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15	INTERVIEW OF AMBASS	SADOR GEOFFREY R. PYATT
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1PROCEEDINGS2MR. FOLIO: Good morning, everyone. Good evening,3Ambassador Pyatt. This is a transcribed interview of4Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt being conducted by the Senate5Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and6the Senate Committee on Finance. This interview was7requested by Chairman Ron Johnson and Chairman Charles8Grassley as part of the Committees' investigation of whether9there were any actual or apparent conflicts of interest or10any other wrongdoing with regard to the Obama11administration's Ukraine policy or Burisma Holdings as well12as related matters.

On April 30, 2020, Chairmen Grassley and Johnson requested Ambassador Pyatt's appearance for a voluntary transcribed interview.

16 Ambassador Pyatt, can you please state your full name 17 for the record?

18 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Geoffrey Pyatt.

MR. FOLIO: Again, good evening, Ambassador Pyatt. My name is Joseph Folio, and I'm Chief Counsel with the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee staff. I am now going to ask the folks around the virtual room to introduce themselves, and I'll start with the remainder of Chairman Johnson's staff.

25 MR. DOWNEY: Good evening, Ambassador Pyatt. My name

1 is Brian Downey. I am a Senior Investigator with Chairman
2 Johnson's office.

MR. WITTMANN: Hello, Ambassador Pyatt. My name is
Scott Wittmann. I'm also with Chairman Johnson's office.
MR. SACRIPANTI: Hi, Ambassador. This is Will
Sacripanti, also with Chairman Johnson's office.
MR. FOLIO: Thank you all. And now I'll ask
representatives from Chairman Grassley's staff to introduce
themselves.

MR. FLYNN-BROWN: Hello, Ambassador Pyatt. My name is Josh Flynn-Brown. I'm Deputy Chief Investigative Counsel with Chairman Grassley. Today I am joined with my colleague Quinton Brady. Thank you for your time.

MR. FOLIO: Thank you all. Will Ranking Member Peters' 15 staff please introduce themselves?

MR. SCHRAM: Good afternoon, Ambassador. My name is NR. SCHRAM: Good afternoon, Ambassador. My name is Zack Schram. I'm Chief Counsel with Ranking Member Peters. Hank you for your participation in today's interview. The minority's participation today is not an endorsement of the investigation.

Based in part on the public statements of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the statement of the Department of Treasury announcing sanctions of Russialinked election interference actors, Ranking Member Peters remains alarmed that this investigation amplifies an active 1 Russian disinformation campaign and is intended to interfere

2 in our 2020 Presidential election 42 days from today.

3 We are conducting this interview remotely because we 4 are in the midst of a pandemic that has created an 5 extraordinary public health crisis in the United States. 6 Since this investigation started, 200,000 Americans have 7 died of COVID.

8 The Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 9 Committee has jurisdiction over pandemic preparedness and 10 response, and yet this Committee has now spent more than 11 twice as much time on the record in this investigation than 12 it has devoted to all of its COVID hearings combined.

Ranking Member Peters believes that this investigation Ranking Member Peters believes that does not advance the is a misuse of Committee resources that does not advance the health, safety, or economic security of Americans consistent with our Committee's mission. Minority staff have a right and responsibility to be here, and we will do our best to ensure that you are treated fairly, that the record is accurate and complete, and that the national security interest of the United States is protected.

I am joined by my colleagues Soumya Dayananda, Roy
Awabdeh, and Yelena Tsilker.

23 MR. FOLIO: And just a brief response to Mr. Schram's 24 opening statement, just to note that the claims that the 25 investigation is based on a Russian disinformation campaign 1 are not grounded in fact. The investigation is based on 2 collecting and reviewing U.S. Government records and 3 speaking with current and former U.S. Government officials 4 like Ambassador Pyatt [inaudible] , and part of the 5 Committee's core jurisdiction is to explore conflicts of 6 interest and understand what effect, if any, that has on 7 U.S. policy.

8 With regard to COVID, we've held a half dozen or so 9 hearings, and aside from the public-facing work, the 10 Committee staff, several dozen of which continue to work 11 tirelessly in the background to track these important issues 12 for the American people.

13 I'm going to ask Ranking Member Wyden's staff to 14 introduce themselves.

MR. GOSHORN: Good evening, Ambassador Pyatt. My name is Dan Goshorn. I'm Senior Investigative Counsel to Senator Wyden on the Finance Committee staff. I'm joined by my colleagues Dave Berick, our Chief Investigator, as well as Josh Heath and Michael Osborn-Grosso, who are Investigators on our staff. Our staff associates itself with the comments made by Zack Schram on the HSGAC minority, and we thank you for your time today.

23 MR. FOLIO: Thank you. And for the record, the State 24 Department participants on the phone please introduce 25 themselves. MR. KILLION: You have Bill Killion with Legislative
 Affairs and Ken Thomas with the Office of the Legal Advisor.
 MR. FOLIO: Thank you.

Ambassador Pyatt, I will now explain how the interview will proceed. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to any of the Committees' investigative activities, including transcribed interviews.

8 The way questioning will proceed is that we will 9 alternate between the majority and minority staff for 1 hour 10 each turn. The majority staff will begin and proceed for an 11 hour, and the minority staff will then have an hour to ask 12 questions. Then we will rotate back and forth until there 13 are no more questions and the interview will be over. And 14 we are going to endeavor to be very focused and respectful 15 of your time. We appreciate all of the other many important 16 issues that you must deal with as Ambassador to Greece.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yeah, thank you. I appreciate that. Nou'll see if you look on your news tickers, there's a new announcement from Turkey tonight that's blown up several weeks of U.S.-Greece diplomacy as well. So there's a lot going on out here. So if we can do this quickly, I'll be grateful, and it'll make the country safer.

23 MR. FOLIO: Understood. Thank you.

One other thing for the record. I just wanted to note that our colleague Lydia Westlake is also joining the 1 interview as well for Chairman Johnson's staff.

2 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Great. Hello, Lydia. It's been a 3 while.

4 MS. WESTLAKE: Good morning, Ambassador, or good 5 afternoon.

6 MR. FOLIO: All right, Ambassador Pyatt. So during the 7 interview, again, we will do our best to limit the number of 8 people who are directing questions at you during any given 9 hour. That said, from time to time a follow-up or 10 clarifying question may be helpful. And if that's so, you 11 may be hearing from additional folks around the virtual 12 table. Because it is virtual, I will ask everyone to please 13 speak slowly, give others time to answer, and try not to 14 talk over one another.

The court reporter is going to create a verbatim record of what we discuss today. With that in mind, Ambassador Pyatt, it's important that you respond to questions verbally because the reporter cannot properly record nonverbal responses or gestures. Do you understand this?

20 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes.

21 MR. FOLIO: We encourage the witnesses that appear 22 before the Committees to freely consult with counsel. Do 23 you have counsel present with you today?

24 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes, I do.

25 MR. FOLIO: And for the record, counsel, can you please

1 state your name?

2 MS. JEFFRESS: Yes, thank you. Amy Jeffress from 3 Arnold & Porter, and I'm joined by my colleagues Sam Witten 4 and Tian Tian Xin.

5 MR. FOLIO: Good morning, Amy, Sam, and Tian Tian.
6 MS. JEFFRESS: Thank you.

7 MR. FOLIO: Ambassador Pyatt, we want you to answer our 8 questions in the most complete and truthful manner possible, 9 so we are going to take our time. If you have any questions 10 or do not understand what we ask, just let us know, and we 11 will do our best to clarify or, if necessary, repeat.

12 This interview is unclassified, so if a question calls 13 for any information that you know to be classified, please 14 state that for the record as well as the basis for the 15 classification. And then once you've done that, we will ask 16 you to respond with as much unclassified information as 17 possible. And if we need to have a classified session 18 later, that can be arranged.

19 It's also the Committees' practice to honor valid 20 common law privilege claims as an accommodation to a witness 21 or party when those claims are made in good faith and 22 accompanied by a sufficient explanation so the Committees 23 can evaluate the claim. When deciding whether to honor the 24 privilege, the Committee will weigh its need for the 25 information against any legitimate basis for withholding it. 1 This interview is occurring without prejudice to any 2 future discussions with the Committees, and we reserve the 3 right to request your participation in future interviews or 4 to compel testimony.

Ambassador Pyatt, if you need to take a break, please let us know. We ordinarily will take a break in between the 1-hour questioning sessions. But if you need to take a break for any reason, let us know, and we will try to accommodate you.

10 Ambassador Pyatt, you're required to answer questions 11 before Congress truthfully. Do you understand this? 12 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes.

MR. FOLIO: This also applies to questions posed by MR. FOLIO: This also applies to questions posed by congressional staff. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. Section 1001 makes it a crime to make any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation in the course of a congressional investigation, and this statute applies to our interview here today. Do you understand that?

19 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes.

20 MR. FOLIO: Is there any reason that you are unable to 21 provide truthful answers to today's questions?

22 AMBASSADOR PYATT: No.

23 MR. FOLIO: Finally, we ask that you do not speak about 24 what we discuss in this interview with anyone else who is 25 outside the room in order to protect and preserve the 1 integrity of our investigation, and for that same reason, we 2 also ask that you not remove exhibits or share those with 3 others. Do you understand and agree?

4 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yep. As long as everybody sticks to 5 the same terms, I'm fine with that.

6 MR. FOLIO: All right. If there are no more questions, 7 before we begin we will start with the majority's 1 hour of 8 questioning, and I will turn the lead over to--

9 MS. JEFFRESS: Joe?

10 MR. FOLIO: Yes, sorry, Amy. Go ahead.

MS. JEFFRESS: Just to amplify on Ambassador Pyatt's response there, we understand your desire to keep this interview confidential, and we would respect that. But if anyone mischaracterizes Ambassador Pyatt's testimony and we feel the need to correct that, then we will no longer feel bound by confidentiality because someone else will have preached it, and we hope you understand.

MR. FOLIO: We do, Amy. Thank you for clarifying. And 19 as I think we've explained, we'll give you an opportunity to 20 review the transcript as well, but understand those unique 21 circumstances you're describing.

22 MR. SCHRAM: Joe, just to add, Ambassador Pyatt, the 23 Committee passed a motion to release the transcripts in full 24 with appropriate redactions for national security concerns 25 at the same time that the Committee's report is released. So I just want you to be aware that the Committee has
 expressed its intention to release the transcripts publicly.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yeah, thanks. I would just ask that A I have the opportunity to review the transcript for correctness, as I did when I was debriefed by the SSCI a couple of years ago on similar topics.

7 MR. FOLIO: Yes, you will.

8 All right. Now I'll turn the questioning over to 9 another member of Chairman Johnson's staff. Thank you.

MR. DOWNEY: Hi, Ambassador Pyatt. Thank you for your time today and your service to the country.

We're going to get started off here. Did you serve as Ambassador to Ukraine from July 2013 to August of 2016? AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes.

MR. DOWNEY: As U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, who did you 16 report to?

17 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I reported to the President through18 the Assistant Secretary of State and the Secretary.

MR. DOWNEY: And who were the Assistant Secretary of State and the Secretary of State at the time that you were Ambassador to Ukraine?

22 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Victoria Nuland was the Assistant 23 Secretary, and John Kerry was the Secretary.

24 MR. DOWNEY: Who were your main Deputies at Embassy 25 Kyiv? 1 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I had a series of Deputies. My 2 first was Bruce Donahue. He sadly passed away while I was 3 posted in Ukraine from a health problem. I had a series of 4 interim Deputies thereafter, and then George Kent finally 5 arrived as the full-time Deputy, if I'm remembering 6 correctly, sometime in 2016. He did a couple of temporary 7 stints. I had a series of temporary Deputies after Bruce, 8 who was forced to depart post for medical treatment.

9 MR. DOWNEY: What role did Vice President Joe Biden 10 play in articulating and implementing U.S.-Ukraine policy 11 while you were U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: He was one of--the Vice President was the leading voice for the administration's policy as part of a large interagency team that helped to mobilize the U.S. Government in response to Vladimir Putin's unprovoked invasion and occupation of Ukraine, the first time that that had happened in the history of the post-World War II security order in Europe. But it was a whole-of-Government effort, and I had the opportunity and the privilege to work with President Obama; with the Vice President; with the National Security Adviser; with Avril Haines, the Deputy; with Tony Blinken, Deputy Secretary of State; Victoria; with almost every Assistant Secretary of State who had any involvement with Ukraine. Our INL program was quite large. Senator Johnson, we had a robust foreign assistance program.
 So it was a very large enterprise that I eventually came to
 lead.

MR. DOWNEY: So how did Vice President Biden's leading 4 5 role on U.S.-Ukraine policy, how did that work with the role 6 of Secretary of State John Kerry during that time period? 7 AMBASSADOR PYATT: So we were part of a large 8 interagency enterprise. Most U.S. foreign policy is driven 9 at the embassy level by the country team, so I had my 10 Deputy, my State Department colleagues, my CIA, FBI, 11 Department of Justice, USAID. It's one of the things that 12 makes the U.S. Government's presence overseas so effective 13 and so unique, and we all worked back through our 14 interagency counterparts up to and including the Cabinet 15 officers. I can't remember how many Deputies Committee 16 meetings, Principals Committee meetings I was involved with 17 over the course of my 3 years there. There were a lot. 18 I particularly remember the day that President 19 Yanukovych fled the country because we had two Deputies 20 Committees meetings, a double header. My first was probably 21 around 8 o'clock in the morning Washington time, and the 22 last one was well after midnight Kyiv time. So there was a 23 lot of interagency process. The Vice President was a very 24 important voice in that process, but he was just one part of 25 a large interagency policy.

1 MR. DOWNEY: So now we're going to go into the U.S. 2 loan guarantees to Ukraine, and we understand that there 3 were three \$1 billion loan guarantee agreements between the 4 United States and Ukraine during the period of 2014 to 2016. 5 Ambassador Pyatt, what role did you play in setting and 6 monitoring conditions for U.S. loan guarantees to Ukraine? 7 AMBASSADOR PYATT: So let me back up and do a little 8 bit of big picture because I think it's important to 9 understand those loan guarantees in context.

There were three big lines of effort that characterized 10 11 U.S. policy towards Ukraine after the Russian invasion that 12 I talked about earlier. The first and most important was 13 the kinetic one, to help the Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian 14 armed forces resist a brutal invasion of their sovereign 15 country by Vladimir Putin and the Russian military. At the 16 peak of the fighting, which was the winter of 2014, spring 17 of 2015, a little bit in the summer of 2014, we estimated 18 there were nearly 10,000 regular Russian soldiers in 19 Ukraine. Some of Russia's most advanced weapons systems 20 like the Smerch and the Buk missile which shot down an 21 airplane full of European and American citizens. So our 22 first line of effort was to prevent what I clearly saw as 23 Vladimir Putin's effort to dismember that country, to do a 24 full Yuqoslavia, and I was really privileged in that period 25 that a lot of the Senate senior leadership agreed with me on

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1 this, members like Senator McCain, Senator Corker, Senator
2 Johnson, Senator Portman. And it was a whole-of-Government
3 effort involving all the power that the United States can
4 bring to bear, including our military; our security
5 assistance, which was critically important, because nobody
6 else was able to do it; and the intelligence support that we
7 were able to provide.

8 The second line of effort was the economic one because 9 when the corrupt President, Yanukovych, fled the country in 10 February of 2014, he left behind an empty treasury with very 11 large debts to the international financial institutions. 12 There was a real risk of the economy bleeding out, and the 13 loan guarantees that you referred to were part of the U.S. 14 response to that threat, coordinated jointly with the 15 international financial institutions. We worked closely 16 with the IMF, with the World Bank, but also with the 17 Europeans who carried their share of the burden.

And then the third line of effort related to why the revolution happened in the first place. The revolution against President Yanukovych was driven not by the United States or the CIA, as Vladimir Putin would have us believe, but it was driven by the desire of the Ukrainian people to live in a normal European society. Their deep disappointment at the profound corruption that President Yanukovych had allowed to flourish under his rule, corruption that went back to really the Soviet Union and the
 way the Soviet Union ran things, but against which the
 Ukrainian state had made very little progress in the first
 decades of that country's independence.

5 So the loan guarantees from the beginning were targeted 6 on those second two lines of effort: first, to provide 7 critical support to Ukraine so that Putin was not able to 8 achieve through economic coercion what he failed to achieve through military coercion; and, second--and this was 9 10 reflected in the loan guarantee condition precedents, which 11 we developed across the interagency community, which were 12 notified to Congress because it involved congressional 13 appropriations and which were the subject of constant back-14 and-forth with Washington, but also with our congressional 15 appropriators, those conditions precedent were targeted on 16 trying to support that process of reform. So everything 17 from changes to the energy sector, which had been one of the 18 real epicenters of Russian malign influence in Ukraine, as 19 it is in much of Europe, where Russia continues to use even 20 today energy as a political tool to exert influence, 21 something I know Senator Johnson cares about a lot because 22 he and I talked about it over 7 years now. So energy sector 23 reform, fiscal reform to rebalance the economy, 24 privatization, and progress on anticorruption.

25 The Ukrainians called their revolution the Revolution

1 of Dignity, and what meant was their desire to live with 2 dignity and to live in a normal society with rule of law, 3 with freedom of speech, with the accountability of their 4 rulers. So the conditions precedent in each of those 5 instances in those three loan guarantees, which, as far as I 6 know, have been fully repaid to the U.S. Government, but the 7 conditions precedent were all shaped to support those two 8 big lines of effort that I just described to you.

9 MR. DOWNEY: Understood. So the third \$1 billion loan 10 guarantee to Ukraine, we understand it was signed on June 3, 11 2016, and then entered into force September 27, 2016. Does 12 that sound accurate?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: It sounds about right. I was confirmed at the beginning of July. I was actually in Washington, D.C., for this job through a chunk of June, but this was obviously all unfolding at about the same time. So If I think your chronology is roughly accurate. There would have been a signing ceremony which was done by me and the yukrainian Prime Minister, the USAID Mission Director, and USAID plays a huge role on all of these issues because they have the technical and financial expertise. So you'd have to consult with them on the exact moment.

23 MR. DOWNEY: So a condition for the third U.S. loan 24 guarantee was the removal of Ukraine's prosecutor general, 25 Viktor Shokin. Ambassador Pyatt, when did the U.S. 1 government decide to condition a third loan guarantee on the 2 dismissal of then Prosecutor General Shokin?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: So I don't actually recall the exact date or even the exact month. What I can tell you is that there was a gradual evolution in the thinking of the interagency community about these issues.

7 As I said, probably the most remarkable of many 8 remarkable days that I had in Ukraine was the first Sunday 9 after Yanukovych fled the country. He fled Kyiv on a 10 Saturday--Friday night, Saturday morning with his gold bars 11 and helicopter and everything else.

I went downtown. We were focused--that first Saturday was largely focused on the security mission and efforts now, which is my first responsibility.

But that Sunday, I went down to see the acting President at that point, who was the Speaker of Parliament, Mr. Turchinov. And what I will always remember was driving up towards the Parliament, which I had done many times before at that point, and eventually, my Cadillac couldn't get through the crowds anymore because there were so many people with strollers and parents and flowers, and they were all walking to Parliament. And it was an incredibly moving occasion. It was basically the Ukrainians reclaiming their democracy, and it was really telling to me that in the face of the departure of this tyrant--and they weren't pulling 1 down statues. They weren't--they weren't breaking into 2 offices. They were walking to the Parliament with their 3 kids and, as I said, with flowers and candles.

And I think it was an incredibly powerful moment. I remember in the days thereafter talking with my ambassadorial colleagues from other countries, and I work very closely with the EU ambassador, the Germany ambassador, the British, the French. We all were saying to yourself, "Wow. This is really amazing, and maybe this time is really going to be different. Maybe Ukraine is really going to live up to the aspirations of its people to move towards a more European future."

13 This is a big country. It's 45 million people. So it 14 will have--it's going to have a decisive impact on the 15 future of Europe and European security.

16 That, of course, is exactly why Vladimir Putin found it 17 to be such a threat. That's why he invaded a few weeks 18 later, because he thought he could get away with it.

19 MR. DOWNEY: So, Ambassador Pyatt-

AMBASSADOR PYATT: No, let me finish on this, please. And so we were very focused from the beginning on how to live up to those aspirations of the Ukrainian people, how to help the Ukrainian people build the rule of law society that they wanted. That was one of our very early priorities. So we were really pleased. I had terrific support from the Department of Justice. I had a very good Department of Justice regional legal advisor. I also had terrific support from State INL. So the State Department's INL Bureau provided funding for a major police reform program all about what had happened in Georgia, where basically they reinvented the police, but also for advice to the prosecutor general's office.

8 The prosecutor general, you have to understand in 9 Ukraine, it's not like the United States. It's an office 10 that combines extraordinary powers. So it's sort of a 11 combination of the U.S. Attorney, the Department of Justice, 12 and a judge. So there's an incredible concentration of 13 power, and this office had been used in the past in post-14 Soviet societies, including Ukraine, to pursue politically 15 motivated prosecutions.

16 So, for instance, Yulia Tymoshenko, whose case I know 17 Senator Johnson was very familiar with because we worked on 18 it, he asked me about it in my confirmation. Yulia 19 Tymoshenko was a victim of what we called "politically 20 motivated prosecution," driven by the prosecutor general's 21 office.

