12 | of Common Pleas of Clarion County of the Commonwealth of | | | | | | |
| 13 | Pennsylvania. | | | | | | |
| 14 | | | | | | | |
| 15 | | | | | | | |
| 16 | APPEARANCES: | | | | | | |
| 17 | DREW WELSH, Esquire | | | | | | |
| 18 | appeared on behalf of the Commonwealth | | | | | | |
| 19 | ERICH SPESSARD, Esquire appeared on behalf of the Defendant | | | | | | |
| 20 | | | | | | | |
| 21 | | | | | | | |
| 22 | Recorded by: Brittany Lynn Beaver | | | | | | |
| 23 | | | | | | | |
| 24 | BEAVER REPORTING 222 Main Street | | | | | | |
| 25 | Johnsonburg, Pa. 15845 (814) 594-5012 | | | | | | |

| 1 | | INDEX | OF | EXHIBIT | S | |
|----|-------------------------|-------|----|---------|-------------|----------|
| 2 | DESCRIPTION | | | | MARKED | ADMITTED |
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| 5 | 2. Document 3. Document | | | | 7 7 7 | 12 12 |
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THE COURT: We have scheduled a hearing or argument as the attorneys determine is appropriate in the Commonwealth vs. Palmore case on the defendant's motion to dismiss for due process violation.

Mr. Palmore is present with Attorney Erich

Spessard, and Assistant District Attorney Drew Welsh is
here for the Commonwealth.

So Mr. Spessard, you may proceed.

MR. SPESSARD: Thank you, Your Honor. With the Court's permission, I have consulted with Assistant District Attorney Welsh regarding the admission of some stipulations into evidence in order to make the Court aware of all factual circumstances in this matter.

So if I may, I will read off the stipulations at this time, and make sure that the Commonwealth is ready to consent.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. SPESSARD: No. 1, in late 2015, the entirety of the Clarion University surveillance footage was located at the public safety building of Clarion University. This same building contained the university police.

- No. 2, for all intensive purposes, public safety and university police are synonymous.
- No. 3, the report of the sexual assault in this matter was made on November 5, 2015, so that is the date

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of the actual report.
 1
 2
           THE COURT: November 5 of what year?
 3
           MR. SPESSARD:
                           2015.
           THE COURT: '15.
 4
                          This report date was less than 30
           MR. SPESSARD:
 5
    days from the date of the alleged incident.
 6
 7
           THE COURT:
                        Okay.
                          No. 4, Darold Palmore made a request
           MR. SPESSARD:
 8
    for surveillance footage within 60 days of the date of the
 9
    alleged incident.
10
                       Within 60 days?
11
           THE COURT:
           MR. SPESSARD:
12
                          Yes.
13
           THE COURT:
                      Okay.
           MR. SPESSARD: No. 5, Officer Shane White testified
14
    at trial in this matter that typical surveillance footage
15
    was kept for a period of 30 to 60 days.
16
17
           THE COURT: He testified at trial?
           MR. SPESSARD:
18
                           Yes.
19
           THE COURT: Footage was kept --
           MR. SPESSARD: For a period of 30 to 60 days.
20
21
           THE COURT: Okay.
                          I belive this is No. 6: Officer
           MR. SPESSARD:
22
    White made no effort to attempt to review the footage.
2.3
24
           THE COURT:
                       Okay.
           MR. SPESSARD: No. 7, as of 2015, the video footage
25
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at Clarion University was stored digitally and could have 1 2 been transferred in digital format to a storage device. 3 THE COURT: Could have been transferred how? MR. SPESSARD: In a digital format to a storage 4 5 device. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. SPESSARD: No. 8, neither the university conduct board nor any other Clarion University agency has 8 9 access to the surveillance footage. 10 THE COURT: Nor any other what? MR. SPESSARD: University agency. 11 12 THE COURT: Has access to surveillance footage. 13 MR. SPESSARD: Yes. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. SPESSARD: No. 9, in a case involving a sexual assault prosecuted in roughly the same time period, 16 17 Corporal White acquired video footage in that matter where 18 the victim indicated that she was an eyewitness to the 19 assault and where the victim also indicated that she 20 witnessed the defendant inside the residential hall. Ιt 21 indicated that she was an eyewitness and indicated the defendant was in the residence hall. 22 This is another incident? 23 THE COURT: 24 MR. SPESSARD: Yes. THE COURT: That is unrelated? 25

MR. SPESSARD: Yes. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. SPESSARD: That video footage involving this other incident contained the defendant entering a 4 residence hall and also entering an elevator. 5 As testimony at the time of trial, Officer White 6 7 indicated --. Is this No. 10? THE COURT: 8 9 MR. SPESSARD: Yes. 10 THE COURT: So what is ten? MR. SPESSARD: At the time of trial, Officer White 11 indicated he did not acquire video footage with respect to 12 this incident because the victim was an eyewitness and 13 identified the defendant inside the residence hall. 14 THE COURT: She was an eyewitness and what? 15 16 MR. SPESSARD: She was able to identify that the 17 defendant was inside the residence hall. 18 THE COURT: Okay. MR. SPESSARD: No. 11, we stipulated to the 19 authentication as admission of e-mails contained within 20 and previously marked Defense Exhibit Nos. 3 and 4. 21 THE COURT: From the trial? 22 These are extraneous e-mails. 23 MR. SPESSARD: No. 24 The details which will be provided. I think they are

involved in the e-mails themselves, the subject's

25

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contents.
 1
 2
           THE COURT: But my question relates to Exhibits 3
 3
    and 4.
           MR. SPESSARD: I am sorry. Soon to be admitted,
 4
 5
    not previously admitted.
           THE COURT: Not previously marked?
 6
 7
           MR. SPESSARD: Yes.
           THE COURT: You are marking them now.
 8
           (Documents are marked as Defense Exhibit Nos. 3 and
 9
10
    4.)
           And they will be admitted.
11
           MR. SPESSARD: Correct.
12
           MR. SPESSARD: And final stipulation to the
13
    authentication and admission of the letter sent from
14
    Clarion University to the defendant which we are marking
15
    as Exhibits 1 and 2.
16
           (Documents are marked as Defense Exhibit Nos. 1 and
17
    2.)
18
           THE COURT: Mr. Welsh, would you like to have that
19
20
    repeated?
           MR. WELSH: Yes. I would like -- on Stipulation
21
    No. 9, the stipulation was the victim indicated she was an
22
    eyewitness, and the second part indicated that the victim
23
    identified the defendant or indicated that the defendant
24
    was inside the residence hall?
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THE COURT: This is the other incident? 1 2 MR. WELSH: Yes. THE COURT: The victim said she was an eyewitness 3 to the assault and witnessed the defendant inside the 4 5 residence hall. MR. WELSH: Okay. THE COURT: That is what I wrote down. MR. SPESSARD: I mean, I think that is accurate. 8 9 THE COURT: Does that answer your question? 10 MR. WELSH: It does. I agree with every stipulation without amendment or 11 correction. 12 No. 9, related to the other case, I will stipulate 13 that is factually accurate; however, there are more 14 circumstances in that case that I'd either ask for him to 15 16 make the Court aware or make an argument based on if there is going to be a direct parallel shown between that case 17 18 and this case, which it is not an apples to apples 19 comparison in the two cases. 20 THE COURT: Okay. Do you have additional facts 21 that you want to add to the stipulation? MR. WELSH: I will offer some facts to the 22 23 stipulation. 24 The facts would be in that case, which is the Logan

Bernat Case, the Commonwealth verus Bernat Case.

25

video footage was obtained. I agree. 1 The victim indicated that she was an eyewitness. 2 Ι 3 agree. And she indicated that the defendant was inside the 4 residence hall. I agree. 5 I also offer a fact that there was a specific and 6 narrow timeframe for which to pull the video from. 7 would be one stipulation. THE COURT: A specific and narrow timeframe to 9 10 what? 11 MR. WELSH: From which to pull the video from -- or 12 the time of the incident was clearly defined. No. 2 --13 14 THE COURT: But specific and narrow timeframe of the incident? 15 16 MR. WELSH: Yes. 17 THE COURT: From which what did you say? 18 MR. WELSH: To retrieve the video. THE COURT: 19 Okay. No. 2, the victim in that case 20 MR. WELSH: immediately reported this assault to the police. 21 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 No. 3, at the time of the video's MR. WELSH: 24 retrieval, the suspect and, eventually, Defendant Logan 25 Bernat was unidentified by the victim.