22 So we began working on these anticorruption issues 23 almost from the days of--the first days of the new 24 government. USAID had programs working with civil society 25 organizations in Ukraine who were key partners of the United 1 States, and we had our advisors inside the prosecutor
2 general's office, who were there to, at the beginning, we
3 hoped, build a new institution.

By 2014--or excuse me--2015, it was clear that those sapirations were not being fulfilled, and that a lot of the bad behaviors that we had seen under President Yanukovych were replicating themselves under the new government.

8 So that's sort of how we came to these issues, and you 9 have to understand that we had a broad anticorruption agenda 10 that followed multiple lines of effort, all of which, 11 however, were aimed at empowering the Ukrainian people and 12 giving them the kind of society they wanted.

13 I'm obviously boring you with this.

MR. DOWNEY: No. There's people in the room, and there's a lot of computers that are on the virtual table. Go I don't want to interrupt you by cross-talk.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: But it's really important to 18 understand the context of where this all came from and what 19 were [inaudible].

20 MR. SCHRAM: [Inaudible].

21 MR. DOWNEY: No, we understand. We just want to be 22 appreciative of your time, Ambassador.

23 Zack, I think you were not muted.

24 MR. SCHRAM: Apologies.

25 MR. DOWNEY: Okay. So, Ambassador Pyatt, based on

4 communicated to the government of Ukraine?

5 AMBASSADOR PYATT: So I would disagree with the premise 6 of your question. It wasn't Vice President Biden who 7 conditioned the assistance. It was the--our interagency 8 policy. It was a policy that was developed based on the 9 data that my embassy was reporting from our contacts in 10 Ukraine civil society, data that the intelligence community 11 was reporting based on their sources, and particularly 12 important, the advice and data that was provided by the U.S. 13 Department of Justice and our experts who were inside the 14 prosecutor general's office.

And that's the important thing to understand. We have a very high level of visibility into this institution because of the technical assistance that we were provided. So it was a U.S. government policy, which was amply debated in many DCs and PCs. I can't tell you now when that was decided, but I'm quite confident that the documentary record fully reflects exactly how that unfolded. And I'm also quite confident that it was briefed to Congress at the time.

24 MR. DOWNEY: So did you speak with individuals at the 25 National Security Council about developing this condition, 1 including Charlie Kupchan, Elisabeth Zentos, and Eric
2 Ciaramella?

3 AMBASSADOR PYATT: You know, I don't remember, five 4 years now, who exactly I discussed it with.

5 What I can tell you is that it was a--it was definitely 6 a topic of various interagency discussions and the way these 7 processes worked in the Obama administration, which is very 8 similar to what I worked with here in the Trump 9 administration is you have a layered process. So, 10 typically, a policy initiative like what I'm doing right 11 now, my Greece-Turkey work. The day-to-day worker-bee 12 engagement happens at the level of the sub-IPC, and that 13 would include people like NSC directors, like Eric 14 Ciaramella, and dozens of other people across the 15 government.

16 Then you have the IPC process, which is typically 17 chaired at the level of an NSC senior director and special 18 assistant to the President, so somebody like Charlie Kupchan 19 in the context that you're referring to, and then finally at 20 the deputies and at the principals level.

21 So these things, it's an iterative process. Generally, 22 certainly in the Obama administration, my experience was 23 there were more of these meetings, not less, and they all 24 had summaries of conclusions, and all of those would 25 document the evolution of the policy.

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1 What I will tell you is at the beginning, it was not 2 our expectation that Shokin's removal would be necessary to 3 achieve our policy goals. I had--and again, this would be 4 reflected in classified embassy cables and classified 5 instructions which I received, with talking points that I 6 used with President Poroshenko, with Mr. Shokin, with other 7 senior Ukrainian officials, as we sought to help the 8 Ukrainian government and in particular President Poroshenko 9 who had been elected as a reformer with support of all of 10 those people who are out putting flowers in front of 11 Parliament after Yanukovych left.

12 So we were working with him and the expectation that he 13 too was trying to figure out how to navigate around the 14 legacy of corruption that he had inherited.

I sometimes--I gave speeches where I talked about old Ukraine and new Ukraine, and I still think that's a very useful framework to understand what we were doing in those days. You had the old forces, the energy oligarchs, the political parties, the media outlets they owned, and then you had new Ukraine, which were a lot of young people, people who were new to politics, the people who were out on the Maidan who wanted to build a modern European state. MR. DOWNEY: So was this condition for the \$1 billion developed and communicated to Vice President Joe Biden in 1 December of 2015?

2 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I don't remember when the Vice 3 President would have weighed in on this.

In that process that I talked about--you know, typically, sometimes there would be a principals meeting, and it was not--it was not unprecedented for the Vice President to participate in a principals meeting. And I can remember those meetings, and I would remember Susan Rice as the chair, as National Security Advisor, saying, "You know, I think we need to have the guys go back and work on this some more." So then they would send it back down to the IPC level or the DC level.

I believe you've spoken to Tony Blinken. Tony, of course, was the Deputy Secretary of State in those days. MR. DOWNEY: No, we haven't spoken to Mr. Blinken yet. AMBASSADOR PYATT: Okay. So as the Deputy Secretary or State, he played--the deputies--the deputies are where the magic happens in the U.S. interagency process. The sweat and tears happen at the sub-IPC level. The consensus emerges at the deputies level, and the principals, they're all busy people. They're Cabinet officers. Their job is to bless the policy and make sure that those are the President's objectives.

24 MR. DOWNEY: So did you communicate this Shokin 25 condition for the third loan guarantee to Vice President 1 Biden?

2 AMBASSADOR PYATT: No. I cannot--no. I mean, I think 3 you--again, you misunderstood my presentation.

I would have gotten an instruction. I would have gotten the instruction which says we, the interagency, have decided that the loan guarantee condition for the third loan guarantee will include--and that would be something--and there would always be an anticorruption condition, but eventually, that condition evolves towards "President Poroshenko, you need to have Shokin removed."

I would have then received that instruction, and I would have communicated that instruction to President Poroshenko. I would have communicated it to people around President Poroshenko, including his chief of staff and national security advisor, both of whom were almost daily interlocutors. And all of that would be-[inaudible] classified State Department [inaudible].

MR. DOWNEY: So following up on what you just said, Ambassador, do you know when specifically you communicated this third loan condition to President Poroshenko and his staff?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: I do not. It would have been in roughly that period you described, and obviously, I didn't--I didn't get through to him or he didn't act on it. And seventually, we used the visit of Vice President Biden in 1 December, I believe, as an opportunity to really drive home 2 that point. The Vice President, Secretary of State Kerry 3 was involved in this effort. This was a whole-of-government 4 effort, and it reflected the best advice that we across the 5 administration gave to him.

Again, you know, it's important to understand I have a very--I've been an ambassador for seven years now. I've survived a long time under Republican and Democratic administrations, and as an ambassador, you develop a very good sense of what your role is. And my role is to represent the President and the people of the United States as best as I can.

I will occasionally provide my advice, but policy comes from Washington, and I've been part of that process as a PDAS. I was three years as the PDAS for South and Central Asia working on Afghanistan, working on India. So I have a good sense of how the interagency process works on the Washington side as well and have appropriate sense of humility about where I--what my role is.

I'm at the pointy end of U.S. diplomacy effort, but I'm 21 not the guy throwing the spear.

22 MR. DOWNEY: So you mentioned Vice President Joe 23 Biden's trip to Ukraine in December of 2015, and I believe 24 the Vice President gave a speech to Ukraine's Rada--25 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Right.

MR. DOWNEY: -- during that trip. Can you walk us 2 through that trip that the Vice President had in Ukraine in 3 December 2015 and whether you were in the room when Vice 4 President Biden allegedly gave his threat to President

5 Poroshenko about the third loan guarantee and the firing of 6 Viktor Shokin?

1

7 AMBASSADOR PYATT: You know, that's five years ago. I 8 honestly can't remember the specifics. I'm sure I was in 9 the room. I was fortunate to have a relationship of trust 10 and confidence with Vice President Biden. I saw him 11 consistently advance the policy interests of the United 12 States of America.

I can tell you if I was in the meeting, I would have 13 14 been there as a notetaker, and my reporting message from the 15 meeting would have been put into the appropriate channels. 16 And it's available somewhere.

MR. DOWNEY: So to be clear, Ambassador Pyatt, during 17 18 the December 2015 trip by Vice President Biden to Kyiv, do 19 you recall the Vice President threatening to withhold aid 20 unless Viktor Shokin was removed?

21 AMBASSADOR PYATT: You know, again, I do not remember--22 and I don't want to misinform the committee--in terms of 23 when precisely that condition was communicated. It would 24 have been recorded in the paper trial. There were many--25 Vice President Biden, as we now know, thanks to the Russian

government, had many phone calls with President Poroshenko,
 and these issues would have been dealt with there as well.

3 We also had other visitors who were part of the 4 interagency team working on these issues, and they would 5 have communicated very similar messages.

6 I had a couple of visits from Jack Lew, the Secretary 7 of Treasury, and anticorruption was on the agenda very time 8 he came. I had visits from Deputy Secretary Blinken, and he 9 talked about anticorruption. Assistant Secretary Nuland was 10 a very frequent visitor. She always raised these issues. 11 She also always met with Ukrainian civil society to 12 understand what their perspectives were, with the Ukrainian 13 opposition parties to understand what the impediments were. 14 MR. DOWNEY: So that's why we appreciate your time 15 today, Ambassador, because if there is documents or paper 16 that exists, those have not been provided to Chairman 17 Johnson or Chairman Grassley at this point.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Anybody who has worked with me in the State Department will tell you that I am a studious cable drafter. I'm a great believer in the historical record, and I--

22 MR. DOWNEY: You and George--you and George Kent take a 23 lot of notes, it seems.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: I write more cables. George writes 25 more emails. I'm a believer in cables. I think cables--the 1 discipline of a cable distributed across the U.S. government
2 is what helps make our policy process smarter, and it's also
3 what the historians use to understand what was happening.
4 And I fully recognize that I served as Ambassador of
5 Ukraine. So I'm very--and I want the historians to get at
6 that.

7 MR. DOWNEY: So was Viktor Shokin removed by the Rada 8 in December 2015?

9 AMBASSADOR PYATT: You'll have to tell me. I don't 10 remember the exact date. I think you may have it a little 11 bit early, but you'll know better than me. That was 5 years 12 ago.

MR. DOWNEY: Okay. I'm going to turn some questions 14 over to my colleague, Scott Wittmann, for a minute.

15 Thank you, sir.

16 MR. WITTMANN: Hi, Ambassador. Can you hear me?17 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yep.

MR. WITTMANN: Thank you for your time today, sir. Just a few clarifying questions regarding your recollection of the meeting that you said you attended with Vice President Biden and President Poroshenko in December 2015. Vice President Biden has said, at a, I guess, Q&A in January 23 2018, in front of the--at the Council on Foreign Relations, he described an interaction he had with President Poroshenko, and he said, and I'll just quote it here, the 1 transcript, Vice President Biden said, "I said I'm telling 2 you you're not getting the billion dollars. I said you're 3 not getting the billion. I'm going to be leaving here in, I 4 think it was about six hours. I looked at them and said, 5 I'm leaving in six hours. If the Prosecutor is not fired 6 you're not getting money. Well, son of a [expletive 7 deleted], he got fired, and they put in place someone who 8 was solid at the time."

Ambassador, is this--did this--is this your 9 10 recollection of what occurred in the meeting that you 11 attended with the Vice President and President Poroshenko? AMBASSADOR PYATT: Again, I, you know, I was privileged 12 13 to be part of a lot of meetings with President Poroshenko 14 and Vice President Biden. I listened in on a lot of phone 15 calls. The anecdote that Vice President Biden told in those 16 remarks is certainly consistent with the leading role that 17 he played in conveying the U.S. Government interagency 18 position that we had concluded that Mr. Shokin, despite many 19 changes and best efforts, including support from U.S. 20 Department of Justice technical advisors, had become an 21 insurmountable obstacle to building a less corrupt Ukrainian 22 political system.

And, therefore, it was in the best interests of our And, therefore, it was in the best interests of our shared agenda to build a modern European and function become to see Mr. Shokin removed. And there was nobody who 1 was more effective at that than Vice President Biden,
2 because he did so with the credibility of the President of
3 the United States, and he also did so with the credibility
4 earned as somebody who clearly demonstrated throughout this
5 crisis, and through his phone calls with President
6 Yanukovych before the revolution, that he cared about
7 Ukraine's future and he recognized the importance of
8 Ukraine's future to the political future of our Euro9 Atlantic community.

MR. WITTMANN: Understood. I think right now we're just trying to understand when this threat occurred, and based on your recollection, since you were in the room, whether your recollection lines--aligns with what Vice President Biden told the public in January 2018. So I just want to go back and just sort of pin down the extent to which you recall whether or not the Vice President specifically said, "I'm going to be leaving in six hours. If the Prosecutor is not fired, you're not getting the money." Is that your recollection?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: I was--I'm not--I can't go there because I simply don't know. I can't remember. It was five years ago. As I said, I consistently--I saw, over three years, Vice President Biden consistently act just like Senator McCain acted and Senator Portman and Chairman Corker and Senator Johnson acted, in the interest of the United States, in the furtherance of the bipartisan policy that saw
 corruption as top priority.

I will assure you that that meeting that Vice President had during his December visit was not the first time that we had aired that U.S. policy position. That policy position had been conveyed earlier, in various channels, in various ways. I am also confident, knowing Vice President Biden's skill as a politician, that he did a better job than the rest of us in focusing President Poroshenko on the urgency of the issue.

11 You know, the precise words, I'm sorry, I just--I 12 simply cannot tell you what happened in a conversation five 13 years ago.

MR. WITTMANN: Was there ever an instance that you recall where Vice President Biden conveyed this condition to President Poroshenko, and within six hours of conveying this condition Viktor Shokin was fired?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Again, you've got--you have a better ocommand of the tick-tock than I can have here, four years after I ceased being U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine. I literally, you know, if I had the cables, if I had my calendars--I don't have access to my calendar from those days. We have to--all of that gets retired as a presidential record.

25 So I can't confirm or deny or corroborate or not

1 corroborate the tick-tock that you're describing, but I'm
2 confident, again, that it's reflected in the documentary
3 record.

4 MR. WITTMANN: Would it be unusual if this type of 5 threat was made with, you know, some sort of time commitment 6 of six hours, and then for that condition to be met within 7 that period of time, six hours?

8 AMBASSADOR PYATT: You know, there was a lot about 9 Ukraine that was unusual. The stakes were very high. The 10 level of U.S. commitment was very high. This was \$100 11 million of U.S. taxpayer money, and all of us treated it 12 very, very seriously.

It would certainly not be--on a whole variety of issues 13 14 that I worked on in Ukraine, whether anticorruption or the 15 Minsk agreements, and the whole question of negotiations 16 with Putin, there were a lot of high-drama moments. Those 17 continued right up until my very last day in Ukraine. 18 Literally, my very last day before I got on the airplane I 19 came into the office in the morning and I had an email from 20 Avril Haines on a totally separate issue than this, which 21 told me that I had a message that I needed to get to 22 President Poroshenko right there, that day. That's the 23 nature of the crisis diplomacy that we were engaged in, and important my office, the office of the American Ambassador, 24 25 and U.S. policy was to saving that country from the

1 concerted effort that Putin was making to dismember it. 2 MR. WITTMANN: Understood. So just so I understand, 3 sir, based on your testimony it sounds like the condition to 4 remove Shokin had been conveyed to Ukrainian officials prior 5 to December 2015, and then it was reiterated by Vice 6 President Biden in December 2015, on this trip. Is that 7 accurate? AMBASSADOR PYATT: That would be my recollection. 8 9 MR. WITTMANN: Okay. I appreciate that. I'd like to enter into the record our first exhibit, 10 11 which will be Tab 16, Will, please. 12 [Pyatt Exhibit No. 1 was 13 marked for identification.] 14 MR. WITTMANN: Ambassador, I don't know if you have 15 these papers in front of you but it should appear on your 16 screen as well. And these are Bates numbers ending in 83--17 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yeah, you can take it down. I just 18 got this one so I printed it out. MR. WITTMANN: -- to 94. Okay, great. So as you can 19 20 see, Ambassador, this is--21 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Can we make that go away so I can 22 see you guys again? 23 MR. WITTMANN: Sure. Yeah, go ahead, Will. 24 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Thanks. 25 MR. WITTMANN: Okay. And as I'm sure you can see,

Ambassador, these are what looks like talking points for
 Vice President Biden for his upcoming meetings in Ukraine in
 December 2015. The dates on the talking points are November
 22, 2015. So obviously there is time between when these
 talking points are dated and then the actual date of the
 trip.

7 So what we are trying to understand, with your help, 8 sir, is to what extent these talking points were changed, if 9 they were, and the extent to which these talking points 10 correspond to your recollection of the meeting the Vice 11 President had with President Poroshenko.

12 The first page I want to draw your attention to is 13 page--the Bates number ending in 86. And just let me know 14 when you're ready, sir.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Sorry. Just give me some words and 16 I'll find it quicker that way.

17 MR. WITTMANN: Sure. At the top of it, it says--

18 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I've got 86 here. I've got it.

MR. WITTMANN: Okay. Great. At the very top paragraph, sir, the second sentence, it begins with, "You will sign on our third billion-dollar loan guarantee and publicly announced FY15 U.S. assistance for the first time," and then it continues.

24 So the question is, as part of these talking points, 25 was State Department advising the Vice President at this 1 point that he was, in fact, going to sign the third billion-2 dollar loan guarantee?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: So I can't help you on that. If you look on the clearance page you will see that I actually didn't see these documents until you guys sent them to me. MR. WITTMANN: Okay.

7 AMBASSADOR PYATT: And that would be exactly the same 8 way if I was hosting Vice President Pence here, or Secretary 9 Pompeo, who--news flash--I will have with me in just a 10 couple of days. I would typically not see these materials. I would say, just to understand how this process works, 11 12 and in terms of how the drafting process works, first of 13 all, as you know, in a visit like this, the briefing 14 materials are often prepared weeks in advance, because they 15 have to go through a long clearance process. Also, these 16 were prepared as sensitive but unclassified points so that 17 they could be carried by people in their briefcases and 18 whatnot. And some of the topics that we would have been 19 dealing with, at these two meetings in particular, the Prime 20 Minister and the President, would be classified. And so 21 those couldn't be conveyed here.

You know, typically what also happens--and I remember, for instance, if you look at my bio you will see long ago I worked for Deputy Secretary of State, and part of my job when I was on the Deputy Secretary of State's staff was to 1 take briefing memos like this, which would be laboriously 2 assembled by the building, and then write a little 3x5 card 3 on top of it, "Dear Mr. Deputy Secretary of State, here are 4 three points you really need to make." Because very few 5 U.S. principals will pull out these talking points and start 6 reading them. The principal is going to want it boiled down 7 to the essence.

8 These three big messages are certainly consistent with 9 what I recall as our three priorities at the time, one being 10 reform and political unity, and the government was 11 struggling with political unity at that moment. The other 12 was the question of our ongoing assistance, in which 13 Congress played such a critical role. And then the third is 14 the thing I talked about earlier, which was our diplomacy 15 with the Germans and Europeans on the question of 16 negotiations with Putin, and whether Putin was going to be 17 able to get at the negotiation table when he couldn't get on 18 the ballot there.

19 So those are certainly consistent, but it would never 20 be my experience that a principal at the level of a Cabinet 21 officer or the Vice President or the President would take a 22 State Department product like this and sort of use that as 23 their script.

24 MR. WITTMANN: Understood. So I want to go to the next 25 page, Bates 87, and draw your attention to, sir, the second 1 bullet point under number 2, U.S. Support. It states, "I
2 will sign a billion-dollar loan guarantee with you today."
3 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Right.

4 MR. WITTMANN: Was it the State Department's plan or 5 expectation that Vice President Biden was going to Ukraine 6 in December 2015 to sign the third billion-dollar loan 7 guarantee?

8 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yeah, again I would go back to my 9 point to your colleague about my role at the pointy end of 10 diplomacy. So there's a huge amount of churn that goes on 11 behind me, or behind an Ambassador, or behind an Embassy, to 12 develop U.S. policy. So I can't tell you when and how that 13 shift happened. Certainly, you know, I would have written, 14 and the Embassy would have sent to the Vice President a 15 scene-setter cable, which was a "Dear Mr. Vice President, we 16 look forward to welcoming you again to Ukraine on December 17 blah. You know, from where I sit these are the top 18 priorities." Likewise, I would have met the Vice President 19 at the airport and as soon as he landed given him my best 20 sense of what the landscape was and what he was walking 21 into.

But I simply--I'm not in a position to tell you, and even if you had gotten me five years I wouldn't have been able to be in a position to tell you when that change happened, because that would have come out of the Washington 1 interagency process that we talked about earlier.