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THE COURT: She didn't know who he was?
 1
           MR. WELSH: Correct. I will add to that in another
 2
 3
    note.
 4
           THE COURT:
                       Okay.
                      No. 4, the victim had met Mr. Bernat
 5
           MR. WELSH:
    that night, and Mr. Bernat provided her with a false name
 6
    and a false telephone number to contact him.
           THE COURT:
                       Okay.
                      No. 5, the university police had a pair
 9
           MR. WELSH:
10
    of tennis shoes as well as a Pittsburgh Pirates hat that
11
    was left behind at the scene to aid in identification.
           I think that would summarize that.
12
           THE COURT: Okay. Do you stipulate to those facts,
13
    Mr. Spessard?
14
           MR. SPESSARD: Can I just get No. 2 read back
15
16
    quickly.
                       I have the victim in the Barnet case
17
           THE COURT:
    immediately reported the assault to the police.
18
                       That is correct.
19
           MR. WELSH:
           MR. SPESSARD: We will stipulate, Your Honor.
2.0
           THE COURT: All right. So the 12 facts stated by
21
    Defense Counsel Spessard by way of a proposed stipulation
22
    are accepted and admitted by the Commonwealth, so those
23
    facts are in evidence.
24
25
           And the five facts offered by Mr. Welsh on behalf
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of the Commonwealth are stipulated to and agreed to by defense counsel.

So all of those facts are now part of the evidence as it relates to the defendant's motion to dismiss.

Okay. So what is next, Mr. Spessard?

MR. SPESSARD: Well, I think that would conclude formal evidence to present.

At this time, I'd move onto oral argument unless the Commonwealth has anything more to present.

MR. WELSH: I don't have any evidence to present.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. SPESSARD: I think the easiest way to handle oral argument would be to do a back and forth on each individual issue, so we don't have inundated with having to back bounce back and forth with argument if that is okay with the Commonwealth.

MR. WELSH: Works for me.

MR. SPESSARD: With respect to timing or questions of potential behavior or not, as indicated in my brief -- and certainly, the Court has read it, I don't want to rehash the entire brief -- my initial argument would be that this motion should not be classified as formal omnibus pretrial motion given its nature of requesting a dismissal of the case specifically on due process grounds, instead more into formal motion to dismiss under Rule 587.

Alternatively, if the Court does not feel it is more akin to that way, I think I would consider it more appropriate for an omnibus pretrial motion pursuant to Rule 579 as averred in the defendant's motion.

It is unclear how long prior counsel, Mr. Stiffler, had this information. As best as I can recall based on my notes, the existence of this e-mail, specifically Exhibit 4, we were not aware of until the notice of appeal had been filed or right around there giving no reason for Mr. Palmore or myself to litigate this motion given that this Court didn't have jurisdiction at that point to hear a matter with that.

So as that would fall under 579(a) as an exception to the Rule for Timeliness, I belive this motion is now properly before the Court.

And with respect to that issue, I would rest on the brief.

THE COURT: You offered these exhibits by way of the stipulation.

MR. SPESSARD: Correct.

THE COURT: So they are admitted. Thank you.

(Defense Exhibit Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 are admitted into evidence.)

THE COURT: Exhibit 4 is an e-mail from Officer
White to Tracy Park of the District Attorney's Office, and

so you are saying that is what you didn't have until after the appeal had already been filed.

MR. SPESSARD: Correct, Your Honor.

I should be more specific. I was unaware I had that until that point.

THE COURT: Unaware you had it?

MR. SPESSARD: Correct.

1.5

As stated in the original petition, this was found in, sort of, just a bulk stack of files with no indication from Mr. Stiffler or anything else that was contained in the file of its origin. I don't know how it got there, when it got there, or how long it had been there; but I found it at that point.

I consulted with the Commonwealth. To this day, we don't have a satisfactorily answer to why this wasn't divulged. There was no indication of any discovery or disclosure that delays this being provided.

THE COURT: Okay. On that issue, Mr. Welsh?

MR. WELSH: I don't have much on argument. As far as the timing goes given when -- because I did some research trying to find out how does the procedural clock work when you have something on remand from the Superior Court, and I didn't find anything satisfactorily to hang my hat on.

As far as when this e-mail in question came out, I

don't think anyone knows the specific answer to that, but it is only reasonable that it came out and that it was in discovery and was copied and provided to the defense. We certainly didn't provide any discovery after the conviction or prior to appeal or anything of that nature. I think it was just part of the file got copied, and it got sent as well.

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2.0

As far as the specific e-mail, we don't know, but we do know that Attorney Stiffler was aware of Mr. Palmore's request. He was copied on the original e-mail to Matthew Shaffer, which Corporal White was copied on as well. He was aware that this video wasn't provided at any sort of period of time, so he was certainly aware at that time.

It is not clear-cut factually, but I couldn't find anything to hang my hat on after something gets remanded.

THE COURT: Okay. We will move on to the next issue, Mr. Spessard.

MR. SPESSARD: Thank you, Your Honor.

The next issue would be for the purpose of organization. I will just call this Rule 573/Brady claim regarding discovery and providing evidence, things of that nature.

Essentially, our argument is that the Commonwealth either willfully or inadvertently lost or permitted the

destruction of evidence that Mr. Palmore was specifically seeking. As best as I can understand -- and I will confess that I am no expert -- the Brady Rule and progeny tend to essentially ask three main questions of any evidence that is presented in this situation: Is it favorable to the accused? Was it in some fashion suppressed? And did prejudice arise from that suppression?

1.3

That is it. There is no other question that needed to be asked. I anticipate the Commonwealth's argument will essentially be that this was a court case, so 573 does not apply. But 573 is a complication of our discovery rules where Brady is more of a federal protection of those rules or enforcement of these rules. They are related, but I don't think that being favorable to one does not necessarily mean you are favorable on the other.

So in terms of the first question of favorability, the evidence based on stipulation and within the exhibits clearly demonstrates that Mr. Palmore had an objectionably reasonable belief that the evidence was favorable. He had multiple exchanges with both Mr. Shaffer in e-mail form. There is an indication where there is a phone call between them based on the contents in Exhibit 3. His entire desire was to get this footage. And I would submit that

the only reason that he would have been so adamant about acquiring this footage was given his favorability.

The second main question would be: Was it suppressed? I'd submit, Your Honor, that given two main points: One, in Exhibit No. 4, Mr. White makes the specific statement referring to Palmore, quote, "He will get nothing from me," end quote.

I would suggest that is tantamount to a specific mission that he is not going to be providing this evidence. It is specifically an admission of suppression. Even if that is not, the Commonwealth, the timing of this incident is that the reports proceed November 5; and by that point, they were still within 30 to 60 day range referred to in stipulation.

As the Commonwealth will inevitably point out, Mr. Palmore, at this point, is not formerly charged with anything.

On November 6 as Exhibit No. 1 indicates, Palmore receives the first indication regarding the university conduct board of an ongoing investigation. This is then updated on November 26 where more information about the investigation and the specific allegations in it are revealed to Mr. Palmore.

This then leads to Exhibit No. 3 where Mr. Palmore makes the formal request for the evidence.

To put this another way, the Commonwealth -specifically, it's agent, Officer White, was aware of
specific allegations as November 5 given his experience
was also aware of the existence of video footage that
could have been accessed. He makes no effort to review
it. But then the charges are not formerly filed until
December 11.

THE COURT: That is the date the charges were filed?

MR. SPESSARD: Correct. December 11 according to the complaint.

So by this time as of December 11, we are past 30 days. We can't say for sure if the footage still exists, but because of Mr. White's delay in filing the charges if we assume the Commonwealth's argument is that this is not a formal court case, that Mr. Palmore had no ability to request this evidence because there were no charges. The Commonwealth only formerly charges him after 30 days anyway. In fact, if it is December 11, we are already closing in on potentially the 60-day mark. Before the Commonwealth even makes -- to put another way -- grants the ability of Mr. Palmore to request the footage that he had been asking for.

Nonetheless given his e-mail in Exhibit 3, the Commonwealth, through it's agent, is put on notice that

this evidence, not only exists, but that it is being specially requested by the defendant.

From there, we know that Exhibit 4 indicates that the Commonwealth, through the district attorney's office, was specifically and unequivocally informed that the defendant also requested this information. So now we have the Commonwealth's agent and the Commonwealth as an entity both had been informed of the defendant's request of this information. And it is not preserved. There is no indication that this footage is ever sought out.

THE COURT: So Exhibit 4 is an e-mail from Mr. Palmore to Matthew Shaffer and then an e-mail from Corporal White to Tracy Park. Both of them are dated December 3.

MR. SPESSARD: Right.

And that it appears that the e-mail from Palmore to Shaffer was forwarded to Tracy Park with the first line says, "Can you let Drew know?", something like that.

So I'd argue no effort at this point is ever made to check to see if this footage even exists. I argue that is clear evidence of suppression, whether willfully or inadvertently.

That brings us to the last element here which is prejudice is, Mr. Palmore suffered prejudice due to the loss of this information.

In reviewing the case law in this question, it ultimately is whether or not the evidence within the material, specifically the material in the effect of: Is there reasonable probability for alternating the outcome?