2 MR. WITTMANN: And for something as significant as 3 this, as signing the third billion-dollar loan guarantee, 4 obviously these talking points are dated November 22, 2015. 5 the trip is just a couple of weeks away. For something as 6 significant as signing the loan guarantee, would those 7 decisions be made in only a couple weeks' time and perhaps 8 changed within that period of time?

9 AMBASSADOR PYATT: That would be perfectly normal. 10 It's the character of U.S. Government policymaking. And, 11 you know, there's both the challenge--and again, I will go 12 back to my PGAS role. I was working on South Asia issues. 13 You know, this is written by a desk officer. This is 14 somebody who is 16 levels removed from the Vice President 15 from a policymaking process. And she or he are trying to do 16 their best job of distilling the policy direction that comes 17 from the DC, PC, IPC process I talked about, clearing it 18 with all the other offices that you see listed here, 19 including F, which are the resource people, who are the 20 worst ones to get clearance from in our building.

21 So this is an imperfect art, and what it ultimately 22 comes down to is the principal's decision, and, you know, in 23 this case how the Vice President based--and there would 24 typically, before a big trip like this, a day or two before 25 he got on the airplane there would have been a deputies' or 1 a principals' level discussion. I would imagine, based on 2 my conversations with him that the Vice President also would 3 have a discussion with the President, and saying, "Hey, 4 boss, this is what I'm doing," and, you know, take it from 5 there.

6 So again, this was a normal interagency process, 7 completely consistent with everything I've done in the U.S. 8 Government for the past 31 years, and certainly consistent 9 with my experience in the Trump administration, and the way 10 I get my instructions in my current role. And as I alluded 11 to, it's not public yet but I'll have Secretary Pompeo here 12 on Sunday, and I can guarantee you that there are memos like 13 this that are also working their way through the building. 14 I can also guarantee you that other than a phone call with 15 me last week, Secretary Pompeo probably hasn't thought a 16 whole lot about this yet.

And then, by the way, then he will get on the airplane, and he will sit down with his briefing book and his closest advisors, and he will say, "Okay, guys, we're going to Greece. What are we trying to do?" That's the question-when I was working on the NSC staff and traveling on the plane, that's the question you have to be ready to answer. But that's not going to happen three weeks before because of some piece of paper drafted at the desk level.

25 MR. WITTMANN: I'm going to turn it back over to my

1 colleague, Mr. Downey.

2 MR. DOWNEY: Ambassador Pyatt, just to round out our 3 questions regarding Vice President Joe Biden's visit to 4 Ukraine in December of 2015 and the alleged threat that Vice 5 President Biden gave to Poroshenko, after the trip 6 concluded, did you hear from President Poroshenko or anyone 7 in the Ukrainian government about that threat? Wouldn't 8 they talk to you, to the U.S. Ambassador, about the threat 9 the Vice President allegedly delivered?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: So, again, this was--I simply can't recall the tick-tock of when these different discussions that were happening. I can guarantee you that they are reflected in U.S. government embassy telegrams and all of which would have been classified.

I can also tell you that I had a number of very emotional conversations personally with President Poroshenko on this issue focused on--and not just about Mr. Shokin, also focused on other individuals who we believe were associated with bad activities around the President's office.

There was another member of Parliament who was very close to President Poroshenko, a guy named Martynenko. I remember getting a screaming phone call from one of the President's senior staff, President Poroshenko's senior staff, complaining that I had--that I had--they pointed remarks about his activities and that it had gotten back to
 President Poroshenko.

3 So this was a long running theme. It was not about one 4 visit. It was about a longstanding U.S. policy priority, 5 which evolved over a period of time, and at which multiple 6 U.S. principals took a cut at the problem. But no principal 7 was more effective in doing so than Vice President Biden.

8 MR. DOWNEY: Okay. We're going to move forward in the 9 timeline here to January of 2016, Ambassador, and in January 10 of 2016, the Ukrainian delegation visited the United States, 11 which included a number of senior-level prosecutors. Do you 12 have any recollection of that delegation going over in 13 January 2016?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: I had no recollection of it until you guys sent me the documents, but again, I want you guys to understand what I was doing in Ukraine. I was fighting a war against Vladimir Putin. We were trying to save the scountry. Our anticorruption effort was one strand of a multifaceted effort.

I was fortunate we had a fantastic level of congressional support. I had close to 100 congressional visitors over two and a half years. So there was a lot of stuff going on, and as I remember--I'm looking for the documents now, but as I remember these particular visitors, they weren't terribly senior. And they would be the sort of Ukrainians that were traveling back and forth to Washington,
 D.C., pretty much every week. So it would not be unusual at
 all that my staff wouldn't be bothering me with this, and
 the machine would just be grinding on.

5 MR. DOWNEY: Okay. So on January 19th, 2016, this 6 Ukrainian delegation visited the White House and met with 7 members of the National Security Council.

8 We're going to have this as Exhibit 2, Will, which is 9 Tab 7. This is a National Archives document, Bates numbered 10 1823.

11 [Pyatt Exhibit No. 2 marked 12 for identification.]

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Can you flash it up? It's a lot 4 easier for me to find it, what I'm sort of looking for. Can 5 you scroll it up? It's empty.

16 Okay. Is this the one you guys sent yesterday?17 MR. DOWNEY: I believe so. Yes, sir.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Okay. I don't have a secretary to 19 help me here or anything. So let me just go through my 20 stuff here. I'm sure--I know I've got it.

21 Yeah, okay. It's a Liz Zentos email. Got it. You can 22 take it away.

23 MR. DOWNEY: So on January 21st, 2016, two days after 24 the Ukrainian delegation met with members of the National 25 Security Council, you sent to Elisabeth Zentos, Eric Ciaramello, and Anna Makanju, an excerpt of an article that
 stated the U.S. State Department has made it clear to the
 Ukrainian authorities that it links the provision of a \$1
 billion loan guarantee to Ukraine to the dismissal of
 Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin.

6 The article stated that this position became known 7 during the Ukrainian delegation's meetings with U.S. 8 officials.

9 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Right.

10 MR. DOWNEY: Ambassador Pyatt, your email to Ms. 11 Zentos, Mr. Ciaramello, and Ms. Makanju simply said buckle 12 in.

13 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Right.

14 MR. DOWNEY: What did you mean by buckle in?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: So this was--this was published in Zerkalo Nedeli, one of the most prominent Greek--or excuse me--Ukrainian newspapers. I knew that would happen sometime today--prominent Ukrainian newspaper. So this would have been--I'm surmising, based on the way I characterized it, this was likely the first time that there was public reporting in Ukraine of the condition that had been established. So that was January 21st, and my reference to buckle in would have been that there was going to be political controversy around this now since heretofore we had managed these issues through private diplomacy, not 1 through--not through public declarations.

2 MR. DOWNEY: So after this article was published, Mr. 3 Ambassador, did you receive communications with Ukrainian 4 officials about whether this was true or not, whether this 5 condition was the actual official position of the United 6 States government?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: I don't recall, but I certainly 7 8 wouldn't have been surprised. I mean, I would have told 9 them--they knew what the condition was. We had communicated 10 it with them, and so I would also emphasize these 11 individuals--I talked about old Ukraine and new Ukraine. 12 Vitaly Kasko and David Sakvarelidze were the personification 13 of new Ukraine. These were young deputy prosecutors general 14 who had worked very closely with my regional legal advisor, 15 Jeff Cole, who was superb, a superb DOJ professional, and 16 other advisors. They were the one--they were the good guys 17 who were trying to clean up the prosecutor general's office. So it may have been the case that they had not--that 18 19 Kasko and Sakvarelidze were not aware that we had 20 communicated this condition because Poroshenko and Shokin 21 would have had no interest in telling reformers inside the 22 government that the Americans were on the side of the 23 reformers, which we were.

But certainly, if the government had come to me, my answer to them, the President's chief of staff, who would 1 have been the most likely one to bring my cell phone--I 2 would have said, "You knew this was coming, and you know why 3 we've gotten to where we are." So that was the--that's the 4 context for that.

5 And then you see here in Eric Ciaramello's email of the 6 21st, he notes to--he notes the fact that there was an IPC 7 dealing with these issues, which is consistent with what I 8 told you about this interagency process, and that that IPC 9 had agreed on the need to come up with some interagency 10 press guidance on the U.S. policy position.

MR. DOWNEY: So on Bates 1822 of this exhibit, Mr. Ciaramello responded to you, Mr. Ambassador, saying, "Yikes. I don't recall this coming up in our meeting with them on I Tuesday, although we did discuss the fact that the PGO IG Scondition has not yet been met."

16 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Right.

MR. DOWNEY: How did you interpret Mr. Ciaramello's 18 comment of "Yikes"?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: So I can't interpret it. You would 20 have to ask Eric that question.

21 What I would say is you see here the clear 22 documentation of what I explained earlier, that we had a 23 condition associated with reforming the prosecutor general's 24 office. I believe you have that document also. You guys 25 sent it to me this afternoon. So that was a widely 1 coordinated interagency, U.S. government position.

I think Eric--again, I don't want to speculate because you're asking me to speculate on his state of mind, and I'm not in a position to do that. I've told you what I had in mind when I said buckle in, but I think you have to ask Eric what he meant by "Yikes."

Sorry to go lawyer on you, but that's--I think that's 8 the truthful answer.

9 MR. DOWNEY: So do you know, Mr. Ambassador, from these 10 January 2016 meetings of this Ukrainian delegation had to 11 Washington if the condition of the loan guarantee for 12 Shokin's removal came up in any of their meetings?

13 So they met with NSC. They met with State Department 14 officials. They met with the FBI.

15 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I have no idea.

16 MR. DOWNEY: Justice officials.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: I have no idea, but it obviously did because they then went to their friends--Zerkalo Nedeli was a reformist newspaper. So they went to their friends in Zerkalo Nedeli and said, "Hey, guys. I'm in Washington. Everybody said the Americans are not going to release the loan guarantee until Shokin's dismissed." So it obviously came up in those meetings.

24 MR. DOWNEY: So you're saying that potentially members 25 of this Ukrainian delegation spoke to this Ukrainian news

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1 outlet?

2 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I'm certain of that. I mean, 3 that's--everything I know about how the Ukrainian press 4 works suggests to me that one of these guys got on their 5 phone and called Kyiv and said, "We've just finished a bunch 6 of meetings at the State Department, and guess what?" 7 MR. DOWNEY: In January 2016 when the Ukrainian article 8 came out, was it a problem that this information about the 9 loan guarantee being conditioned to Shokin's removal leaked? 10 AMBASSADOR PYATT: You know, I--let me answer that this 11 way. As Ambassador, you're not paid to be popular. You're 12 paid to advance the interest of the United States of 13 America.

I have discovered through trial and error over many 15 years now that I get more done by speaking frankly. I think 16 I have a reputation as a straight shooter, and if you talk 17 to Lydia, she'll tell you that's also my reputation with 18 Congress.

You usually--when you start down a road on a difficult issue like this--and I've dealt with lots of difficult issues in my ambassadorial role. Delivering messages--you know, you get paid to be ambassador to deliver the messages people don't want to hear. The messages that people want to hear, they'll save that for the Cabinet principal, but--so I've delivered lots of unpopular messages in my time. And when you do that, you always recognize there's a risk that somebody is going to leak it because they don't like it, and they want to create political pressure or--in this case, again, it's really important to understand where Kasko and Sakvarelidze were coming from. They were the good guys. So they would have pumped this. They would have-they would have put this out back in Ukraine to put pressure on Shokin and to demonstrate that the Americans were really serious about reform to the prosecutor general's office.

10 So you always know this is going to happen. You never 11 look forward to it, and it can make your job more difficult. 12 But as I said, that's what I get paid the modest bucks for. 13 MR. DOWNEY: So was this information in January 2016 14 that you believe leaked from this delegation--wasn't that 15 information classified at the time?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: I can't speak to that issue. You know, what somebody from Washington would have said, what exactly the talking points were, you know, the most--I'm overseas. So Lot of my--most of my sensitive diplomatic communications come in classified channels, but oftentimes a cable that I get, an instruction that I get tomorrow will be classified confidential, and it will tell me go tell the Greek government this. So you're asking me, you know, is that a leakage of information when I tell the Greek government that. No, it's not. I'm doing my job. So I 1 would put this in that same category.

2 MR. DOWNEY: Understood.

3 I think our hour is up, Mr. Ambassador. We thank you4 for your time.

I don't know if you want to take a five-minute break.
AMBASSADOR PYATT: I've got 163 unread emails or
something here. So I just keep going so I can get to the
rest of my job later on.

9 MR. SCHRAM: All right. Brian, you're turning over the 10 microphone? All right.

Ambassador Pyatt, you said in the last hour that you're a great believer in the historical record, and this interview and this committee's investigation will become part of the historical record. What should the historical record say about the Vice President's work in Ukraine?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: So I think the historic record should say that the American people should be very proud of the role that the United States played in helping to support the choices of the Ukrainian people and helping to reflect the very best of America's tradition of a bipartisan foreign policy, which is sought to support all of the post-Soviet states in defining their own future.

Now, that was--if you go back and look at my confirmation statement for that, for the Ukrainian job--so that would have been more than seven years ago now, well 1 more than seven years ago--I talked about that, and at that 2 point, the issue was the desire of the Ukrainian people to 3 move closer to Europe but be part of the European Union and 4 part of the customs agreement that they were negotiating in 5 those days.

6 So I think all of us as Americans should be very proud 7 of the role that the United States played. We should be 8 very proud of the role that a bipartisan coalition 9 represented in that regard.

I think--you know, when I look back on my three years In Ukraine, I already described one emotional moment. Another one that sticks with me very, very warmly was the day of President Poroshenko's inauguration as president, and that delegation was headed by Vice President Biden. But it also included Senator McCain, Senator Murphy, and Senator Johnson.

And I had gotten to know Senator McCain a little bit at that point through is visits and through my consultations with him, and I had gotten to know Senator Murphy and Senator Johnson pretty well as well.

And we were walking down the busiest street in Kyiv. There were huge crowds. There was a street that the President was going to parade down after the inauguration, and we were walking down this street because it was closed off to traffic. And we were going back to our motorcade, 1 and people recognized Senator McCain. And they started-2 they all started cheering "America. USA, USA."

And I can't remember if it was Senator Murphy or 3 4 Senator Johnson who said it, but there's a picture I can 5 probably find of the four of us doing this. And at one 6 point, one of them turned to the other and said, "You know, 7 they're not cheering for us. They're cheering for John." And for me, that moment crystallizes the way our policy 8 9 was meant to work and the way it did work in practice. I very proud--and again, Lydia will corroborate this. 10 11 I worked very hard over seven years on my relations with 12 Congress and particularly with the members of the Senate 13 Foreign Relations Committee, not as Republicans or 14 Democrats, but as patriotic Americans who want to see our 15 nation's interests advanced. And Ukraine was a really good

17 so.

And what was really striking to me was after the invasion of Crimea, after Putin turned Ukraine into a hardpower problem, there was nobody else in the world, no other country that had the military power, the intelligence capacity, the ability to mobilize the world, the international community, to help the Ukrainians make their own choices. And I think history will record Vice President Biden very generously on this issue, precisely because he

16 example of that at a moment when no other country could do

1 played such a leading role in pulling our efforts together.
2 But I can also tell you the history will record Senator
3 McCain very well in that regard, Senator Menendez, Chairman
4 Corker, Senator Portman who was--Senator Portman was
5 probably one of the very first Members of Congress to really
6 grasp the anticorruption issues that I've spent the past
7 hour and a half talking about, and I counted him as a huge
8 ally and partner in the effort to tackle these things.

9 So you asked me how will history remember Joe Biden on 10 these issues. I think it's really more a question of how 11 history will remember the United States.

MR. SCHRAM: And how will history remember Russia's fforts to sow disinformation about the United States' role in Ukraine at this time?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: So are you asking me about my time or the past four years while I've been in Greece?

17 MR. SCHRAM: Your time.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: So I think, you know, Russia--the Russian invasion of Ukraine and then the Russian effort to manipulate the Ukrainian politics, to manipulate the Ukrainian media was really a preview of what we have come to see and what we've come to call "Russian malign influence." I remember in December of 2016 when the intelligence Community first published their report on Russian interference in the American elections. None of that came 1 as a surprise to me because I had seen exactly the same 2 thing in Russia's attempt to influence Ukraine's 3 presidential elections.

There was a boxed--a bolloxed, botched effort by Russia to hack the Central Election Commission, to fiddle with the election numbers. There was fake media. There was fake social medica, fake postings on social media sites. All of the tools which the intelligence community has now documented, Russia has applied against our democracy, it sought to apply against Ukraine's democracy first.

And certainly, as the victim of Russian hacking of American officials' telephone calls, long before it became the new normal, I'm particularly sensitive to this. I'm no longer surprised by it.

But I think history will look back on what happened in Ukraine during my tenure as the most acute manifestation of the problem our country faces of Russian malign influence, of Putin's intent to avenge what he views as the unjust dismantlement of the Soviet Union, his use of cyber-attacks on the Russian--excuse me--on the Ukrainian energy infrastructure when I was in Ukraine or shadow cyber-attacks that the GRU and Russia has conducted against American institutions, the use of fake information, the effort to sow dissension.

25 There were specific instances when I was in Ukraine of

1 Russian outlets planting fake news intended to undermine me, 2 to undermine the principals--the principal voices of 3 American foreign policy. It is a reminder that Vladimir 4 Putin is playing for keeps, that this guy is a stone-cold 5 killer, and that he is conducting a hybrid war against the 6 West, which covers a full spectrum of activities. And at 7 one end of that spectrum is sending Russian military forces 8 into Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, and at the other end of the 9 spectrum is the activity which the Treasury Department has 10 documented continues to this day of trying to inject 11 themselves into our democracy. And we clearly have not 12 changed his risk reward calculus or his behavior thus far. 13 MR. SCHRAM: Is it one of the ways that Vladimir Putin 14 injects himself into our democracy, by promoting the 15 narrative that the Vice President's actions in Ukraine were 16 in some way corrupt?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: So I think on this we're sort of veering towards classified, and I would ask my State pepartment colleagues to help out. I would simply refer everybody back to the Treasury Department statement of September 10, on Andrii Derkach, and the documentation that provides in an unclassified setting, the Russian covert influence campaign, and then the statement that Secretary Pompeo made this same day, amplifying the fact that this was a Russian-directed covert influence campaign centered on 1 manipulating the American political process to advance
2 Russia's maligned interests.

MR. THOMAS: This is Ken Thomas. Thank you, Ambassador. I would just remind everyone that we do look to the Ambassador with his experience on classified information to be the first canary in the coal mine. So, Ambassador, I will--if you feel anything is touching upon classified then you should defer, and if there's any question about that they can come to me.

10 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Okay. Thanks, Ken.

11 MR. SCHRAM: Ambassador Pyatt, you refer to the 12 statement of the Department of Treasury on September 10, "Treasury sanctions Russia-linked election interference 13 14 actors." And with respect to Mr. Derkach, the statement 15 says, "From at least late 2019 through mid 2020, Derkach 16 waged a covert influence campaign centered on cultivating 17 false and unsubstantiated narratives concerning U.S. 18 officials in the upcoming 2020 presidential election, 19 spurring corruption investigations in both Ukraine and the 20 United States designed to culminate prior to election day. 21 Derkach's unsubstantiated narratives were pushed in the 22 Western media through coverage of press conferences and 23 other news events, including interviews and statements." 24 That's what you're referring to?

25 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes.

1 MR. SCHRAM: Ambassador Pyatt, in Chairman Johnson's--2 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Just to continue on that, I would 3 also--I would emphasize the further nuance provided by 4 Secretary of State Pompeo's statement on the same day. 5 MR. SCHRAM: Thank you. Ambassador Pyatt, in the 6 Chairman's open letter of August 10th he wrote, "Many in the 7 media, in an ongoing attempt to provide cover for former 8 Vice President Biden, continue to repeat the mantra that 9 there is no evidence of wrongdoing or illegal activity 10 related to Hunter Biden's position on Burisma's board. I 11 could not disagree more," end quote.

Are you aware of any evidence of wrongdoing or illegal activity by Vice President Biden related to Hunter Biden's position on Burisma's board?

15 AMBASSADOR PYATT: No.

MR. SCHRAM: Was the foreign policy that Vice President NR. SCHRAM: Was the foreign policy that Vice President Biden pursued in Ukraine intended to advance the interests of the United States of America?

19 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes.

20 MR. SCHRAM: Did a potential conflict of interest

21 related to Hunter Biden influence the Obama administration's 22 policy decisions with respect to Ukraine and Burisma?

23 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Never, to my knowledge.

24 MR. SCHRAM: Did Vice President Biden alter U.S. 25 Government foreign policy concerning Ukraine to assist Biden--pardon me, to assist Burisma or to assist his son?
 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Never, to my knowledge.

3 MR. SCHRAM: Did you witness any efforts by any U.S.4 official to shield Burisma from scrutiny?

5 AMBASSADOR PYATT: None at all.

6 MR. SCHRAM: Was the U.S. Government position 7 advocating for the removal of Prosecutor General Shokin part 8 of an effort to stop an investigation into Burisma?