I would submit, Your Honor, Mr. Palmore attempted to, through his defense, provide an alibi that he was not present at the scene at the time. Things were said to have occurred. And had he had access to this evidence and been able to present it, he would have been able to make this claim. Assuming it was available to him, it would have essentially made this claim irrefutable.

Lastly, on this point, I anticipate that the Commonwealth would say that in Mr. Palmore's e-mail from Exhibit 3, Mr. Palmore gives an incorrect date for the alleged incident. I believe he refers to October 6 to the 8 for video footage.

In terms of that, I'd argue that is not favorable to his argument based on Exhibit 2 specifically indicating to Mr. Palmore that the -- I think it is a misstatement here -- but Exhibit 2 indicates that the date of the offense seems to be in that timeframe.

Secondly, even with Mr. Palmore's incorrect date, I think it hardly can be argued that the Commonwealth is still on notice that he is specifically requesting video footage that would assist in his defense whether it be at

the university conduct board hearing or in the case of a criminal trial.

1.2

So the intent, I believe, was manifested through that e-mail regardless of whether the date was correct or incorrect. To hold it against Mr. Palmore that he didn't know the exact date before charges had been filed, before a preliminary hearing, and before pretrial discovery had been completed, it would basically be putting the burden of foresight on him and making a request for evidence, which, of course, he couldn't have had.

So with respect to a Brady violation in Rule 573, I'd argue that the three main elements: The capability, suppression, and prejudice have been met; and therefore, Mr. Palmore was entitled to relief as provided for, I believe, it is 573 (e).

And I'll rest on my brief with respect to that argument, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Welsh?

MR. WELSH: All right. Looking at -- I think

Attorney Spessard points out there is a difference between
a Rule 573 discovery claim and Brady issues. The Brady
issues -- as I addressed in my brief -- Rule 573 relates
specifically to a criminal case.

At the time of this request, a criminal case had not been initiated against Mr. Palmore, so I think that

the Court can very easily swipe this aside in that it doesn't fall within 573.

Attorney Spessard's outlining the three areas.

Predominantly, I'd focus on whether or not the evidence is

exculpatory and whether or not there is any prejudice.

The question then comes to Brady. I agree with

There is a lot of information that we don't have here to determine whether this is exculpatory, not what is certainty that whether this would be exculpatory.

Attorney Spessard was correct that I based a lot of evidence on Mr. Palmore making a specific request. That request was the video footage from October 6 at 12:00 a.m. until October 9 at 12:00 a.m. Even if this video footage had been preserved in that date range and been provided to Mr. Palmore, that would have meant nothing. It had no relevance with what the ultimate issue would have been at trial because the date range, according to the testimony at trial and according to the criminal complaint, was a week after that. So whether or not Mr. Palmore was ever in the lobby of that dorm hall during those dates was completely irrelevant. It would not have been exculpatory for anything.

Secondly, we have a stipulation in evidence whether there is video surveillance of the lobby and looking into the elevator as was pertained in the Bernat case. We do

not have any evidence that says that is the only way to get into the dorms. We do not have evidence that says there are other entrances which are not covered by video surveillance, whether or not there is surveillance in the stairways, whether or not there is surveillance in the hallways of the dormitories, none of that would show that.

2.1

2.4

Even if you were saying that Corporal White or the district attorney's office should have known that Mr. Palmore wanted a different date range than what he asked for, even had they given him that, that would have been exculpatory.

Attorney Stiffler, at the time of trial, was kind of blunt to the prejudice and exculpatory area and cross-examined Corporal White about the video. He cross-examined Corporal White saying that he would have gotten the video, and he didn't get the video. Corporal White admitted to that.

Attorney Stiffler, as part of his case in defense, already pointed to the fact that there was no supporting video evidence which was used. Attorney Stiffler cross-examined Corporal White further regarding swipe cards for access, and other things that could have been attained but was not acknowledged.

When we are looking at whether or not there was prejudice here, there is just one prejudice mainly because

of the date range that he asked for a specific date range, and I am not sure which -- I think it is marked as Exhibit No. 2 which is the revised letter from November 23.

MR. SPESSARD: That is two.

2.4

MR. WELSH: Now the wording on that is vague.

No. 1 is where Attorney Spessard is talking about -- it talks about the claim in this case which would be Kaitlin Housler (spelled phonetically), who was the alleged victim in this case, and it says October 6 is the date range.

It goes on to say, Sexual harassment asking her to provide you oral sex when you confronted her outside of the area of Regal Commons.

That is, according to all testimony that there was at the preliminary hearing and the investigation, that was in that October 6 to 8 date range. That is when that would have happened.

It goes on to say, You later contacted her and requested her to come to your room. She alleged that you put your hand down her pants, touching her vagina. It goes on to say that constitutes sexual assault and sexual harassment.

There wasn't reference even in that paragraph to a later date when the indecent assault would have happened. So we just don't have that solid evidence to say this was

exculpatory evidence or this definitely would have been exculpatory evidence especially with the date range provided or that it provided some sort of prejudice in this case. For that reason, he doesn't meet the Brady requirements.

And I won't comment on the suppression. Attorney

Spessard says it was either intentional or unintentional.

The fact is that the video wasn't preserved. I don't

dispute that. I don't think that -- the motivation behind

that -- I don't think there is sufficient evidence on that

to be indicative one way or the other.

THE COURT: Okay. Is there another issue?

MR. SPESSARD: Well, I have a quick response.

THE COURT: Okay.

2.0

MR. SPESSARD: Just regarding whether it is exculpatory or not. I don't belive the rule requires that it is favorability or its ability to execute the defendant is limited to pure unadulterated -- requiring dismissal. I'd argue that as long as it corroborates the defense being offered that is favorability, so I don't think it is a requirement that it is perfect evidence. That is all I have for that.

But my final issue would be due process generally. Under the 14th Amendment, the requirement here is essentially the defendant has to show that there was

potentially exculpatory evidence, and that evidence was lost through bad faith of the Commonwealth.

Again a lot of --

2.2

THE COURT: I am sorry. Is this the next issue?

MR. SPESSARD: Yes. I am sorry. Due process under the 14th Amendment.

THE COURT: Okay. So bad faith.

MR. SPESSARD: Bad faith and that the footage was potentially exculpatory.

There is another way to analyze it, but I'd have to see. The evidence is only potentially exculpatory. I'd have to see the specifics of the footage.

I don't believe the Commonwealth can reasonably contend that the evidence wasn't potentially exculpatory. Given Mr. Palmore's request before, after it, and based on that it would provide corroboration for a defense, and I think that is fair and material for being presented corroboration.

Further, that evidence was not in any way able to be duplicated. As compelling as video evidence would have been regarding whether Mr. Palmore entered or did not enter a residence hall would have been the most compelling evidence particularly when it comes to the alibi defense.

That would just leave the main question of bad faith. I'd argue that Exhibit 4 is a smoking gun. The

specific phrase, "He will not get nothing from me," is I think it can't be more clear. The Commonwealth's agent, through university police, specifically was not going to review the footage, was not going to provide it, was not going to store it any meaningful way that Mr. Palmore was going to get access to it.

Given such, I would argue clearly demonstrative bad faith. There has to be a due process violation here.

Mr. Palmore was providing a defense with one arm behind his back because of the actions of the Commonwealth after it was utterly clear that they had a duty to at least look into this.

I think that the case that is most closely associated or most closely aligns with this would be Zara Goza-Moreira, and the specific citation would be 780 Federal 3rd 971 (2015). In that case, the defendant was accused of attempting to smuggle drugs into the United States at a customs check point and was stopped by the police.

The defendant gets interviewed by homeland security officials indicating that she was under duress, and she was acted in a manner to be noticed by security officials. The security officials are aware that this is her defense essentially, and yet, there was video footage available that the homeland security was aware of. A request was

made to preserve it prior to the video being deleted, a motion to compel discovery later was filed in order to direct that be turned over. And the footage had already been lost.

2.3

In that case, I assume the Court of Appeals -- yes. In that case, the Court of Appeals found that given the conduct of the defendant at the time of her initial interview based on what the homeland security knew, based on her conduct, based on her request from her defense counsel, the Government in that case had a burden to not only preserve the evidence, but I mean to verify it and to make sure it was still there to require exculpatory evidence.

Because they failed to follow through in that conduct, it was most assuredly a due process violation under the 14th Amendment and requirements on the case. I'd argue that the circumstances here are certainly similar to such a degree that, while Zara's case is precedent, I think it is extremely persuasive.

And otherwise, I'd rest on the brief with respect to the due process.

THE COURT: Was there a question in that federal case about whether the video evidence was exculpatory or not?

MR. SPESSARD: It was determined to be potentially

exculpatory in that matter because no one knew what the specific footage showed, but given the defendant's defense from that point, essentially from the investigation, was, I was trying to be obvious. I was trying to let you guys know something was wrong. That was the -- that is the way the Court of Appeals indicated, You are on notice now. This is related to that her actions were trying to -- I guess -- were objective evidence regarding her being under duress is, kind of, how they viewed it.