9 AMBASSADOR PYATT: No. It had no relationship. 10 MR. SCHRAM: Did you have a view at the time about 11 whether or not removing Prosecutor General Shokin would make 12 more or less likely the success of corruption investigations 13 against Burisma?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: We believed--let me answer that two ways. First of all, I think--I hope it's been evident from my past hour and a half of comments that the anticorruption agenda in Ukraine was much broader than just this one individual, Zlochevsky. It was a matter of systemic corruption. We certainly believed that dealing with that systemic corruption, including the deeply corrupt relationship between Ukrainian oligarchs, the political system, the media, the presidency, was not going to be broken under the approach that Prosecutor General Shokin was pursuing.

25 MR. SCHRAM: And that was the view of the U.S.

1 Government?

2 AMBASSADOR PYATT: That was the policy of the U.S.3 Government.

MR. SCHRAM: So was the policy advocating for the 5 dismissal of Prosecutor General Shokin formulated by Vice 6 President Biden in an effort to assist his son?

7 AMBASSADOR PYATT: No. As I said, it was formulated by 8 the interagency process in all of its glory.

9 MR. SCHRAM: Let's expand on that for a moment. In the 10 previous hour you talked about that decision coming from the 11 interagency process, and that's the spear and you're the tip 12 of the spear, to implement it in country. Am I paraphrasing 13 you accurately?

14 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes.

MR. SCHRAM: So that is with respect to the decision, the policy decision to condition aid to Ukraine on anticorruption reforms, including the removal of Prosecutor Beneral Shokin. Do you know where the idea came from? I'm y trying to separate the idea from the decision.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: No, I understand what you're getting at. I actually don't. You know, as I said, I've been in this business for 31 years. There are a lot of major policy initiatives that I'm very proud of. I can't, off the top of my head, think of a single one where I can say yeah, that was my idea--I was the Einstein, who thought of it, and then 1 I just brought along, you know, another 10,000 people across 2 the U.S. Government.

3 So I actually don't remember--don't recall who the--you 4 know, where the idea would have first surfaced. I can 5 surmise, contextually, that probably the first place we 6 would have heard an idea like that is from our civil society 7 partners in Ukraine. You know, again, I gave speeches about 8 this, that a big part of what we were trying to do when we 9 were working on these issues was to give the Ukrainian 10 people the kind of government they had earned, through 11 10,000 deaths, through fighting and dying on the Maidan and 12 Eastern Ukraine.

I remember as we rolled out this condition, and the broad condition of deep reform in the Prosecutor General's Office, I used to make the point to President Poroshenko and others that he didn't need to do this to satisfy me or to ratisfy Vice President Biden or to satisfy the U.S. Government's loan guarantee conditions. He needed to do this to get himself reelected, to live up to the expectations and the trust that the Ukrainian people had placed in him when he was elected President of this country. In many, you know, it's after my time, but the election, the massive defeat of President Poroshenko and the election of President Zelensky, an outsider, a young soutsider, with no Soviet history to his biography, was a 1 perfect manifestation of the point that I was making in that 2 space.

3 So this was--and a lot of the information that our 4 Embassy was reporting on these issues, some of it, as I 5 said, came from people like Jeff Cole and our Department of 6 Justice advisors, who were working with David Sakvarelidze 7 and Vitaly Kasko and other reforms in the Prosecutor's 8 Office. But a lot of it also came from Ukrainian civil 9 society groups like AntAC and the anticorruption groups that 10 were supported by USAID but with sharp political officers in 11 the Embassy staying in close touch with them.

So contextually--and again, maybe somebody will eventually write a history on this--you know, I think it's entirely possible that this idea first began to emerge from Ukrainian civil society groups, or the partners of Ukrainian civil society groups in the United States, including members of congressional staff. And, you know, you've got to be pretty brave to be an anticorruption reformer in a country like Ukraine, and most of them were pretty smart about their relations with key staff of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee and elsewhere in Congress as well.

23 MR. SCHRAM: As you described the interagency process, 24 you used the word "instruction." You took this decision as 25 an instruction on policy with which--of which it was your

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1 responsibility to implement.

2 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Right.

3 MR. SCHRAM: So to be clear, who does the "instruction" 4 come from?

5 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Oftentimes it will come in a 6 telegram, and I don't know, in this case. I mean, 7 typically, the way these things would work is there would be 8 an interagency discussion. The White House, the National 9 Security Council would provide a summary of conclusions. 10 The summary of conclusions would have numbered conclusions, 11 and one of those conclusions would be the Embassy needs to 12 press for deeper reform of the Prosecutor General's Office. 13 And it would say "action," and the action would be USAID or 14 Department of Justice or U.S. Department of State. And then 15 that action gets translated either as a front channel 16 telegram, the kind of thing I get every single day--I got 17 one yesterday and it has Mike Pompeo's name at the bottom of 18 it. I'm confident Secretary Pompeo never saw it. But 19 that's the institutional instruction in the State 20 Department--or an email from the Assistant Secretary or the 21 Bureau, if I'm talking to the front office, in this case. 2.2 MR. SCHRAM: So this was not an instruction that came 23 from the Vice President outside of any regular channel. 24 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I never saw Vice President Biden 25 operate in any way outside of the normal policy process.

MR. SCHRAM: And with respect to this policy, did you 2 agree with it?

3 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Absolutely. That's why I gave4 speeches about it.

5 MR. SCHRAM: So it's fair to say, to summarize, that it 6 was a whole-of-government policy to condition foreign aid in 7 part on the removal of Prosecutor General Shokin.

8 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes. And I want to spend a lot of time explaining this, because I think it's important to 9 10 understand that this was an evolution. So if you go back, 11 for instance, to my Odessa speech in the fall of 2015, where 12 I talk about these issues, I used the phrase "reform to the 13 Office of the Prosecutor General." I didn't use the phrase, 14 "Get rid of Shokin," because we were still hopeful, at that 15 point, that systemic reform could be accomplished without 16 the abrupt step of changing the Prosecutor General, with all 17 the challenges that that would present to Poroshenko, and 18 finding somebody who would be an appropriate successor, et 19 cetera, and working that conformation process within the 20 delicately balanced state of the parliamentary government in 21 Ukraine.

22 So the--

23 MR. SCHRAM: So let's--

AMBASSADOR PYATT: --later in the year towards the 25 conclusion that Shokin had to go. 1 MR. SCHRAM: Let's focus, then, on the events around 2 the Odessa speech that you've just raised. That speech, as 3 I understand it, was on September 25th at the Odessa 4 Financial Forum, and as you said you criticized the 5 Prosecutor's Office. At that time, who was the Prosecutor 6 General?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: I don't remember. You'll have to
check. It's probably Shokin but you'll have to check.
MR. SCHRAM: Prior to Shokin, who was the Prosecutor
General?

11 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I'm too old to remember that.

12 MR. SCHRAM: Okay.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: I'm sorry to be glib. I honestly don't remember. I mean, you know, Greece is a country of 11 million people so I've learned a lot of new names over the past four years. The only way you can do that is by doing a memory dump on the old ones.

18 MR. SCHRAM: Fair enough. Do you remember what led you 19 to have concerns about Zlochevsky and corruption?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yeah. So let me explain sort of how that all came about. So as I described in the earlier round of questioning, this was part of a gradual evolution of the U.S. Government concern about a set of issues that had been one of the three pillars of our policy going back to the first days of the new government. I was invited to Odessa Financial Forum to give a speech, and when I was invited I sat down with my guys and I said, "You know, I think it's time for me to say something really direct about corruption." The reason I chose to do that in Odessa was three-fold. One, Odessa, in those days, had an aggressively reformist governor, Misha Saakashvili, who came from Georgia and who had a reputation for shaking things up. Two, Odessa had been historically one of the most corrupt regions of Ukraine, and its, you know, typical port, Casablanca, mafias, casinos, all of the usual ingredients of shady business, shipping. So Odessa was a location that I knew would resonate symbolically.

And three was the sense that it had come time to take these issues out of our private diplomacy and raise them up more publicly. And I knew that if I gave this speech in dessa it would do that.

17 So I asked my team to put together the remarks. It 18 was, like every other speech I gave, a team effort, 19 including the political section, the public affairs section, 20 the INL section. I was really lucky to have a really strong 21 INL office, which was generously funded by the Assistant 22 Secretary in those days. And the RLA as well.

I remember when I got one of the drafts of it I said, Wou know, it needs a specific example or two," and so I saked my guys to come up with recommendations of specific

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1 examples. The two that I think we were throwing around, one 2 was a case about the diamond prosecutors, and I won't bore 3 you with the details but the diamond prosecutors got known 4 as the "diamond prosecutors." They were corrupt prosecutors 5 also. The Ukrainian Intelligence Agency raided their 6 office, and when they cracked open their office safe they 7 found bags of loose diamonds, so that's how the diamond 8 prosecutors got their name.

And then you had the case of Zlochevsky, which was a 9 10 particularly egregious case for my Department of Justice 11 colleagues, because they worked very hard on it, along with 12 the British government, on a very complex asset forfeiture, 13 asset seizure case, which was intended to recoup, for the 14 Ukrainian people, the money that was stolen from them. We 15 knew that when Yanukovych fled the country he took literally 16 hundreds of millions of dollars of Ukrainian state assets 17 with him. It was diamonds, bearer bonds. I remember there 18 was one residence belong to one of his Cabinet members that 19 the police raided in downtown Kyiv after these guys all 20 left, and they all had like gym bags. On the security 21 cameras at the airport you saw footage of the gym bags that 22 they had, and there was footage from the security cameras at 23 Yanukovych's residence of dolly carts rolling out to the 24 helicopters with what looked like stacked gold bars. So 25 these guys took a lot with them.

1 This one particular Cabinet member, at his residence, 2 he left on the kitchen/dining room table bags--bundles of 3 hundred dollar bills, bags of loose diamonds, a collection 4 of Rolexes. And I remember saying to my guys, "If that's 5 what they left behind, when they were running out, imagine 6 what they had in their carry-on bag?"

7 So this was wholesale looting of the country, and this 8 case against the former Environment Minister Zlochevsky was 9 the first attempt at trying to recoup some of those assets. 10 We had a whole FBI task force. The FBI had sent agents out 11 to Ukraine, who were looking over documents from 12 Yanukovych's residence, who were trying to help the 13 Ukrainians build the evidentiary chain to trace back, do the 14 forensic accounting on some of this stuff.

But this was a really important case and it fell apart when the Prosecutor's Office, over a Christmas holiday period, sent a letter to the court in UK saying, "Never mind. We're not interested anymore." So this was a particularly egregious one for my Department of Justice colleagues. So that's how that ended up being in the speech.

22 MR. SCHRAM: After that happened, after the Prosecutor 23 said, "Never mind. We're not interested anymore," was it 24 the U.S. Government's hope that Prosecutor General Shokin 25 would cooperate with UK officials on the Zlochevsky matter? 1 AMBASSADOR PYATT: And many other cases where he 2 was--where he and his institution--and again, it was an 3 institutional problem, where he and his institution were 4 systematically failing to go after individuals who were 5 credibly accused of corrupt behavior.

6 MR. SCHRAM: Did Shokin reopen the case against 7 Zlochevsky?

8 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I don't remember. I can tell you, 9 Shokin was widely viewed as--as I said, by his professional 10 peers--I'm not a lawyer, but Shokin was widely viewed by his 11 professional peers from the United States as ineffective in 12 his role. And, you know, again, I had any number of 13 meetings with him, which would be documented in Embassy Kyiv 14 classified recording cables, where I walked through with him 15 the specific changes that we sought.

One of those, for instance, was the creation of an independent inspector general inside the Prosecutor General's Office. You know, and I'm an optimist. I wouldn't be an American diplomat if I wasn't an optimist. And so every time we'd get one of these small changes we would always hope, okay, maybe this is really the start of a new phase. But inevitably we were always disappointed.

23 MR. SCHRAM: Why were you disappointed?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Because of the failure to deal with the problem of corruption at the senior-most levels of the

1 Ukrainian Government. You know, I think it's important--2 it's important to recognize, as I said in my earlier 3 remarks, this was a legacy problem. It was a legacy of the 4 Soviet Union. The Soviet system was built on a lie, and it 5 inculcated a political culture in which corruption was the 6 grease that made the political system work, and that ranged 7 from petty corruption--you know, everyday Ukrainian citizens 8 who had to pay money under the table to get medical 9 treatment or who had to pay money under the table so that 10 their teacher would show up to work at their children's 11 school--and the big corruption that people like Zlochevsky 12 were involved in that involved stealing hundreds of millions 13 of dollars from Ukraine and from the Ukrainian people. 14 MR. SCHRAM: Was it your hope that your speech would 15 get their attention and advance the case of reform in the 16 prosecutor general's office?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Absolutely. I mean, you know, as Ambassador, everything I do I try to do strategically. I always ask--will ask my team, you know, "What's the headline that I want to come out of this speech? What am I trying to do here?" And in that case, what I was trying to do was to induce change in the behavior of the prosecutor general's office.

24 MR. SCHRAM: And why did you--you talked about why you 25 mentioned Zlochevsky individually. Was there a reason you 1 didn't mention the company Burisma?

2 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I'm not even sure if I knew at that 3 point what Zlochevsky's relationship to Burisma was. I'm 4 sure I had people in my embassy who knew that, but I don't 5 actually recall when that was brought to my attention. It 6 was certainly brought to my attention by later that fall as 7 the issues around Burisma began to surface. But I was 8 focused on--I think when you read the speech, you'll see 9 what I was focused on was not contemporary Ukrainian affairs 10 but the corrupt activities that Zlochevsky had been involved 11 with as Environment Minister.

MR. SCHRAM: But it's fair to say in September you 13 still had hope for Shokin?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Absolutely. In retrospect, clearly misplaced hope, and, you know, this was a conversation that I would have with President Poroshenko and the others in the yovernment saying to me but also saying to other senior sofficials, just give the guy another chance, you know, he's really going to change the system.

20 MR. SCHRAM: And how did you lose faith with respect to 21 Shokin's ability to change?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: It's less me losing faith than the Outputs in that U.S. Government judgment were what we were hearing from Ukrainian civil society, what we were hearing 1 from the U.S. Department of Justice experts--and, again, I'm 2 not a lawyer, so I'm not competent to judge whether the 3 delay in bringing a case is a matter of incompetence, 4 ineffectiveness, or if it's just the way things have to work 5 because you have to get the documents together. So the 6 judgment of my legal advisers and the Department of Justice 7 experts was critically important. And then, finally, what 8 we were seeing from the intelligence community.

9 Chairman Graham. When you or members of your staff get 10 information in-country from civil society, how is that 11 information communicated to Washington? And how does it 12 become part of the policy process?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: You know, if it's my embassy, it eventually gets written into a State Department cable, which goes to the wide audience in Washington, D.C. There's a lot more that gets done by email these days in our system, which r is natural and understandable. But as I said, I actually appreciate the discipline of a cable because it forces people to think through cause and effect a little more carefully than is the case in an email that you're pounding out on an iPhone while you're driving to work or something. MR. SCHRAM: Do you think that if we had access to reflected?

25 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I am absolutely certain it would

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1 demonstrate those concerns.

2 MR. SCHRAM: Turning to the Vice President's trip to 3 Ukraine in December 2015, at the time of Vice President 4 Biden's visit, had Prosecutor General Shokin made any real 5 progress toward investigating corruption or reforming the 6 prosecutor general's office?

7 AMBASSADOR PYATT: So as I said, there were little baby 8 steps from time to time. I think I mentioned the 9 establishment of the independent inspector general within 10 the prosecutor general's office. That was something that we 11 had pushed for. In one of those meetings with Shokin, I 12 know that I handed over a tick list that was drafted for me 13 by the combination of the political section, the economic 14 section, the INL team, and the Department of Justice team 15 with specific suggestions for reform. I think that also may 16 be in one of the documents that you guys sent this 17 afternoon. I'd have to relook at it again. I only got it 5 18 minutes before we started here, so I only glanced at it 19 once. But I think the draft conditions precedent have some 20 of that language as well.

21 MR. SCHRAM: Turning again to Exhibit 1, what the 22 majority entered as Exhibit 1, and to the page that begins 23 with "Goals and Objectives." Do you have that in front of 24 you?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yeah, and I apologize, I actually

1 got--the numbers on mine are totally different, and I put 2 that back in my stack of papers here, so it's going to take 3 me a minute.

4 MR. SCHRAM: No problem. I won't refer to the numbers. 5 At the top it says "Sensitive but unclassified, November 22, 6 2015."

7 [Pause.]

8 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I know it's here because I haven't 9 left my chair, so I couldn't have put it too far--

10 MR. SCHRAM: Ambassador Pyatt, I'm just going to ask 11 you about one sentence in that memo. We can put it up for 12 you if that works.

13 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yeah, sure.

14 MR. SCHRAM: Just a moment.

15 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Here it is. I found it.

16 MR. SCHRAM: Okay, great.

17 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Which page?

18 MR. SCHRAM: The Bates number ends in 8-5, and at the 19 top it says "Vice President Biden's meeting with Ukrainian 20 President Petro Poroshenko."

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes, I've got it in front of me. MR. SCHRAM: Okay. That's great. So the second section is labeled "Background," and about a third of the way down, the first paragraph, drawing your attention to the sentence that starts, "There is wide agreement." 1 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Sorry? I lost you there. "There is 2 wide agreement that anticorruption must be at the top of 3 this list." Yes, got it.

4 MR. SCHRAM: That's right. And "that reforms must 5 include an overhaul of the prosecutor general's office, 6 including the removal of Prosecutor General Shokin"--

7 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Right.

8 MR. SCHRAM: --"who is widely regarded as an obstacle9 to fighting corruption."

10 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Right.

MR. SCHRAM: Do you know what the "wide agreement" 12 refers to?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: What I've spent the past 2 hours talking about, the interagency community's agreement. The "There is wide agreement" is a reflection of what I've described, which is the view of the interagency community on this.

MR. SCHRAM: And what about our international partners? Do you know if they had a view on this at the time? AMBASSADOR PYATT: Certainly, as I mentioned in the beginning, I worked particularly closely with my EU ambassadorial counterpart, Jan Tombinski; with the French Ambassador, with the German Ambassador, or the British Ambassador. Jan in particular, he was an extremely skilled beginnat, a good colleague, and the most important thing to 1 know about him is that he was Polish. So Poland, like 2 Ukraine, had lived through this process of de-Sovietization, 3 and they had a very severe process of institutional reform, 4 which is what positioned them to become what they are today, 5 a NATO ally, an economically prosperous member of the 6 European Union. So Jan was particularly focused, much more 7 so than I could be as a privileged American, on the task for 8 reforming Ukrainian society that had to be accomplished. If 9 anything, I think his views on the removal of Shokin were 10 even stronger than mine, and I know he communicated those to 11 the President, to the prosecutor general, and the Ukrainian 12 Government. And I think we actually did so together on a

13 couple of occasions with joint presentations.

MR. SCHRAM: You've spoken movingly about the importance of congressional support for our policy and bipartisan congressional support. How was the policy-respectively with respect to anticorruption reform, how were those policies communicated to Congress?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: So I can talk about what I did in Ukraine. I can assure you that every congressional delegation that came to Ukraine, staff and members--and there were a lot of them, including, I should add, our current Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs. But every one of those delegations we would have discussed the anticorruption agenda with, because as you've heard me 1 describe, it was one of the three pillars on which the 2 policy approach that I was presenting rested.

I can't help you in terms of how these things were communicated in Washington. I can tell you I made it a habit when I was Ambassador to go up on the Hill, and I still do. Every time I'm in Washington, I offer myself up to the Foreign Relations Committee. I think Lydia will attest that Senator Johnson and I--I probably had more meetings with Senator Johnson than just about any other member of the Foreign Relations Committee on the Republican side. And I'm very grateful for the support he's provided and the interest that he's shown in my work as Ambassador.
And we certainly would have talked about these issues. MR. SCHRAM: And when you say "these issues," what are you referring to?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: The agenda of corruption, of anticorruption. And as I said, you know, the broad agenda as described in this briefing memo and many other places of helping the Ukrainian people to build the kind of society that they deserve.

21 MR. SCHRAM: How specific would you get with respect to 22 our policy, our anticorruption policy?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yeah, I think I have to fall back on the same I'm getting all the best 5 years ago answer. I bonestly--I just don't remember, and, you know, oftentimes, 1 again, as Lydia will attest, you know, when I have the 2 privilege of sitting down with a busy member like Senator 3 Portman or Senator Johnson, you know, it's oftentimes 10 4 minutes before a vote, there's somebody else in the waiting 5 room, so I tend to be--when I am on the Washington side, I 6 tend to be pretty tactical and 35,000-foot in my 7 presentation. That's one of the great advantages of having 8 congressional delegations travel overseas because there is 9 no better way to help Congress understand what we're trying 10 to do out here with the taxpayers' money and the important 11 role the Congress plays in advancing America's interests 12 abroad.

MR. SCHRAM: Was it your understanding that Congress
supported our anticorruption agenda in Ukraine?
AMBASSADOR PYATT: A hundred percent. That was

16 reflected--and as I said, there is nobody who was more 17 passionate on these issues than Senator McCain. Senator 18 McCain and I actually traveled to Odessa together for the 19 same reason that I gave that speech in Odessa. I count it 20 as, you know, one of the real treasured memories of my time 21 in Ukraine, the work that I was able to do with John McCain 22 and the way he represented the United States of America.