The rule was potentially exculpatory because we didn't know the specifics of it, and they didn't know it. Given what the defense offered in defense and what the measures that not only -- no. Given the measures that defense counsel took in order to get that footage, essentially the government was on notice at that point, and it would have to be considered as potentially exculpatory.

THE COURT: How are you distinguishing your Brady argument from this last due process? Why are they different issues?

MR. SPESSARD: So Brady is more of a question of discovery and fair play in providing it in evidence. The due process is really towards the destruction of evidence and the ability to present the evidence at the trial. I think there are some there, but I think the analogies are

technically different. The Brady violation isn't technically required that day, whereas the due process violation does. And there is a couple other obvious differences between them. That is the main thing. They have to be separated, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: And getting back to Rule 573/Brady issue, you heard Mr. Welsh say 573 doesn't apply because the criminal case had not been initiated. So are you still making an argument that 573 does apply or no?

MR. SPESSARD: I think it has to just given the nature that Brady is the Commonwealth equivalent of what 573 purports to be codified for. If 573 is our written down rules to follow and Brady happened to be the federal equivalent of common law, I think they kind of have to be viewed together in that a Brady violation requires as afforded to 573.

To answer more specifically, I guess I'd have to see that Rule 573 does require a court case in that respect given that both of the issues involve the turning over of evidence. They seem to be intermingled in that way.

The specific answer -- I have no specific way to refute that part of the Commonwealth's argument that 573 doesn't apply. I think that these two sections work closely, or I should say Brady and 573 are so close that

they should be used as --

THE COURT: But 573 as it relates to the Commonwealth's mandatory disclosure or production really requires that the Commonwealth have possession or access to that information at the time of the request.

MR. SPESSARD: Correct. These are all examples that require the Commonwealth's evidence within the files of the Commonwealth's agents for which the Commonwealth is aware of must also be preserved, which is why the Exhibit 4 is so important because that demonstrates bad faith.

But with respect to 573, it demonstrates knowledge on the part of the district attorney's office being aware that this evidence could and does exist within the direct control of the university police, and they are the only ones with access to it.

am dealing with and I guess right from the start of this consideration of this motion was when an individual such as Mr. Palmore makes a request that I guess indirectly is to law enforcement for potentially relevant evidence in a criminal case before the case is filed and before he has an attorney and before the district attorney is involved to the extent of at least filing criminal cases, is the Commonwealth bound by a pre-criminal charge filing or request by an individual? Is that the equivalent of the

defense counsel asking the Commonwealth's counsel after charges have been filed for discovery?

There seems to me there needs to be a distinction. If some individual asks, you know, campus police or security for information before charges are filed, how is that binding on the Commonwealth by way of being able to enforce Rule 573?

MR. SPESSARD: Well, I think that the main issue is that point. We look at it in reverse. How would a defendant ever get exculpatory evidence if there is never a court case filed? In any instance, the police could delay filing long enough until evidence was inadvertently lost.

Then files charges, and the Commonwealth, who had no idea, says, "We have complied with all of our rules."

Meanwhile, the defendant only now gets to assert any rights and says, "I want that evidence."

The Commonwealth says, "We don't have it."

And the police say, "Sorry. It was lost, and you didn't have a right to ask for it," or, "We lost it."

THE COURT: It seems to me you are asserting sort of the evidence argument that we see on the civil side.

That is if the same principle applies in a criminal case.

Okay.

Mr. Welsh, what do you say about due process?

MR. WELSH: What is the page number on the case that you cited? That wasn't in your brief.

MR. SPESSARD: I am sorry.

THE COURT: 971.

MR. SPESSARD: 971.

MR. WELSH: I don't think it was in the brief, so I haven't read it to review it.

I think the due process issue is very much the same as the Brady issue. If you have a police agency that is delaying filing things until things are unintentionally destroyed, that is not an unintentional act.

That could be potentially a due process violation if a delay is purposely done to destroy evidence. There is no evidence that that happened here. That was the reason that things were filed when they were.

e-mail from Corporal White to Tracy Park is a smoking gun. He indicates that, "He will get nothing from me," to refer to Mr. Palmore. If you read the e-mail, he is indicating Mr. Shaffer will not get anything. And I don't have that exhibit directly in front of me.

I think it is an, I told Matt, Matt Shaffer, he will get nothing from me. I guess you could interpret it either way, but the request was to Matt Shaffer.

Also, there was no evidence that Corporal White at

that time to say that was bad faith for him to say, even if we assume that he was saying Mr. Palmore will get nothing from me, there is no evidence, one, that Corporal White had any obligation in preparation for a university conduct board hearing to provide Mr. Palmore with the video or anything of that nature. I think that even Corporal White indicates that his understanding is he provides the report, and they don't provide anything else.

Two, there is no evidence here to say that in any course that anyone has to have access to that video. That any citizen -- any student can ask the university for a copy of a video at any point, and they give that to them. There is no evidence. That is not an obligation.

So if you are looking at bad faith, saying that the corporal had bad faith in this case, you have to have some sort of obligation that Corporal White was obliged to give him this video in preparation and that he intentionally refuted that obligation. He chose that he wasn't going to comply with anything that was supposed to be done for the purpose of violating an obligation, which he had none.

And finally, with the Zara Case, we are looking at a specific timeframe to point to and look at. Here is a person that you can look at, here is a video, which is not what we have here. Again, we have a different timeframe that is asked for the video.

Attorney Spessard makes the argument that the Commonwealth can't possibly argue that this is not exculpatory because Mr. Palmore wanted that video so much it had to be exculpatory.

You are creating a strong man there, but there is also an equally likely scenario that if you go under the hypothesis that Mr. Palmore is guilty and that he knows when he would have assaulted somebody and he knows that it wasn't October 6 through 9, he would have thought: I got one over on the police. They think I did it this week. I did it this other week. I'll get the video for the week that I know I didn't do anything, and that is going to look great for me.

He asks for that week. That week had nothing to do with what was also the dates of the incident. Even if it was preserved, it made no difference whatsoever.

THE COURT: Any other issues?

MR. SPESSARD: No other issues, Your Honor.

I'd have to concede that there was no obligation to provide the footage. That is a separate question from the preservation of it.

Corporal White was on notice as of December 3 that this was intentionally important to the defendant that this video footage was important for his university conduct board hearing.

Yes, I'll concede that Mr. Palmore didn't know that there a criminal case being filed because how could he?

But Mr. White did, who sent the e-mail to the

Commonwealth, so Mr. White, Corporal White, was clearly aware of what the intentions were regarding the case.

Otherwise, there be no need to send an e-mail to the

Commonwealth or to the district attorney's office.

That all I have.

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MR. WELSH: Can I respond to the response?

We are looking at a situation -- you say there is an obligation for -- if a police officer at the university who knows that there could be potential for video as there are cameras throughout the campus, in any criminal case if the police don't preserve the video in that case, regardless of a request because any police officer is going to know that there could be video evidence somewhere, if they don't preserve that, that is always a due process violation.

Every case can go through and be dismissed because that is putting an obligation on the police to preserve any sort of evidence that could potentially be out there, even if there is no showing exculpatory.

You can expand that: The Court was saying you are putting an obligation on the police to essentially do more than they are necessarily required to do. They have to do

extra steps in an investigation; and if they don't do these extra steps of the investigation, then it is a due process violation. Then, charges are going to be dismissed.

That is why we have a trial. That is why we have a jury. The police didn't do X, Y, and Z; it is pointed out all of the time.

MR. SPESSARD: But the requirement is bad faith.

That is the initial requirement of why that issue comes up. That comes up here because Mr. Palmore did make that request and because it is not in any way honored to provide the preservation.

THE COURT: I think an element of bad faith in this situation would be that Mr. Palmore was entitled to the information, and I think that is your argument, in part anyway. At that stage of the proceedings with the university, he can't demonstrate that he was entitled to it.

MR. WELSH: Correct.

THE COURT: So how could that be bad faith if they didn't give it to him?

MR. WELSH: Right.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I certainly will consider the stipulations and the arguments and the briefs and the evidence, and do my very best to get you my

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    decision as soon as I can.
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            MR. WELSH: Thank you, Your Honor.
            MR. SPESSARD: Thank you, Your Honor.
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            THE COURT: Thank you.
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            Court is adjourned.
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            (The proceedings were concluded at 4:19 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE OF COURT RECORDER I hereby certify that the proceedings, evidence and rulings of the Court are contained fully and accurately, to the best of my ability, in the recording and notes taken by me on the hearing of the above petition and that it is a correct transcript of the same. ttany Lynn Beaver Court Recorder & Notary Public DATE: 05/08/2019