I was very grateful for the letter that was signed by a number of congressional leaders to President Poroshenko reinforcing all the messaging that I had been conveying on

1 anticorruption issues. I don't remember who wrote that 2 letter. I'm going to guess its Tyler Brace, who is now a 3 colleague in the State Department's European Affairs Bureau 4 who works for Senator Portman, and as I said, Tyler was a 5 really--and Senator Portman was a particularly important 6 partner and supporter on all of these issues. But all the 7 members who signed that letter--Senator Durbin, Senator 8 Shaheen, Senator Portman, Senator Johnson, Senator Kirk, Senator Murphy, Senator Blumenthal, Senator Brown--these are 9 10 all members who have taken the time to come to Ukraine to 11 understand what we were trying to do there and obviously put 12 their names on a letter to the President, making clear that 13 what Poroshenko was hearing in those days from me, from Vice 14 President Biden, from Secretary Kerry, from Assistant 15 Secretary Nuland was not just an executive branch policy. 16 It was the policy of the whole U.S. Government, including 17 the legislative branch and, in particular, the Senate. 18 MR. SCHRAM: And at that time, that policy included 19 conditioning aid on the removal of Prosecutor General Shokin? 20

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yeah. We just talked about the timeline, and it was public knowledge, again, if I'm remembering that newspaper article that you guys--January 24 21st, yeah. So all of these issues with the visit to 25 Washington of Vitaly Kasko and Sakvarelidze and the coverage 1 in the Ukrainian press, which I'm sure there would have been
2 a great deal of after this story, was all public knowledge
3 before this letter came out.

MR. SCHRAM: Marking as Exhibit A, I believe this is
the letter that you've been referring to, February 12th,
from the signatories you mentioned to President Poroshenko.
[Pyatt Exhibit A was marked
for identification.]

9 MR. SCHRAM: We'll just put it up so you can confirm 10 this is the letter that you've been referring to.

11 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Exactly.

MR. SCHRAM: And I would draw your attention to the fourth paragraph and the sentence that starts, "We similarly urge you to press ahead..." Do you see that line?

15 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes.

MR. SCHRAM: "We similarly urge you to press ahead with urgent reforms to the Prosecutor General's office and judiciary."

19 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Correct.

20 MR. SCHRAM: So you raised this letter on your own, and 21 if I am understanding you correctly, you were aware of it at 22 the time. You were talking about your contemporaneous 23 understanding of support from Congress.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Absolutely. I was delighted at the 25 letter, and I don't remember specifically what I did with 1 it, but I'm quite confident that I would have gotten a
2 letter like this, and I would have emailed the .pdf to the
3 President's Chief of Staff and said something like, "You
4 will find this of interest. It reinforces everything we've

5 been talking about for the past few weeks."

6 MR. SCHRAM: So this letter helped you make the case 7 with President Poroshenko that Prosecutor General Shokin 8 needed to be removed?

9 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes. As part of a broad process of 10 urgent reforms to the prosecutor general's office and 11 judiciary.

12 MR. SCHRAM: I'll stop there.

MR. DOWNEY: Hi, Ambassador Pyatt. Would you like to 14 take a 5-minute break?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: No. Let's keep going. I'm at 189 16 now, so I've got a long night ahead of me, so let's finish 17 up here, and then I'll go back to doing what I'm paid to do. 18 MR. DOWNEY: Understood.

MS. JEFFRESS: Could I ask, Brian--and I know you do have more questions, but given Ambassador Pyatt's responsibilities, could we limit the interview to maybe another half-hour for each side and then call it a night so he can get back to work?

24 MR. DOWNEY: Yeah, I think that generally is okay. 25 While I'm going, I'll let some of my colleagues discuss 1 that, but I think that should be okay.

MS. JEFFRESS: That would be terrific. Thanks so much.
AMBASSADOR PYATT: All right. Thank you.

4 MR. DOWNEY: No problem. Ambassador Pyatt, when did 5 you become aware that Hunter Biden was on Burisma's board of 6 directors?

7 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I don't recall. I think it probably 8 would have been--it was certainly not something that was 9 prominent on my radar scope. It likely would have been 10 around the time that the U.S. press began reporting on this 11 issue, which was the late part of 2015 before Vice President 12 Biden's big visit. And, again, it just reflects the fact, 13 which I've tried to explain over the past 2 hours, that 14 Burisma-Hunter Biden had zero impact on my work. I never 15 met with them. Their positions and interests had no impact 16 on work that I did as America's Ambassador. So it just 17 wasn't something that was on my radar scope. But I 18 certainly became aware of it when the New York Times and 19 others started to write about it.

20 MR. DOWNEY: So in the winter of 2015 you became aware?
21 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes. Late 2015.

MR. DOWNEY: During your time as Ambassador in Ukraine, and any members of your team raise concerns about Hunter Biden being on Burisma's board?

25 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I don't recall. You know, one of

1 the things about being Ambassador is you don't do a lot of 2 water cooler talk. You know, the Navy calls it "the 3 loneliness of command," and it's very much like running an 4 aircraft carrier or something. You know, everybody tells 5 you everything is going great until it runs into an iceberg. 6 So, no, I didn't--so I did not, and I think anybody 7 who's worked with me in the State Department will tell you 8 that I have the reputation as anything but a gossip or a 9 rumormonger. So I don't recall any conversations on this 10 issue. They could have happened, but it would have been out 11 of character for me.

MR. DOWNEY: During your time as Ambassador, after you became aware that Hunter Biden on Burisma's board in the winter of 2015, did any Ukrainian officials raise the topic with you, why the Vice President's son was on this corrupt company's board?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Again, I don't recall a single instance, and I think given the genesis of our anticorruption policy and the broad focus of our calls for reform of the Ukrainian system, to include fiduciary and the Prosecutor General's Office and the police, it doesn't surprise me that that wouldn't come up, because it was justit was not a thing in Ukraine. You know, I don't remember. Even, you know, this New York Times story, which you guys dug up and sent out to me, that was just--the day-to-day 1 concerns of Ukrainians, especially in those days, was not
2 what Hunter Biden was doing. It was whether Vladimir Putin
3 was going to send more troops in, whether their economy was
4 going to survive, whether the political coalition around
5 Prime Minister Yatsenyuk was going to stay intact, and
6 whether they would have the better future that they so
7 desperately hoped for.

8 MR. DOWNEY: So you've explained all the measures and 9 anticorruption programs that our government was trying to 10 instill in Ukraine. Did you find it awkward that the Vice 11 President's son would serve on the board of a corrupt 12 Ukrainian gas company?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: You know, you're sort of asking me a personal opinion on these things. As Ambassador you really don't get to have personal opinions. So for the past seven years, everything I say, everything I do, where I go out to dinner, you know, everything is scrutinized and everything I do reflects the United States of America.

I'm in Athens. You know, the ancient Greeks used to say the most important title is citizen, and eventually I will go back to being a citizen again. But for now my title s Ambassador, so I don't get to have personal opinions.

23 MR. DOWNEY: So during--

AMBASSADOR PYATT: And to further answer your question, there was no time at which Hunter Biden's employment by Burisma in any way compromised my ability to do my job
 effectively.

3 MR. DOWNEY: During the Vice President's trip to 4 Ukraine in 2015, you mentioned that these articles in The 5 New York Times and other publications were coming out 6 regarding Hunter Biden being on Burisma's board. During 7 that trip, did you discuss with the Vice President the fact 8 that his son served on a corrupt Ukrainian gas company's 9 board?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: It wouldn't have crossed my mind, for the reason I earlier stated, that it had no impact on my work or my life in Ukraine.

MR. DOWNEY: So you never gave thought of raising a 14 concern to the Vice President about this board position his 15 son had?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: No. He's the Vice President of the 17 United States and it would have been wildly out of place for 18 me to raise something like that, especially insofar as it 19 had zero impact on the work that I was doing.

20 MR. DOWNEY: Did you ever--did you or any member of 21 your team in Kyiv believe that Hunter Biden's position on 22 Burisma's board was a conflict of interest?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Again, you know, you'll have to ask other members of the Embassy in terms of what their perspectives were. It had no impact on the work that I did. 1 Conflict of interest sounds like a lawyer's term, so I'm not 2 competent to make that judgment. You know, as a public 3 official I do my OGE forms every day, every year, and I have 4 a clear sense of what my obligations are in terms of 5 conflict of interest, but I simply can't speak to a private 6 citizen like Hunter Biden.

7 MR. DOWNEY: So you never raised any concerns about 8 Hunter Biden's board membership on Burisma to Vice President 9 Biden?

10 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I had no reason to raise any 11 concerns about Hunter Biden to Vice President Biden, because 12 it had no impact on my work. As far as I can discern, it 13 had no impact on the vigorous approach Vice President Biden 14 took to implementing and supporting our anticorruption 15 policy, and it just wasn't part of the world that I was 16 responsible for out in Ukraine.

MR. DOWNEY: During your time as Ambassador in Ukraine was there Russians or Russian-aligned oligarchs that were pushing the fact that Hunter was on Burisma's board as, you know, the opposite of what the U.S. policy was regarding anticorruption?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: There was one incidence that was consistent with that, and I was reminded of it in the documents that you guys sent me, that Russia's levers of maligned influence in Ukraine are so extensive and 1 widespread they hardly needed Hunter Biden in order to 2 undermine the country. You know, the Russians had deeply 3 penetrated--after the collapse of the Soviet Union they 4 deeply penetrated Ukrainian intelligence, the Ukrainian 5 military. The whole energy sector was controlled by Russian 6 interests, because what we're talking about in this instance 7 was Russian gas from Russia flowing through Ukraine to 8 wealthy Russian customers by Germany. That's why the whole 9 U.S. Government, to include the Senate, has been so emphatic 10 in working to block the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and it's 11 exactly the right policy, is you've got to strangle this 12 stuff off.

So Russia has so many levers of maligned influence in Ukraine. There was, as I said there was one instance of a media outlet, which we judged to be heavily influenced, if not a direct tool of the Russian intelligence services, which lifted this issue up as part of an apparent effort to membarrass Vice President Biden. But it didn't get much traction, and as I said, this was not an issue that was widely talked about or widely reported at the time when I was in Ukraine. My guess is there's probably more attention in Ukraine today to all of this stuff than there was at the time when I was there, but you'd have to ask our current team.

25 MR. DOWNEY: So you mentioned your September 2015

speech in Odessa where you specifically raised Zlochevsky.
 Is Zlochevsky an oligarch that's aligned with Russians?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Again, I think you're sort of-you're straining both my recollection and also my expertise on oligarchs in Ukraine. Most Ukrainian oligarchs, including the really big ones, you know, people like Rinat Akhmetov, people like the head of PrivatBank, whose name is escaping me for a minute--

9 MR. DOWNEY: Kolomoyskyi?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yeah--who, of course, has recently been indicted by the United States Department of Justice because of corrupt activities in the United States. You know, all of these guys are shady, to one degree or another. Zlochevsky, you know, was a minnow compared to a guy like Kolomoyskyi or Akhmetov. So, you know, you asked me is he corrupt. I don't know. You know, certainly the judgment of my Department of Justice experts--and his tenure as an Environment Minister, was before my arrival. So certainly the judgment of my Department of Justice experts who pursued the asset forfeiture case with the UK against him was that he was deeply corrupt, in terms of his work as Environment Minister.

23 MR. DOWNEY: Understood. I think this will be Exhibit 24 3, and it will be Tab 4, Will, and it's a December 6, 2015, 25 email that you wrote, Mr. Ambassador. So this is right 1 before Vice President Biden's trip to Ukraine in December of 2 2015.

3 [Pyatt Exhibit No. 3 was
4 marked for identification.]
5 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yep. Yeah, this is the Russian
6 origin story that we just talked about.

7 MR. DOWNEY: Understood. So on December 6, 2015, you 8 wrote an emailing saying, "I assume all of you have the DOJ 9 background on Zlochevsky, the short unclassed version in 10 non-lawyer language, is that the U.S. and UK were 11 cooperating on a case to seize his corrupt assets overseas 12 which had passed through the United States. The case fell 13 apart when individuals in the PGO acted to thwart the U.S. 14 case."

15 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Right. That's what I described 16 earlier.

MR. DOWNEY: So what was the DOJ background on 18 Zlochevsky? Do they have a report drafted on him? What was 19 that about?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: I think you'll have to ask the Department of Justice. You know, again, I'm neither a lawyer nor a Department of Justice official. I relied on the advice that was provided by my DOJ team. But I'm sure they will be happy to answer that question.

25 MR. DOWNEY: So there might be more information in the

1 classified version of this document?

2 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I'm certain that the Department of 3 Justice has more information about Zlochevsky because they 4 were pursuing an international legal assistance case on the 5 United Kingdom.

6 MR. DOWNEY: Do you know what section of DOJ was trying 7 to perfect that case?

8 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I have no idea. I would probably 9 start with Bruce Swartz, who is the most competent official 10 I've found in the Department of Justice on almost anything 11 that involves this part of the world, Assistant Attorney 12 General who is a superb civil servant. He knows his ground 13 as well as anybody in the U.S. Government.

MR. DOWNEY: So you sent this email to State officials and senior officials and Vice President Biden's office, including Kate Bedingfield, Michael Carpenter, and Colin Kahl.

18 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Right.

MR. DOWNEY: Why did you assume members of Vice President Biden's office had the DOJ background on Zlochevsky?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Because that's the way the a interagency process works. Mike Carpenter, who is the person further down on this string, was the Vice President's expert on all of these Ukraine issues, and he was somebody 1 who was involved in all of our meetings and all of our 2 discussions, and so was Colin Kahl. So I knew that Mike 3 would have access to the additional classified information. 4 MR. DOWNEY: So at that time Hunter Biden had joined 5 Burisma's board in May of 2014, and this email from December 6 of 2015. So Vice President Biden's staff, at that time, 7 knew that DOJ had a case against the owner of Burisma. 8 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I think you'll have to ask them 9 that.

10 MR. DOWNEY: Um--

AMBASSADOR PYATT: And again, as I said, I am--as I told you earlier, I can't remember, at the time I gave the Odessa speech I can't even remember if I was aware that Zlochevsky--the speech was about Loches's role as Environment Minister. It was not about Burisma. And I don't recall at what time I became aware of the linkage there.

18 MR. DOWNEY: Understood. Can we go back and talk 19 about--

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Again this whole--this email chain, if you read further down, the whole article, which we believed at the time was from a Russian-influenced source, was about Hunter Biden and it was about Burisma and allegations of corruption. So again, that's--you know, there you have it, in terms of what the Russians were trying 1 to put out and what they were trying to propagate.

2 But I want to emphasize what I said earlier, that this 3 was not a prominent issue in Ukraine at the time.

4 MR. DOWNEY: So I want to kind of explore the gentleman 5 who served as Prosecutor General before Shokin. That was 6 Yarema.

7 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes.

8 MR. DOWNEY: And you had mentioned that the case that 9 the U.S. and the UK were trying to perfect against 10 Zlochevsky had fallen apart in December of 2014.

11 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Right.

MR. DOWNEY: Are you aware of allegations that I3 Zlochevsky bribed members of Yarema's team?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Now that you mention it I remember that that was part of the charge sheet that was made against Zlochevsky, but again, you know, it was a while ago. You've obviously looked at the history more closely than I have. MR. DOWNEY: Your DCM, George Kent, was--who was spoke to, sir, spoke at length about the alleged bribe and the dollar amount of \$7 million to Yarema's team, and the case falling apart as well. So do you know anything more about whether those allegations were given to U.S. authorities? What do you know about the alleged bribe?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: I know much less than George, 25 because at that time he was the European Bureau's senior

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1 advisor on anticorruption issues, so he followed this stuff
2 intimately. He also followed it from Washington. And one
3 of the other things that you learn as Ambassador is the
4 United States is blessed with a hugely competent
5 intelligence community that gathers a vast array of
6 information. As Ambassador, even as Ambassador, you don't
7 see all of that information because some of it is highly
8 compartmented and is handled just in Washington channels.
9 So there would have been things that George would have seen,
10 working on these issues from Washington, that I would only
11 see if I was visiting Washington and INR asked me to come
12 into a SCIF and sign a piece of paper and get briefed into
13 some compartment. So that's just how the U.S. Government
14 process works.

MR. DOWNEY: So Mr. Kent, Jeff Cole, that you've mentioned during our time with you, from what we understand they seem to be pretty up-to-date and knowledgeable about this alleged bribe that Zlochevsky gave to Yarema's prosecutors or his team. I think you said that Jeff Cole was a good resident legal advisor.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: I was lucky to have him on the team. MR. DOWNEY: Do you known if Mr. Kent and Mr. Cole continued to pursue those allegations, to make sure that U.S. officials, when they could, investigate that or be part of the team to investigate whether that bribe occurred? 1 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yeah, I mean, you're getting to a 2 level of detail--

3 MR. SCHRAM: I didn't bring up Blue Star.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: --that was below my level of attention as Ambassador. The other thing you find out as Ambassador is, you know, the U.S. government is a big renterprise and you've got to trust your people. I was really fortunate when I was in Ukraine that I had a really strong team. But if I sort of got down into the weeds on everything they dealt with I wouldn't have been able to deal with the other two pillars of our efforts that I've spent some time talking about tonight.

MR. DOWNEY: And just for the record, Zack, I think 14 your mic was on again.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: I'm happy to talk about Blue Star 6 when we get there, as long as we can do it in the next 40 7 minutes or so.

18 MR. DOWNEY: Well, let's do it since Zack didn't think 19 we were going to get to it. Did you meet with Blue Star in 20 December of 2015?

21 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes, I did.

22 MR. DOWNEY: And who--did you request a meeting with 23 them or did Blue Star?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: No, they did. You know, they came 25 to me as an American business group, wanting to introduce 1 themselves and explain what they were doing in Ukraine.

2 I've maintained an open-door policy with American business 3 people there and here. It's served me well and it's helped 4 me to advance America's commercial interests.

5 MR. DOWNEY: So we understand this meeting was at the 6 U.S. Embassy in Ukraine on December 16, 2015.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes. That sounds about right.
MR. DOWNEY: Can you tell us what Blue Star officials
9 wanted to discuss with you?

10 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I actually don't know. I can't 11 remember. But what I'll share with you is that about a year 12 ago, when the impeachment process was getting going, I was 13 approached by a prominent U.S. reporter who was working on 14 this story, and he came to me for comment, because he was 15 seeking to report on the Blue Star issue. He told me, the 16 journalist, in the question told me that he had spoken to 17 Blue Star and that they had come to see me, and that they 18 had made their pitch on Burisma and how the company's role 19 had been misunderstood, and that they found me totally 20 inflexible and unresponsive to their pitch, which sounds 21 like me.

So beyond that, though, I don't remember the specifics of the meeting. I don't remember the specific points that they were making to me. I expect I would have been joined--I'm certain I would have been joined by some other Embassy 1 officials, but I just don't recall the specifics of the 2 conversation. It would have been, you know, one of, you 3 know, many, many meetings that I would have had that week in 4 the fire hose issues that I was dealing with as Ambassador 5 at that time.

6 MR. DOWNEY: What did Blue Star believe you were 7 inflexible on?

8 AMBASSADOR PYATT: The nature of the allegations 9 against Zlochevsky. I think you will know the timing and 10 the tick-tock better than I will because you've got it in 11 front of you, but I think this was after my Odessa speech. 12 So they probably felt aggrieved by the way I characterized 13 Mr. Zlochevsky. I don't know if they were working for him 14 at the time, but it wouldn't surprise me that they would 15 have raised concerns because I was very blunt, as you know. 16 MR. DOWNEY: At this December 16, 2015, meeting between 17 you and Blue Star officials, did Blue Star officials discuss 18 Burisma?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Again, I don't remember. The reporter that I alluded to tells me, or told me, in an email, that he had been told that they had raised Burisma with me.

23 MR. DOWNEY: Did Blue Star officials with the U.S. at 24 this December 16th, 2015, meeting raise Hunter Biden's name? 25 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I would be very surprised. My 1 reputation precedes me in that regard.

2 MR. DOWNEY: Did you have any other further meetings 3 with Blue Star officials when you served as Ambassador to 4 Ukraine up until the summer of 2016?

5 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Not that I can recall. They came to 6 see me once here in Greece working on behalf of another 7 client, Caesars International, in conjunction with a 8 billion-dollar integrated resort tender that the Greek 9 government is proceeding with.

10 At the time, we had three American bidders or 11 interested parties. One was Caesars. One was a company 12 called Mohegan. The other was Hard Rock. And I was very, 13 very careful in that instance as well to meet with any of 14 the American companies interested so that I couldn't be 15 accused of favoring one over the other.

MR. DOWNEY: During this December 16th, 2015, meeting with Blue Star officials, when you speak, sir, are you speaking for the U.S. government policy--

19 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Everything I've said--

20 MR. DOWNEY: --and the views of the U.S. government?
21 AMBASSADOR PYATT: --is the police of the U.S.

22 government. That's the dilemma of being Ambassador, for 23 better or worse. You don't get a day off.

24 MR. DOWNEY: So your speech in Odessa is the same? 25 It's what the U.S. policy and views are? 1 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Of course, just like the speech that 2 I gave yesterday with a delegation from EXIM and the 3 Development Finance Corporation. Everything I say publicly 4 is the policy of the United States government.

5 MR. DOWNEY: And that seemed to be clear to Blue Star 6 since they saw you as inflexible. No? Is that a yes?

7 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yeah. So I'm--I didn't hear a 8 question. Sorry.

9 MR. DOWNEY: So when you spoke with them in December of 10 2015, you said that it seemed they thought you were 11 inflexible regarding Burisma and Zlochevsky-

12 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes.

13 MR. DOWNEY: -- and your comments about them.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes. Although again, I want to emphasize I do not recall the conversation. So the only-the only recollection I'm offering is that which was conveyed to me by a reporter from a major American media outlet, which then went into the State Department public affairs machine and I don't think we ever responded to. MR. DOWNEY: Are you aware of Blue Star officials, after they met you in December of 2015, meeting with other bureaus and State Department officials here in Washington? AMBASSADOR PYATT: I know from the documents that you sent that they also met with Under Secretary Novelli, our Under Secretary for Economic Affairs in the State 1 Department. As I recall, that meeting was focused on the 2 pitch for more resources, additional U.S. government funding 3 for Ukraine.

MR. DOWNEY: So during that time period after you met
with them in December of 2015, were you surprised at how
aggressive Blue Star officials were with meetings with
Ukrainians, meetings with other State Department officials?
AMBASSADOR PYATT: I met with Paul Manafort when he was

9 working for President Yanukovych. So I'm not surprised by 10 lobbying people working hard for their clients.

11 MR. DOWNEY: Understood.

12 Just one second, sir.

13 [Pause.]

MR. DOWNEY: So I'm going back to the December 2015 meeting you had with Blue Star officials. Would you have represented to Blue Star that your representation was the views of the United States government?

18 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Absolutely.

19 MR. DOWNEY: Understood.

I'm looking around because I'm trying to figure out how much time we may or may not have. I guess--I've been told we have one minute.

23 With this final minute, I'll ask you this, sir. After 24 Shokin was removed by the Rada, he was voted out, as you 25 know. That's their process. There was an interim and then 1 Lutsenko becomes the prosecutor general.

2 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Right.

3 MR. DOWNEY: And I know you left Kyiv to go to Athens. 4 Your nomination occurs in the summer of 2016. What was your 5 hope, and what was your view of Lutsenko when he took over 6 the prosecutor general's office in 2016?

7 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yeah. I was actually among those 8 who thought that Lutsenko would be able to deal better with 9 the problem for the prosecutor general's office. He is 10 somebody who himself had been a victim of selective 11 prosecution. Members of Congress, Senator Durbin, I think 12 Senator McCain, and others worked very hard to achieve his 13 release from jail in a politically--what the State 14 Department considered to be a politically motivated 15 prosecution.

And I remember when I was taking the reins in Kyiv, my predecessor, John Tefft, describing to me how emotional it was when he went to meet--went to meet Yuriy Lutsenko when he was released from prison during--before my arrival. And then during the Revolution of Dignity, during the demonstrations of the Maidan, Lutsenko had played a prominent role among those calling for Yanukovych's removal and among those calling for reform. He then was an active player in Ukrainian politics.

25 So I had gotten to know him as a political figure and

as somebody who professed to be strongly committed to
 building the kind of modern European state that we talked
 about. So I was among those who was hopeful when he was
 named.

5 I mentioned earlier I think that--and you exactly 6 described the politically sensitive process of parliamentary 7 approval that the new prosecutor general had to receive, and 8 I remember some back-and-forth with Washington at the time 9 about how Lutsenko's history and his past would work both in 10 favor and against his parliamentary approval.

But I certainly was among those who was hopeful that he would turn a new page in terms of how the prosecutor general's office operated. I think that view was shared by a lot of my colleagues in the interagency community, and as you noted, I departed in August. So I wasn't around for hat happened afterwards.

MR. DOWNEY: So before you departed in August, sir, was Burisma's owner, Zlochevsky, ever held accountable for Athens?

20 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I don't--you know, he--Zlochevsky 21 certainly was not that I recall.

I think I've made available to you--and if not, the State Department, I'm sure would be happy to. I'm quite proud of my last interview in Kyiv. It was given to the Kyiv Post around July, but I was asked-- 1 MR. DOWNEY: We've read it, yeah.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: I think it's a very good distillation of what I tried to do over my three years, and let me add. I know you guys have had to listen to a lot of my ambassadorial war stories, but if I can just give you one more philosophical point.

7 You know, I've had an extraordinary privilege over 8 seven years now to represent the people and government of 9 the United States of America. The most humbling experience 10 that I've had in both countries is when random citizens--and 11 it's happened in both Ukraine and here in Greece. People 12 I've never seen before come up to me on the street and say, 13 "Ambassador, you don't know me, but I just want to say thank 14 you for what America is doing to help my country."

But you have to--you know, you always have to remember, and this is my--sometimes my political appointed colleagues aren't as good about remembering this because I come out of a system where I worked 25 years before I held up my hand and swore the oath of office.

But you always have to remember it's the office, it's not you, and it's temporary. And so when you're in that role, I always say it's like paddling those--remember the cartoons with the canoe above a waterfall? And you're sort of handed the paddle, and you just row as hard as you can. And you pull as hard as you can, and you hope that you move 1 the canoe forward a little bit. And then at some point, you
2 tag out, and somebody else comes in and picks up the paddle
3 and keeps rowing.

And I think on these issues of anticorruption in particular, I'm hugely proud. First of all, I'm proud that the canoe didn't go over the waterfall. I'm proud of the fact that we clearly moved the issues forward. The situation was better when I left Ukraine than it was when I arrived, both in terms of the forwarding of Vladimir Putin's agenda, but also the beginnings of the process of reform.

And you'll see in that interview, I talked a lot about how with that three-year time perspective, I was optimistic that Ukraine had reached a point of no turning back. The process of reform had proceeded far enough that there would never be another Yanukovych, just institutionally corrupted, depended on Russia dictator.

I still think that's the case, and as I said, I wouldn't have been able to say that without very strong support from Senator Johnson and, as I said, Senator McCain, Senator Menendez, Senator Durbin, Senator Portman. I'm going to leave out a few people, and I'll feel bad about it when I read the transcript.

But all of that was done in the spirit of a bipartisan U.S. policy, and it pains me greatly to see how this bipartisan issue, which is so important to the interest of 1 the United States and Europe, has become such an issue of 2 political discord.

3 MR. DOWNEY: Well, we thank you for your continued 4 service, Mr. Ambassador.

5 It's 1:37, and the Majority's time has ended, and we'll 6 turn it over to the Minority.

7 Thank you, sir.

8 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Thanks.

9 MR. SCHRAM: Ambassador Pyatt, in your frequent travels 10 with the members of the congressional Ukrainian caucus, did 11 any of them ever bring up Hunter Biden's position on the 12 board of Burisma?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Not that I recall. I had a phone call with--during my time as Ambassador, there was no instance that I can recall. I had a phone call with Senator Graham about a year ago. It was relatively brief. It was when I was in Washington, and he asked me exactly that sissue. And I was very gratified. I gave him the answer, which you would expect me to give, basically the threeminute version of what we've spent the past two and a half hours on, and Senator Graham's answer to me was along the lines of "Thank you very much, Ambassador. You know how much we all respect your work." It's important for me to hear that from you.

25 MR. SCHRAM: So Chairman Johnson never mentioned it to

1 you in 2014, '15, or '16?

2 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Not that I can recall, but again,3 Senator Johnson will know better.

MR. SCHRAM: With respect to your meeting with Blue Star, we've discussed with the Majority, and apologies for the hot mic incident. Thank you, Brian, for your grace in handling it. Was Hunter Biden's name used by Blue Star or any representative from Burisma in order to secure a meeting with you?

10 AMBASSADOR PYATT: No.

MR. SCHRAM: Did you provide special treatment to Blue 12 Star Strategies?

13 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Absolutely not.

14 MR. SCHRAM: At the time of you--

AMBASSADOR PYATT: I don't even think I gave them a cup 16 of coffee.

17 MR. SCHRAM: I could use a cup of coffee.

At the time of your meeting in December 2015, what was the State Department's perception of Burisma, briefly? AMBASSADOR PYATT: Again, I just--I can't answer that question well be cause it just was not on my radar scope. It was not something that I was talking about with Washington policy officials.

We dealt with it in the context of the press guidance,which had to be developed around Vice President Biden's

1 visit to Kyiv.

Energy companies generally in Ukraine for the reasons I described earlier, there are a lot of--there are a lot of "watch out fors" around anybody who is in the energy business in Ukraine because the penetration--the relations with Russia are so deep because the history of corruption is so longstanding. And again, Zlochevsky is an example of that.

9 But I've also worked with very well-known American 10 energy companies like ExxonMobil and Chevron, and I trusted 11 that they had corporate compliance policies. And if you 12 talk to an executive from ExxonMobil and Chevron, they would 13 tell you exactly the same thing about the energy business in 14 the post-Soviet world.

And remember I was involved with these issues in Wraine as Ambassador but also as PDAS in SCA where I was responsible for the countries of Central Asia. So that includes oil export in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. So this was pretty familiar ground to me, and you just learned to tread very carefully and follow all of the rules that the I.S. government system has put in place so that our behavior as senior government officials is transparent and above reproach.

24 MR. SCHRAM: And that was the case in this instance, 25 too? 1 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes.

2 MR. SCHRAM: Your behavior and the behavior of other 3 senior department officials was beyond reproach?

4 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes.

5 MR. SCHRAM: Did your perception of Burisma change as a 6 result of one meeting with Blue Star?

7 AMBASSADOR PYATT: No.

8 MR. SCHRAM: Did the State Department's views on 9 Burisma change after meetings with Blue Star?

10 AMBASSADOR PYATT: No

MR. SCHRAM: Based on what you know and observed, did U.S. policy change in any manner to favor Burisma as a result of Blue Star's representation?

14 AMBASSADOR PYATT: No.

MR. SCHRAM: Did Hunter Biden's role at Burisma become a means to influence matters at the State Department in any way?

18 AMBASSADOR PYATT: In no way at all.

MR. SCHRAM: Do you believe that your interaction with 20 Blue Star executives influenced matters at the State

21 Department to change Ukraine policy?

22 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Not in the slightest way.

23 MR. SCHRAM: Do you believe Blue Star's interaction 24 with any State Department officials influenced matters at 25 the State Department to change Ukraine policy?

1 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Not that I'm aware of because policy 2 was consistent throughout the time that I was dealing with 3 it. It only became harder. It didn't become softer. MR. SCHRAM: Turning briefly to the loan conditions, 4 5 you mentioned during the first hour that there was an 6 interagency process. We've spoken about that at length. 7 And conditions were set for Ukraine to receive a third loan 8 guarantee. 9 I'm marking at Exhibit B--this is a document. At the 10 top of the first page, the number is 017179. It's an email 11 exchange. The first page is dated January 15th, 2016. 12 [Pyatt Exhibit B was marked 13 for identification. 14 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yeah. That's the one you guys just

16 them out just before--

15 sent me. Let me see where I put this. I literally printed

17 MR. SCHRAM: I will ask you about--

18 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yeah, I've got it.

19 MR. SCHRAM: You've got it. Okay.

20 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I think so. Yeah, "Have a good 21 weekend." Yeah, I've got it.

22 MR. SCHRAM: So turning to the page that shows the 23 proposed conditions of--proposed conditions precedent.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Right. Yeah. You guys can take the 25 document down now. I've got it in front of me. 1 MR. SCHRAM: So there were other conditions beyond 2 reform of the prosecutor general's office, correct?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yeah. I talked about that in our first hour, but yeah, it was designed to deal with issues like privatization and energy sector reform as well.

6 MR. SCHRAM: Were those conditions met before providing 7 the third loan guarantee?

8 AMBASSADOR PYATT: I assume all of the conditions were 9 met before providing the third loan guarantee. I'll have 10 to--I haven't looked at this stuff for a number of years 11 now, but I seem to recall that all of them would have been 12 met.

I would also note an editorial comment and a process comment. One, for me, the most interesting thing about this document is the email distro, which I think illustrates the point I made quite a bit earlier about the vast U.S. government machine that developed these conditions and the number of different dot-gov email addresses that are there, I think, gives you a good sense of how broad the interagency team that reached these conclusions and these conditions was.

And then the other process point I would emphasize is I know from talking to my USAID colleagues that these loan quarantees' conditions are formerly briefed to Congress. So there would have been a congressional notification process, and there are questions which Congress and especially
 appropriations staff asks as part of that process. I assume
 there would be a record about that, that would refine that.

And then when it comes to the time of disbursement, there would have to be some kind of a certification action memo that would check off all the boxes.

So we're talking about a lot of U.S. taxpayer money.
So it's not something that anybody gets to decide in their
back pocket.

MR. SCHRAM: Prosecutor General Shokin was dismissed by 11 the Rada in March of 2016. Do you recall when the loan 12 guarantee was provided?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: No. But I'm sure--I know that there is an Embassy Kyiv press release that has a picture of me and the then prime minister. It was a new prime minister at that point, Prime Minster Groysman and the mission director, and I vividly remember the room we were in and trying to fit the whole cabinet into a single photograph in the room. So I'm sure that's an easy fact to determine. Just google "Embassy Kyiv Pyatt loan guarantee." It should pop right up.

22 MR. SCHRAM: We'll try that. Our understanding is it 23 was in September 2016. Is that consistent with what you've 24 just described?

25 AMBASSADOR PYATT: No, because that would have been

1 after my departure, but maybe I'm remembering the second 2 loan guarantee in that case. But, anyway, the--yeah.

3 MR. SCHRAM: But it was well after the dismissal of 4 Prosecutor General Shokin and depended in part on the other 5 conditions that you've outlined, correct?

6 AMBASSADOR PYATT: That's correct.

7 MR. SCHRAM: The Majority referred to Exhibit 2, the 8 email exchange dated December 5th and 6th, 2016. You were 9 one of the recipients of the email on December 5th regarding 10 the article, the Ukrainian--quote, Ukrainian scam of the 11 Biden family"

12 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Right. That's the Russian malign 13 influence example that I talked about.

MR. SCHRAM: Right. Was there any merit to the 15 allegations in the article that the Biden family would begin 16 a, quote, large-scale privatization of Ukraine?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Of course not. This was manufactured fake information that Russia put out in order to undermine U.S. policy.

20 MR. SCHRAM: Or a, quote, seizure of state enterprises? 21 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Again, completely manufactured and 22 very typical of the lines of misinformation that Russia 23 propagated in Ukraine.

Again, remember you have a whole generation of Soviet 25 Ukrainians, and so this issue of state enterprises and 1 selling off of state enterprises was a very potent--a very
2 potent button to press, especially for older Ukrainians who
3 were nostalgic for what they viewed as the more predictable
4 and safer life that they had in Soviet times.

5 MR. SCHRAM: And the argument that Hunter Biden's 6 position on the board of Burisma corrupted U.S. 7 anticorruption efforts in Ukraine, do you include that as 8 part of the Russian disinformation narrative?

9 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes, of course. And it's of a 10 pattern with lots of other Russian disinformation.

Even here in Greece, the embassy has active programs to help expose Russian disinformation and fake media exactly like this, which talks about the ecumenical patriarch, the Russian church, the Greek Orthodox church. This is a toolkit which Russia is using across Europe to undermine security and advance their perceived interests.

MR. SCHRAM: Briefly, what are effective ways to 18 confront Russian disinformation?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: So I have talked about my work with Senator Portman earlier. I am very grateful for the work that Senator Portman, in particular, has led along with Senator Murphy to authorize and fund the Global Engagement Center. Lea Gabrielle at the State Department is a good colleague and a big part of her work, and I'm very proud of the fact that here in Greece, we've been able to partner with Lea Gabrielle and the GEC in order to develop public
 programs to educate citizens and media to be more discerning
 consumers of Russian misinformation.

I wish we had had a tool like that at the time that this stuff was happening in Ukraine because we could have used it, and again, this is--I talked at the very beginning about the challenge of Russia's hybrid warfare tactics and how we as a government are learning how to be more robust in the way that we push back on that. And this is, I think, an important element of it.

MR. SCHRAM: You testified that Russia hardly needed Hunter Biden to work towards undermining Ukraine?

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yeah. A better choice of words was Russia did not need, but yes, I said "hardly needed." Scorrect.

MR. SCHRAM: So in your view, Russia didn't need Hunter MR. SCHRAM: So in your view, Russia didn't need Hunter Biden in their work to undermine Ukraine, but they're clearly using Hunter Biden now in an effort to undermine our election currently. Knowing what you know about Russian malign influence and the credibility of actors like Andrii Derkach, Andrii Telizhenko, and others, how should we evaluate narratives promoted by Ukrainian proxies of Russia with respect to the corruption of the Vice President's policy, promotion of U.S. policy in Ukraine as a result of Hunter Biden being on the board of Burisma? 1 AMBASSADOR PYATT: So I'm going to be very careful on 2 this one, again, because of the classified content of some 3 of it. And, of course, I ceased to be responsible for 4 Ukrainian policy in August of 2016, and I've made it a 5 pretty strict policy that we've got one Ambassador at a 6 time. Or right now we don't have an Ambassador, but I hope 7 that will change soon. General Wald (phonetic) is a 8 fantastic nominee.

9 I think the Treasury statement and the State Department 10 statement of September 12th don't leave much doubt in terms 11 of the ways in which Russia is using Mr. Derkach. He tried 12 to influence malignly our democracy, our election process. 13 I know that Secretary Pompeo has been very clear in his 14 public statements about the fact that Russia needs to stop, 15 and I think beyond that, in terms of the specific mechanisms 16 that Russia has used, some of which I have been briefed on 17 at a high level of classification, I think that goes beyond 18 what we can do in this unclassified setting.

MR. SCHRAM: Understood. Again, the Treasury's statement refers to false and unsubstantiated narratives concerning U.S. officials in the upcoming 2020 Presidential election. Is the narrative that Vice President Biden's actions in the Ukraine were corrupt, is that a false narrative?

25 AMBASSADOR PYATT: Yes, it is. And I think you only

1 need to look at what Secretary Pompeo said about Derkach,
2 what Treasury said about Derkach, and their contemporaneous
3 release of privileged telephone conversations between the
4 Vice President and President Poroshenko by Derkach to
5 understand what's referred to there.

6 MR. SCHRAM: Ambassador Pyatt, we are very appreciative 7 of your time. I want to note for the record that you 8 offered to conduct this via written interrogatories, and 9 I'll mark as Exhibit C a letter to Chairman Johnson from 10 Acting Assistant Secretary for Leg. Affairs Ryan Kaldahl, 11 which notes that you'd like to answer our questions without 12 compromising your ability to perform critical duties during 13 this fragile time in the Eastern Mediterranean.

14 [Pyatt Exhibit C was marked
15 for identification.]
16 MR. SCHRAM: The Chairmen elected not to accept

17 handling this via interrogatory, which has led to your 18 testimony today. I won't take any more of your time. We're 19 very grateful for your service, and I wish you luck in your 20 current duties.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Thank you. I need it. MR. DOWNEY: All right. Ambassador Pyatt, Chairman Johnson and Chairman Grassley also thank you for your service. And as we mention to all witnesses at the end, as soon as we have a transcript available, we will provide it 1 to your counsel for you and them to review. I think that 2 this conversation that we had today was fruitful, and it's 3 good to see you. And if no one else has any comments, we 4 can go off the record.

5 MR. FOLIO: Brian, this is Joe. Just one last comment, 6 Ambassador Pyatt, with regard to the letter that Mr. Schram 7 referred to. The letter offered two options: written 8 responses or this interview. And I think Chairman Johnson 9 chose this interview because, frankly, it's a more efficient 10 way, more dynamic environment to answer our questions. We 11 recognize that it's time away from your work. We appreciate 12 you being very generous with your time, and having gone this 13 route, I don't see much, if any, need for follow-up.

14 Again, we appreciate it. Thank you very much for your 15 service, and nothing else from us.

AMBASSADOR PYATT: Great. Thank you. And I would just ask, in addition to my counsel, I would ask that the State Department be given the opportunity to review the transcript as well, both to make sure that I didn't glance too close to any of the issues of classification, but also because uniquely I'm the one person who's speaking as a sitting Ambassador to Ukraine and as somebody--a Presidential appointee now of two Presidents. So I want to make very sure that everything that I'm saying is fully convergent with U.S. policy. I presented this speaking as a sitting

1 Ambassador, and in that sense I'm offering not personal 2 views but the views of the U.S. Department of State, so they 3 should be given the opportunity to review and correct 4 anything that I've gotten wrong. MR. FOLIO: We'll make sure that happens. MR. DOWNEY: All right. It's 1:57, and we're off the 7 record. AMBASSADOR PYATT: Thanks, everybody. [Whereupon, at 1:58 p.m., the interview was concluded.] 

From:	
Sent:	Mon, 23 Nov 2015 14:20:28 -0500
То:	
Cc:	EUR Ukraine Clearances
Subject:	*REMINDER: OOB Monday, 11/23 Clearance - VPOTUS Yats & VPOTUS
Poroshenko BCLs	
Attachments: clearance.docx	MP01 - VPOTUS-P2_for clearance.docx, MP02 - VPOTUS-Yats_for

Please clear on these. The latest versions are attached.

#### Best,

SBU This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From:	
Sent: Monday, November 23, 20	5 10:37 AM
To: D EUR Duty Officer2;	; D-MR Clearance; EUR-Press; EUR-RUS-POL-
DL	
Cc: EUR Ukraine Clearances	
Subject: REMINDER: OOB Mond	y, 11/23 Clearance - VPOTUS Yats & VPOTUS Poroshenko BCLs
(+EUR RUS Pol since	is covering for .)

Colleagues,

Attached are the updated P2 and Yats VPOTUS BCLs that include the edits I have received thus far. **Please clear ASAP.** This needs to go up shortly.

Best,

SBU This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From:

Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2015 5:19 PM

To: D EUR Duty Officer2; D-MR Clearance; EUR-Press; EUR-RPM-OSCE-DL; Cc: EUR Ukraine Clearances Subject: OOB Monday, 11/23 Clearance - VPOTUS Yats & VPOTUS Poroshenko BCLs Importance: High

Colleagues,

Please clear on the attached BCLs for the VPOTUS Kiev trip **by OOB tomorrow**. A/S Nuland needs to see these tomorrow before she leaves on travel.

Both papers are extremely similar. Thanks for your help and please let me know if you have questions.



Ukraine Desk Tel: (202) 647-4117 UNCLASS: SIPR:

SBU This email is UNCLASSIFIED. SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

November 22, 2015

### Vice President Biden's Meeting with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko December 7-8 (TBC)

## **GOALS AND OBJECTIVES**

(SBU) Your visit to Kyiv comes as infighting among the parties in Ukraine's governing coalition is growing and stalling progress on the government's agenda, popular disaffection with the government is mounting over difficult economic reforms and conditions, and public doubts are worsening over political leaders' (particularly President Poroshenko and PM Yatsenyuk) commitment to breaking with old-style politics and rooting out corruption. Your meeting with Poroshenko will be an opportunity to press for reenergizing the reform agenda, particularly critical progress on anti-corruption, offer new U.S. support, and encourage Ukraine to continue its efforts at Minsk implementation, particularly on securing an agreement on local elections in the Donbas. Your last call with Poroshenko was November 5 and your last meeting was in New York on September 28.

## BACKGROUND

1. (SBU) Unity and Reforms: With local elections in the rear-view mirror and an economy that while still in difficulty, seems to have moved back from the precipice, the time is ripe for President Poroshenko to reanimate his reform agenda. You should recommend that he give a state of the nation speech to the Rada in which he reenergizes that effort and rolls out new proposed reforms. There is wide agreement that anti-corruption must be at the top of this list, and that reforms must include an overhaul of the Prosecutor General's Office including removal of Prosecutor General Shokin, who is widely regarded as an obstacle to fighting corruption, if not a source of the problem. Reform priorities should also include the judiciary and standing up the new national investigative bureau (akin to the FBI). You will want to press Poroshenko to eschew radical plans and agree with Yatsenyuk on a 2016 budget and tax plan that are consistent with the IMFrecommended program. Poroshenko has prioritized privatization, and you should encourage the government to set up a mega-holding company for 10-20 state-owned enterprises, which will help cut off traditional sources of corruption.

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- 2. (SBU) U.S. Assistance: Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk will be looking for tangible signs of U.S. support to assist the Ukrainian people during these difficult times, facilitate further reforms, and help with efforts to defend against Russian aggression. You will sign our third billion-dollar loan guarantee and publicly announce FY 15 U.S. assistance for the first time: \$189,035,756 -- which does not include security assistance (previously announced separately). Our support will go to top nonsecurity priorities including: assistance to fight corruption, strengthening the rule of law, supporting civil society, restoring economic stability, carrying out democratic and constitutional reforms, advancing energy security, and supporting OSCE monitoring in eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Government has asked for more security assistance and continues to probe occasionally about the possibility of lethal assistance, including beefing up air defenses. Following the successful U.S. National Guard train and equip program which ended on Nov 8, multinational training of Ukrainian conventional and Special Forces began on November 23. The UK, Canada, Lithuania, and Estonia are also participating in training.
- 3. (SBU) Minsk Implementation: You should relay to Poroshenko that the President Obama told President Putin at the G-20 summit that we insist on full implementation of the Minsk agreements. The President agreed with Quint leaders that the EU should renew its sanctions on Russia for six months to be followed by another six month extension if Russia and the separatists do not honor their Minsk commitments. In the past few weeks, combined Russian-separatist forces have ratcheted up attacks on Ukrainian positions, with reports of new weapons and personnel entering separatist territory from Russia. Russia and the separatists also continue to deny OSCE monitors access and to block the delivery of humanitarian supplies by UN agencies and NGOs. Recent meetings of the Normandy format and Trilateral Contact Group and its working groups have resulted in limited progress on some issues like demining, but none on the next key step of agreeing on Donbas election modalities. This is due to Russia and the separatists' refusal to engage on the election proposal put forward by Ukraine in the political working group, which the government is working to sell to political parties in the Rada simultaneously -- a big challenge. You should encourage Ukraine to put its best foot forward despite these difficulties and offer our help.

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#### TALKING POINTS

#### 1. (SBU) Unity and Reforms:

- Now that the local elections are over, you and Prime Minister Yatsenyuk need to continue to show unity and reenergize reforms.
- You should do so in a major state-of-the-nation speech to the Rada in which you list the new reforms you plan to pass soon.
- Anti-corruption efforts have to be at the top of your agenda. That will mean standing up the National Investigative Bureau.
- It will also require changing the Prosecutor General who is damaging your credibility and obstructing the fight against corruption.
- I urge you to work with the Prime Minister to present a 2016 budget and tax plan that is in line with the IMF program.
- I commend your efforts on reform of the judiciary and hope that effort will continue to move ahead quickly.
- We agree that privatization will be critical, but it must be transparent and well-managed and we think that requires a holding entity that can prevent corruption until state-owned enterprises are fully private.

## 2. (SBU) U.S. Support:

- We will continue to stand behind you and your reform efforts.
- I will sign a billion-dollar loan guarantee with you today and announce additional, new assistance for Ukraine of nearly \$190 million.
- This assistance will go to reform priorities such as: fighting corruption, strengthening the rule of law, restoring economic stability, advancing energy security, carrying out democratic and constitutional reforms, and supporting OSCE monitoring in eastern Ukraine.
- This new announcement does not include security assistance, which we will continue to work separately with you and through the Multinational Joint Commission. I'm pleased the next phase of multinational training of Ukraine's conventional Special Forces started Nov 23.
- We need Ukraine to commit the personnel and resources to make this training effort and the Multinational Joint Commission successful.
- In addition to training, we urge you to commit to institutional reform to build long-term sustainable defense capacity. We stand ready to assist.
- We recognize Ukraine's right to self-defense. We have not ruled out providing lethal assistance, but are focused on supporting

#### U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE - PRODUCED TO HSGAC NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

- 4 -

international efforts to find a diplomatic solution via the Minsk agreements.

## 3. (SBU) Minsk Implementation:

- At the G-20, President Obama told Putin that we insist on full implementation of Minsk.
- The President agreed with EU leaders that they will renew sanctions for six months, to be followed by another six months if needed.
- I applaud your efforts to implement Minsk, including your proposal on elections, even when the ceasefire appears under threat. We are concerned about that and have told Russia the violence must cease.
- You must forge ahead despite these challenges, especially in your work on Donbas local elections. I am glad you are working in parallel to build support among parties in the Rada, which we know is hard.
- We will continue to help you however we can.
- We are pressing the Normandy powers and working with others to resolve the continuing access problems for OSCE observers, UN agencies, and humanitarian organizations.

## PARTICIPANTS

<u>United States</u> Vice President Joseph Biden Ambassador Geoff Pyatt <u>Ukraine</u> President Petro Poroshenko TBC

Attachment:

**Biographic Information** 

Approved:	EUR: A/S Victoria Nuland	
Drafted:	EUR/EE: 7-4117 and ce	
Cleared:	D: P: S/P: D-MR	() () (OK) (OK)
	EUR/EE: EUR/PD EUR/PRA: EUR/RPM: EUR/RUS: EUR/ACE: D/CSP: F:	() (info) (OK) (OK) (OK) (OK) (OK)

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

November 22, 2015

### Vice President Biden's Meeting with Ukrainian PM Arseniy Yatsenyuk December 7-8 (TBC)

## GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

(SBU) Your visit to Kyiv comes as infighting among the parties in Ukraine's governing coalition is growing and stalling progress on the government's agenda, popular disaffection with the government is mounting over difficult economic reforms and conditions, and public doubts are worsening over political leaders' (particularly PM Yatsenyuk and President Poroshenko) commitment to breaking with old-style politics and rooting out corruption. Your meeting with Yatsenyuk will be an opportunity to press for reenergizing the reform agenda, particularly critical progress on anti-corruption, offer new U.S. support, and encourage Ukraine to continue its efforts at Minsk implementation, particularly on securing an agreement on local elections in the Donbas. Your last meeting with Yatsenyuk was in Washington on July 14.

## BACKGROUND

- 1. (SBU) <u>Unity and Reforms</u>: With local elections in the rear-view mirror and an economy that while still in difficulty, seems to have moved back from the precipice, the time is ripe to encourage immediate progress on reforms. You should recommend that Yatsenyuk work closely and collaboratively with Poroshenko on pushing forward reforms and note that showing unity with Poroshenko publically is necessary to instill public confidence in the government. There is wide agreement that anticorruption must be at the top of the reform priority list, and that reforms must include an overhaul of the Prosecutor General's Office, including removal of Prosecutor General Shokin. Reform priorities should also include the judiciary and standing up the new national investigative bureau (akin to the FBI). You will want to agree with Yatsenyuk's vision for a 2016 budget and tax plan that are consistent with the IMFrecommended programs.
- 2. (SBU) <u>U.S. Assistance</u>: Yatsenyuk and Poroshenko will be looking for tangible signs of U.S. support to assist the Ukrainian people during these difficult times, facilitate further reforms, and help with efforts to defend against Russian aggression. You will sign our third billion-dollar

## SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

#### U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE - PRODUCED TO HSGAC NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - 2 -

loan guarantee and publicly announce FY 15 U.S. assistance for the first time: \$189,035,756 – which does not include security assistance (previously announced separately). Our support will go to top nonsecurity priorities including: assistance to fight corruption, strengthening the rule of law, supporting civil society, restoring economic stability, carrying out democratic and constitutional reforms, advancing energy security, and supporting OSCE monitoring in eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian government has asked for more security assistance and continues to probe occasionally about the possibility of lethal assistance, including beefing up air defenses. Following the successful U.S. National Guard train and equip program which ended on Nov 8, multinational training of Ukrainian conventional and Special Forces began on November 23. The UK, Canada, Lithuania, and Estonia are also participating in training.

3. (SBU) Minsk Implementation: You should relay to Yatsenyuk that President Obama told President Putin at the G-20 summit that we insist on full implementation of the Minsk agreements. The President agreed with Quint leaders that the EU should renew its sanctions on Russia for six months to be followed by another six month extension if Russia and the separatists do not honor their Minsk commitments. In the past few weeks, combined Russian-separatist forces have ratcheted up attacks on Ukrainian positions, with reports of new weapons and personnel entering separatist territory from Russia. Russia and the separatists also continue to deny OSCE monitors access and to block the delivery of humanitarian supplies by UN agencies and NGOs. Recent meetings of the Normandy format and Trilateral Contact Group and its working groups have resulted in limited progress on some issues like demining, but none on the next key step of agreeing on Donbas election modalities. This is due to Russia and the separatists' refusal to engage on the election proposal put forward by Ukraine in the political working group, which the government is working to sell to political parties in the Rada simultaneously – a big challenge. You should encourage Ukraine to put its best foot forward despite these difficulties and offer our help.

## **TALKING POINTS**

#### 1. (SBU) Unity and Reforms:

• Now that the local elections are over, you and President Poroshenko need to continue to show unity and reenergize reforms.

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- 3 -

- Anti-corruption efforts have to be at the top of your agenda. That will mean standing up the National Investigative Bureau.
- It will also require changing the Prosecutor General, who is damaging your credibility and obstructing the fight against corruption.
- I urge you to work with President Poroshenko to present a 2016 budget and tax plan that is in line with the IMF program.
- I commend your efforts on reform of the judiciary and hope that effort will continue to move ahead quickly.
- We agree that privatization will be critical, but it must be transparent and well-managed, and we think that requires a holding entity that can prevent corruption until state-owned enterprises are fully private.

## 2. (SBU) <u>U.S. Support</u>:

- We will continue to stand behind you and your reform efforts.
- I will sign a billion-dollar loan guarantee with you today and announce additional, new assistance for Ukraine of nearly \$190 million.
- This assistance will go to reform priorities such as: fighting corruption, strengthening the rule of law, restoring economic stability, advancing energy security, carrying out democratic and constitutional reforms, and supporting OSCE monitoring in eastern Ukraine.
- This new announcement does not include security assistance, which we will continue to work separately with you and through the Multinational Joint Commission. I'm pleased the next phase of multinational training of Ukraine's conventional Special Forces started Nov 23.
- We need Ukraine to commit the personnel and resources to make this training effort and the Multinational Joint Commission successful.
- In addition to training, we urge you to commit to institutional reform to build long-term sustainable defense capacity. We stand ready to assist.
- We recognize Ukraine's right to self-defense. We have not ruled out providing lethal assistance, but are focused on supporting international efforts to find a diplomatic solution via the Minsk agreements.

## 3. (SBU) Minsk Implementation:

• At the G-20, President Obama told Putin that we insist on full implementation of Minsk.

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- 4 -

- The President agreed with EU leaders that they will renew sanctions for six months, to be followed by another six months if needed.
- I applaud your efforts to implement Minsk, including your proposal on elections, even when the ceasefire appears under threat. We are concerned about that and have told Russia the violence must cease.
- You must forge ahead despite these challenges, especially in your work on Donbas local elections. I am glad you are working in parallel to build support among parties in the Rada, which we know is hard.
- We will continue to help you however we can.
- We are pressing the Normandy powers and working with others to resolve the continuing access problems for OSCE observers, UN agencies, and humanitarian organizations.

## **PARTICIPANTS**

<u>United States</u> Vice President Joseph Biden Ambassador Geoff Pyatt <u>Ukraine</u> President Petro Poroshenko TBC

Attachment:

**Biographic Information** 

Approved:	EUR: A/S Victoria Nuland	
Drafted:	EUR/EE: 7-4117 and ce	II:
Cleared:	D: P: S/P: D-MR:	() () (OK) (OK)
	EUR/EE: EUR/PD EUR/PRA: EUR/RPM: EUR/RUS: EUR/ACE: D/CSP: F:	() (info) (OK) (OK) (OK) (OK) (OK)

# BEGINNING OF NEW RECORD

From:	
Sent:	
To:	
Subject:	

Zentos, Elisabeth <elisabeth\_f\_zentos@nsc.eop.gov> Thursday, January 21, 2016 10:46 AM Montgomery, Molly C; Ellsworth, Michael P FW: DT: US loan guarantee conditional on Shokin's dismissal

From: Zentos, Elisabeth
Sent: Thursday, January 21, 2016 10:44 AM
To: 'Pyatt, Geoffrey R' <PyattGR@state.gov>; Ciaramella, Eric <Eric\_A\_Ciaramella@nsc.eop.gov>; Makanju, Anna
<Anna\_A\_Makanju@ovp.eop.gov>
Subject: RE: DT: US loan guarantee conditional on Shokin's dismissal

Yes, just talked to the Desk about this.

Recommended that you or Post email Rory informing him of this view. Will be much more influential coming from you (or at least from someone at Post).

From: Pyatt, Geoffrey R [mailto:PyattGR@state.gov]
Sent: Thursday, January 21, 2016 10:31 AM
To: Ciaramella, Eric <<u>Eric A Ciaramella@nsc.eop.gov</u>>; Zentos, Elisabeth <<u>Elisabeth F Zentos@nsc.eop.gov</u>>; Makanju, Anna <<u>Anna A Makanju@ovp.eop.gov</u>>
Subject: RE: DT: US loan guarantee conditional on Shokin's dismissal

We also need to readdress all the LG anti-corruption conditions, since some of what we had been asking for is now OBE, and at this stage there's only one that really matters.

From: Ciaramella, Eric [mailto:Eric\_A\_Ciaramella@nsc.eop.gov] Sent: Thursday, January 21, 2016 5:23 PM To: Pyatt, Geoffrey R; Zentos, Elisabeth (nsc.eop); Makanju, Anna Subject: RE: DT: US loan guarantee conditional on Shokin's dismissal

Yikes. I don't recall this coming up in our meeting with them on Tuesday, although we did discuss the fact that the PGO IG condition has not yet been met. (I've been meaning to write to you about our meeting—we were super impressed with the group, and we had a two-hour discussion of their priorities and the obstacles they face.)

In yesterday's IPC we agreed to come up with some interagency press guidance/TPs for UA officials on the Shokin/LG issue. So, we will circle back with EUR and our/their press folks to expedite that effort.

**From:** Pyatt, Geoffrey R [http://redirect.state.sbu/?url=mailto:PyattGR@state.gov] **Sent:** Thursday, January 21, 2016 10:03 AM

Buckle in

From: Pasichnyk, Volodymyr O <<u>PasichnykVO@state.gov</u>> Sent: Thursday, January 21, 2016 16:11 To: Kyiv, POL ALL Subject: DT: US loan guarantee conditional on Shokin's dismissal


According to Dzerkalo Tyzhnya news website, "the U.S. State Department has made it clear to the Ukrainian authorities that it links the provision of a one billion dollar loan guarantee to Ukraine to the dismissal of Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin. This became known during the visit by Deputy PGs Vitaliy Kasko, David Sakvarelidze, and Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Nazar Kholodnytsky to the U.S. The Ukrainian officials are holding a number of professional and political meetings during their working visit to the U.S."

>http://redirect.state.sbu/?url=http://zn.ua/POLITICS/ssha-privyazali-predostavlenie-ukraine-kreditnyhgarantiy-k-otstavke-shokina-201985 .html

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From:Bedingfield, Kate J. EOP/OVP
Sent:Sun, 6 Dec 2015 16:23:56 +0000
To:Pyatt, Geoffrey R;Carpenter, Michael R. EOP/OVP;Kahl, Colin H. EOP/OVP;Hochstein, Amos J;Nuland, Victoria J
Subject:RE: Podrobnosti.biz : The Ukrainian scam of the Biden family (information on the website included)

Thx



Subject: Re: Podrobnosti.biz : The Ukrainian scam of the Biden family (information on the website included)

I'd adjust the last sentence to change our desired end state. Something like "...begin rooting out the cancer of corruption that has done so much over the years to hold back economic growth and sap the confidence of Ukrainians in those who govern them."

I assume all have the DoJ background on Zlochevsky. The short unclas version (in non lawyer language) is that US and UK were cooperating on a case to seize his corrupt assets overseas (which had passed through the US). The case fell apart when individuals in the PGO acted to thwart the UK case.

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.
From: Bedingfield, Kate J. EOP/OVP
Sent: Sunday, December 6, 2015 6:04 PM
To: Carpenter, Michael; Pyatt, Geoffrey R; Kahl, Colin H. EOP/OVP; Hochstein, Amos J
Subject: RE: Podrobnosti.biz : The Ukrainian scam of the Biden family (information on the website included)

Proposed TPs for the VP if he gets asked after the stories break in the next few days. Especially interested in your feedback on how to answer the third Q if he gets asked. He is not currently slated to take any questions from reporters on the record on the trip, but he will talk to our traveling press at length off the record and will need to be prepared to answer these kinds of questions.

#### TALKING POINTS

 $\cdot$  My son is a private citizen and I'm not going to get into discussing his personal business, it has no impact on my work.

• What I will say, though, is that no one has been tougher in pushing Ukranian leaders to root out corruption than I have. It has been a primary focus of my discussions, both publicly and privately, for years. And I think you can see from the substance of this trip it remains a major priority for me and for the US government.

Important strides have been made – the appointment of a Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor and the establishment of an independent Inspector General to prosecute corrupt prosecutors are two good ones. But much more needs to be done and we will continue to encourage everyone involved to commit to meaningful reforms.

Q: Have you asked Hunter to step down from the board? Has he discussed that with you?

A: I'm not going to discuss private conversations with my family. Hunter is a private citizen and does independent work.

Q: Do the optics of this situation undermine your credibility when you're pushing the Ukranians to clean up their own house?

A: No. I have long pushed and will continue to push for the Ukranian government to root out corrupt practices. My record on this speaks for itself. I have called on Ukranian leadership to root out corruption, encouraged civil society reformers to remain focused on this and push the government themselves, and I welcome the news that the government will appoint a Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor. Important steps have been taken, but there is so much left to be done. Corrupt officials must be brought to justice and reformers must work together to ensure this happens

Q: Do you think Zlochevsky is corrupt?

A: I'm not going to get into naming names or accusing individuals. We have been working consistently to push the Ukranian leadership to make meaningful changes in the Prosecutor General's office and across the government to help ensure that the Ukranian people are represented fairly and fully.

-----Original Message-----From: Carpenter, Michael [>http://redirect.state.sbu/?url=http://redirect.state.sbu/?url=mailto: 

Subject: Re: Podrobnosti.biz : The Ukrainian scam of the Biden family (information on the website included)

Ugh.

+ Kate, CK

From: Pyatt, Geoffrey R [>http://redirect.state.sbu/?url=http://redirect.state.sbu/?url=mailto: <

Sent: Sunday, December 06, 2015 01:45 AM

To: Carpenter, Michael

Subject: FW: Podrobnosti.biz : The Ukrainian scam of the Biden family (information on the website included)

A really nasty Russian outlet on the same issue

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: lbi@lbicompany.com.ua [>http://redirect.state.sbu/?url=http://redirect.state.sbu/?url=http://redirect.state.sbu/?url=mailto:lbi@lbicompany.co m.ua]<

Sent: Saturday, December 05, 2015 7:05 PM

To: Kyiv, Media Alerts

Subject: Podrobnosti.biz : The Ukrainian scam of the Biden family (information on the website included)

this web site is very similar (stile, shrifts etc) to Ukrainian Podrobnosti that belongs to Inter TV Channel - the same name as its TV summary news block at 8pm

but we checked contacts and there is a Russian address there

Podrobnosti.biz

The Ukrainian scam of the Biden family

05.12.2015

Author: Eugene Prosvirin

The news that the son of the US Vice President Joe Biden was appointed to the board of directors of the Ukrainian gas company Burisma Holdings, for the first time appeared in media last spring.

The Internet marked this new appointment unequivocally - a massive stamping folklore entertainment began in social networks. The story had got a special piquancy - Joe Biden's visit to Kyiv in April, where he took a place of the president of Ukraine, not the guest at the negotiation table.

There were even such headlines: "Hunter Biden: a rape of Ukraine with a special cynicism."

The hatred among the public was coursed by the fact that Biden's tandem participates not only in Ukrainian politics, but in the Ukrainian business as well. However, neither Joe nor Hunter weren't ashamed of their imperial approach. On the contrary, they have demonstrated that this could be and should be.

Hunter demonstrated his true management potential in six months after the appointment. In mid-October 2014 it became clear that he failed out of the US Navy Reserve. Hunter failed an ordinary drug test - it was accused of cocaine use. A failed sailor, but a successful businessman due to family ties, said then that he was "deeply sorry" about the incident.

He still owns an investment-consulting company Rosemont Seneca Partners. Nobody took his place it the chair Board of the US World Food Programme, which, with other things, works directly with the UN World Food Programme. He still heads the Burisma Holdings, part of Kolomoisky's financial empire.

A tandem of the influential father and the enriched son opened not a small window but a real portal of capabilities for the Biden family in Ukraine. Analysts make an unnerving forecast : it is quite possible that the Biden family will begin a large-scale privatization in Ukraine, which in fact would be a banal raider seizure of state enterprises. The family has already watched their six at the politician field - it's time to do American business.

>>http://redirect.state.sbu/?url=http://redirect.state.sbu/?ur

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With best regards,

LBI Team

>>http://redirect.state.sbu/?url=http://redirect.state.sbu/?url=http://redirect.state.sbu/?url=www.lbicompany.com.ua<

(044) 501 58 41

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With be

st regards,

LBI Team

>>http://redirect.state.sbu/?url=http://redirect.state.sbu/?url=http://redirect.state.sbu/?url=www.lbicompany.com.ua<</pre>

(044) 501 58 41



February 12, 2016

H.E. Petro Poroshenko President of Ukraine Presidential Administration of Ukraine 11 Bankova Street Kyiv, Ukraine 01220

Dear President Poroshenko,

As members of the U.S. Senate Ukraine Caucus and strong supporters of your government, we write to express our concern regarding the recent resignation of Minister of Economy Aivaras Abromavičius and his allegations of persistent corruption in the Ukrainian political system.

During the past year, Mr. Abromavičius and his team implemented tough but necessary economic reforms, worked to combat endemic corruption, and promoted more openness and transparency in government. He was known to many of us as a respected reformer and supporter of the Ukrainian cause. Minister Abromavičius's allegations raise concerns about the enormous challenges that remain in your efforts to reform the corrupt system you inherited.

We recognize that your governing coalition faces not only endemic corruption left from decades of mismanagement and cronyism, but also an illegal armed seizure of territory by Russia and its proxies. Tackling such obstacles to reforms amidst a war and the loss of much of southeastern Ukraine's economic productivity is a formidable challenge -- one which we remain committed to helping you overcome.

Succeeding in these reforms will show Russian President Vladimir Putin that an independent, transparent, and democratic Ukraine can and will succeed. It also offers a stark alternative to the authoritarianism and oligarchic cronyism prevalent in Russia. As such, we respectfully ask that you address the serious concerns raised by Minister Abromavičius. We similarly urge you to press ahead with urgent reforms to the Prosecutor General's office and judiciary. The unanimous adoption by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Basic Principles and Action Plan is a good step.

We very much appreciate your leadership and commitment to reform since the Ukrainian people demonstrated their resolve on the Maidan two years ago, and we look forward to continued cooperation in the future.

Sincerely,

Senator Rob Portman

Stanne Shaheen

Senator Richard J. Durbin

Senator Jeanne Shaheen

Senator Ron Johnson

Senator Chris Murphy

Senator Mark Kirk

hil Senator Richard Blumenthal Senator Sherrod Brown

From:	Segal-Knowles, Christina <christina_m_segal-knowles@nsc.eop.gov></christina_m_segal-knowles@nsc.eop.gov>
Sent:	Friday, January 15, 2016 8:45 PM
То:	Goldbrenner, Rachel A
Subject:	RE: PAPER IPC: Ukraine Loan Guarantee Conditions Precedent - Response requested by
	October 29
Attachments:	2015-11-05 CPs for Ukraine LG3_clean.docx

Rachel,

Here's nearly the latest CP document. We've made some very minor tweaks since this version, which I will dig up and send to you tomorrow but wanted to get something to you tonight. Will also loop you into the Ukraine IPC agenda chain when I distribute the agenda tomorrow morning.

Have a good weekend!

Christina

From: Goldbrenner, Rachel A [mailto:GoldbrennerRA@state.gov]
Sent: Friday, January 15, 2016 7:50 PM
To: Segal-Knowles, Christina <Christina\_M\_Segal-Knowles@nsc.eop.gov>
Subject: FW: PAPER IPC: Ukraine Loan Guarantee Conditions Precedent - Response requested by October 29

Christina,

Thanks again for your time just now.

Is this the proper CP document, or is there a more recent version?

Also thanks in advance for looping me in on the IPC distro.

Rachel

SBU This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Segal-Knowles, Christina [mailto:Christina M Segal-Knowles@nsc.eop.gov]

Sent: Friday, October 23, 2015 8:57 PM

**To:** Wylie, Allison; 'ramin.toloui@treasury.gov'; 'Andres.Chong-Qui@treasury.gov'; Svenstrup, Mary; Daleep Singh; 'Matthew.Malloy@treasury.gov'; Leonard, Michael (Contact); Nuland, Victoria J; Jeffrey, Jahn F; EUR-EE-Ukraine Econ-DL; Romanowski, Alina L; Wynne, Janine M; F-EUR; Kubiske, Lisa; Watson, Samuel R; Dove, Amy N; Dunnigan, Robin L; Hochstrasser, Franz J.; Hochstein, Amos J; Pyatt, Geoffrey R; Bond, Clifford G; Laitinen, William H; Johnston, Thomas L; Saad, Fouad; Fairweather, Rob; Ryan, Erika; Murray, Matthew (trade); Chumak, Boris (trade); 'Daniel.Dodds@trade.gov'; 'skip.jones@trade.gov'; Mullaney, Dan; Hafner, Betsy (US Treasury Department); Lorenz, Andrew R; 'Andrea.Lockwood@hq.doe.gov'; 'Jonathan.Elkind@hq.doe.gov'; Urbanas, Elizabeth (Contact); 'Paul.Tumminia@Hq.Doe.Gov'; Katz, Jonathan; Gonzales, Laura (KYIV/DIR); McPherson, Donald B. (GC/EA); Gallagher, Leo; 'Bruce.Swartz@usdoj.gov'; Newcombe, Catherine; #EUROPE; Carpenter, Michael; #LEGISLATIVE; #STRATPLAN; <sup>017180</sup> Stroh, Mark E.; Topping, Jennifer; Silkworth, William R; Goldbrenner, Rachel A **Cc:** MacFarquhar, Rory; Leahy, Michael; Wylie, Allison **Subject:** PAPER IPC: Ukraine Loan Guarantee Conditions Precedent - Response requested by October 29

All,

As discussed at the IPC on 9/30, departments and agencies are asked to approve the attached list of conditions precedent for a potential third loan guarantee for Ukraine. If approved, we would share these as our opening proposal to the government of Ukraine in advance of consultations on the loan guarantee. The final language will be subject to negotiation between the United States and Ukraine and departments and agencies will have additional chances to make line edits.

Departments and agencies are asked to concur with the sub-IPC recommendation that the reform steps listed in the attached word document represent a satisfactory set of conditions precedent for our next Ukraine loan guarantee. Clearance is requested at the IPC level (or above as you judge necessary to achieve departmental sign-off).

# Please send responses to <u>awylie@nsc.eop.gov</u> no later than COB October 29, copying me (<u>csegal-knowles@nsc.eop.gov</u>).

The attached PDF document contains background, prepared by departments and agencies, on each of the proposed conditions precedent.

Best, Christina

#### From: Segal-Knowles, Christina Sent: Thursday, October 01, 2015 8:33 AM

To: Wylie, Allison <Allison G Wylie@nsc.eop.gov>; 'ramin.toloui@treasury.gov' <ramin.toloui@treasury.gov>; 'Andres.Chong-Qui@treasury.gov' <Andres.Chong-Qui@treasury.gov>; 'Mary.Svenstrup@treasury.gov' <Mary.Svenstrup@treasury.gov>; Singh, Daleep <daleep.singh@treasury.gov>; 'Matthew.Malloy@treasury.gov' <Matthew.Malloy@treasury.gov>; 'Michael.Leonard2@treasury.gov' <Michael.Leonard2@treasury.gov>; 'Nuland, Victoria J (nulandvj@state.gov)' <nulandvj@state.gov>; 'Jeffrey, Jahn F' <JeffreyJahnF@state.gov>; 'EUR-EE-Ukraine Econ-DL' <<u>EUR-EE-UkraineEcon-DL@state.gov</u>>; 'Romanowski, Alina L' <<u>RomanowskiAL@state.gov</u>>; 'Wynne, Janine M' <WynneJM@state.gov>; 'F-EUR@state.gov' <F-EUR@state.gov>; 'Kubiske, Lisa' <KubiskeL@state.gov>; 'Watson, Samuel R' <WatsonSR@state.gov>; 'dovean@state.gov' <dovean@state.gov>; 'dunniganRL@state.gov' <dunniganRL@state.gov>; 'Hochstrasser, Franz J.' <HochstrasserFJ@state.gov>; 'hochsteinaj@state.gov' <hochsteinaj@state.gov>; 'pyattgr@state.gov' <pyattgr@state.gov>; 'Bond, Clifford G' <BondCG@state.gov>; 'Laitinen, William H' <LaitinenWH@state.gov>; 'JohnstonTL@state.gov' <JohnstonTL@state.gov>; Saad, Fouad <Fouad P. Saad@omb.eop.gov>; Fairweather, Rob <Robert S. Fairweather@omb.eop.gov>; Ryan, Erika <Erika\_S\_Hamalainen@omb.eop.gov>; 'Matthew Murray' <Matthew.Murray@trade.gov>; 'boris.chumak@trade.gov' <boris.chumak@trade.gov>; 'Daniel.Dodds@trade.gov' <Daniel.Dodds@trade.gov>; 'skip.jones@trade.gov' <skip.jones@trade.gov>; Mullaney, Dan <Daniel Mullaney@USTR.EOP.GOV>; Hafner, Betsy <Elizabeth Hafner@USTR.EOP.GOV>; Lorenz, Andrew <Andrew R Lorenz@ustr.eop.gov>; 'Andrea.Lockwood@hq.doe.gov' < Andrea.Lockwood@hq.doe.gov>; 'Jonathan.Elkind@hq.doe.gov' <Jonathan.Elkind@hq.doe.gov>; 'Urbanas, Elizabeth (Contact)' <Elizabeth.Urbanas@Hq.Doe.Gov>; 'Paul.Tumminia@Hg.Doe.Gov' <Paul.Tumminia@Hg.Doe.Gov>; 'jokatz@usaid.gov' <jokatz@usaid.gov>; 'Gonzales, Laura (KYIV/DIR)' lgonzales@usaid.gov>; 'Donald McPherson' <br/>
bmcpherson@usaid.gov>; 'Gallagher, Leo'

017181

<<u>GallagherL@state.gov</u>>; 'Bruce.Swartz@usdoj.gov' <<u>Bruce.Swartz@usdoj.gov</u>>; 'Newcombe, Catherine' < <u>Catherine.Newcombe@usdoj.gov</u>>; #EUROPE <<u>#EUROPE@dsr.eop.gov</u>>; Carpenter, Michael <u>MCarpenter@ovp.eop.gov</u>>; #LEGISLATIVE <<u>#LEGISLATIVE@dsr.eop.gov</u>>; #STRATPLAN <<u>STRATPLAN@nsc.eop.gov</u>>; Stroh, Mark <<u>Mark E Stroh@nsc.eop.gov</u>>; 'Topping, Jennifer' <<u>ToppingJL@state.gov</u>> **Cc:** MacFarquhar, Rory <<u>Rory\_MacFarquhar@who.eop.gov</u>>; Leahy, Michael <<u>Michael\_B\_Leahy@nsc.eop.gov</u>>; Haubrich, Edward\_J\_Haubrich@nsc.eop.gov>; Lortie, Josh <<u>Joshua\_M\_Lortie@nsc.eop.gov</u>>; **Subject:** RE: Ukraine Loan Guarantee IPC | Wednesday 9/30 at 8:30am, Situation Room

All, Apologies for the repeat email. I understand that some people are having trouble seeing the SOC pasted in the body of the email below. Please find it attached as well.

#### From: Segal-Knowles, Christina

Sent: Thursday, October 01, 2015 8:05 AM

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All, thank you for a productive meeting yesterday. Please find a SOC below.

It was agreed:

- The IPC concluded that (1) Ukraine has made sufficient progress on its reform agenda to justify a third guarantee and (2) Ukraine has an economic need for the guarantee and it is in our strategic interest to provide one. As such, the IPC recommends moving forward with a third loan guarantee for Ukraine in the near-term, noting State/F's preference to issue the guarantee as late as possible to allow more clarity on the budget context and Embassy Kyiv and Treasury's assessment that Ukraine needs the guarantee by end-2015.
- The IPC notionally approves the following proposed conditions precedent, with the caveats listed below

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- Macroeconomic Stability
- Social Safety Net
- $\circ$  Anti-Corruption (e-procurement) but with revised CP language that is more specific.
- Rule of Law (prosecutor general's office) but with a preference to revise the CP to better ensure that the decision to set up an independent inspector general cannot be easily overturned and that the independent inspector general is subject to appropriate oversight and accountability.
- USAID, working with State, will revise the Anti-Corruption/e-procurement CP to make it more specific (USAID and State by October 6)
- State (including via consultation with State/INL) and DOJ will explore options to further strengthen the PGO CP and submit a revised proposal (State and DOJ by October 6)
- The IPC recommends dropping from consideration the conditions related to Naftogaz receivables, privatization, and the deposit guarantee fund.
- The IPC will be open to reconsidering the condition on the independent energy regulator if there is new information that suggests that the condition is achievable and that including this condition in our loan guarantee agreement will make a material difference in advancing this reform.
- Departments and agencies will continue to search for conditions precedent that would represent a significant but achievable step forward on key reforms (**all by October 6**). In particular:
  - Treasury will complete draft one-pagers on potential financial disclosure and large taxpayer unit CPs, drawing on information from their ongoing consultation with the IMF and World Bank (Treasury by October 6)
  - USAID, with input from Post and DOE, will update the one-pager on the electricity market law to better reflect the current state of play and any political risks (USAID, State, DOE by October 6)
  - State, working with USAID, will revise the draft CP on e-Governance to make it more concrete. (State and USAID by October 6)
- NSC will host a sub-IPC to discuss new and revised conditions precedent. Please note that this sub-IPC has been scheduled for Wednesday, October 7 at 9:00 am in the White House Situation Room. We will send a separate invitation later this morning.

#### Third U.S. Loan Guarantee: Proposed Conditions Precedent

- 1. **IMF PROGRAM:** Ukraine shall fulfill all IMF prior actions of economic reforms and macroeconomic policies necessary to obtain IMF Board approval of the second review of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement. Ukraine shall provide to USAID written verification of its intent to remain in compliance with the EFF Arrangement.
- 2. **SOCIAL SAFETY NET:** Ukraine shall affirm in writing that proceeds from the U.S. loan guarantee will contribute to social spending to help protect the most vulnerable Ukrainians from the impact of necessary economic adjustments, including continued reductions in untargeted energy subsidies.

Ukraine also shall affirm its commitment to continue implementing income testing in the energy privileges (EP) program, in accordance with Law 76-VIII/2014, to improve the targeting of social-assistance benefits. Ukraine shall affirm its intent to provide to USAID, through [specify ministry or office], quarterly reports for one (1) year beginning on [date] on the number of beneficiaries in Housing Utility Subsidy (HUS) and EP programs; the total value of fiscal transfers for HUS and EP; and the number of applications received for HUS and EP.

- 3. **PUBLIC PROCUREMENT:** Ukraine shall submit to Parliament a new law formalizing the use of electronic procurement for government acquisition of goods and services to increase transparency and efficiency in government procurement.
- 4. **PROSECUTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE:** Ukraine shall provide to USAID a copy of the comprehensive regulation, adopted by the Prosecutor General, which ensures the independent operations of the Office of Inspector General (IG) of the Prosecutor General's Office (PGO). The regulation shall clearly define the PGO IG's jurisdiction, powers, and authority, to enable it to perform its functions in a manner that is effective and credible, and that increases the accountability of the PGO to the public. The regulation shall be endorsed by the U.S. Department of Justice.
- 5. NAFTOHAZ CORPORATE REFORM: Ukraine shall take the following actions towards improving corporate governance at Naftohaz in line with the Corporate Governance Action Plan (CGAP) agreed to with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: the Cabinet of Ministers shall: 1) approve the restated Charter of Naftohaz, as specified in Action 1.2 and Action 1.3.1 in the CGAP; 2) approve and make public the Nomination Policy for the Supervisory Board of Naftohaz and the criteria for the Supervisory Board Members; 3) authorize the committee created by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade to be used as a nominating committee for the candidates for the Supervisory Board of

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Naftohaz; and 4) publish on the Internet the job descriptions for Supervisory Board Members, as specified in Action 1.3.6 and Action 1.3.7 in the CGAP.

- 6. TAX ADMINISTRATION REFORM: Ukraine shall provide evidence that Ukraine's State Fiscal Service has transferred the files of all taxpayers meeting largetaxpayer criteria to the Large Taxpayer Office (LTO) and has assigned staff to each new large-taxpayer file. Ukraine shall also affirm in writing its commitment to provide adequate resources to the LTO and satisfy the IMF structural benchmark.
- 7. **ASSET DISCLOSURE:** Ukraine shall affirm in writing that it has developed an IT system to manage asset disclosures of high-level officials and shall provide evidence that it has begun posting asset disclosures of high-level government officials electronically and publicly.



Washington, D.C. 20520

The Honorable Ron Johnson, Chairman Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate Washington, DC 20515

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Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your April 30 letter which requested interviews with Department employees, including United States Ambassador to Greece Geoffrey Pyatt. As you know, Ambassador Pyatt is currently serving in Athens and undertaking critical diplomatic efforts to prevent armed conflict between Greece and Turkey.

The Department is prepared to suggest two options to be responsive to the Committee's inquiries, consistent with Ambassador Pyatt's current responsibilities. To expedite you receiving answers to your questions, the Department can facilitate Ambassador Pyatt providing written responses to your unclassified and/or classified questions in an appropriate manner no later than September 9. This format will allow him to review and answer your questions more fully regarding his work as U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine from July 2013 through August 2016. It also will ensure he is able to address your questions without compromising his ability to perform his critical duties during a fragile time in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Department also understands he recently engaged private counsel, which would make a transcribed interview in the very near future difficult, consistent with his right to counsel. In light of these considerations, Ambassador Pyatt would strongly prefer a question and answer format. He is, however, also willing to participate in a voluntary transcribed interview on or about September 15, 2020, subject to discussions on scope and timing, and the operational demands of his work in Athens.

We hope one of these options is acceptable to you. Please let us know if this format is acceptable to you.

Sincerely,

Ryan M. Kaldahl Acting Assistant Secretary Bureau of Legislative Affairs



Cc: The Honorable Gary Peters, Ranking Member Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs