



January 6, 2021 Event

After-Action Report

Table of Contents

EVENT OVERVIEW	5
STRENGTHS	7
ANALYSIS OF OBSERVATIONS & RECOMMENDED ACTION.....	9
1. ACCESS CONTROL AND PHYSICAL SECURITY	9
2. CDU RESPONSE	11
3. COMMUNICATIONS	14
4. EQUIPMENT	16
5. INCIDENT COMMAND	18
6. INTELLIGENCE	19
7. PERSONNEL IDENTIFICATION AND SAFETY	21
8. STAFFING	22
9. TRAINING	25
10. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS	26
APPENDIX A: EVENT TIMELINE	27

EVENT OVERVIEW

Event Name

January 6, 2021 Event

Event Dates

January 6, 2021

Mission Area(s)

Protection and Response

Scope

This document is compiled from USCP employee observations submitted following the events on January 6, 2021, and utilized a review of radio communications to clarify comments as necessary. A total of forty-four (44) submissions were provided to the Coordination Division. Each submission was reviewed, categorized, and synthesized for common themes to present an overview of the observations presented by the employees. The analysis includes recommendations from the employee and/or additional information from the reviewers to provide appropriate context for recommendations. The recommendations are a combination of those provided with the original observation or recommendations provided by the reviewers if a recommendation was not provided with the observation.

Event
Background

On Wednesday, January 6, 2021, the Joint Session to Count Electoral Votes was held to certify the Presidential election. Just prior to the convening of the joint session, explosive devices were discovered outside of both the Republican National Committee and the Democratic National Committee buildings. During the joint session, thousands of individuals converged and surrounded the U.S. Capitol Building to contest the counting of the electoral votes. A significant number of these individuals turned violent and engaged with the USCP. With the continued increase in violence, the USCP was no longer able to maintain the perimeter around the U.S. Capitol Building or the inaugural stand that was in the process of being constructed.

When the police line outside of the U.S. Capitol Building was initially breached, the USCP issued a campus-wide lockdown of the Capitol Complex. Eventually, due to the violence and the number of individuals, numerous breaches through doors and windows on each side of the U.S. Capitol Building occurred. This led to the House and Senate Chambers being locked down. The Vice-President, who was presiding over the joint session, and the House and Senate Leadership were relocated to safe locations. Members of Congress were escorted from the Capitol to ensure their safety.

During this event, the USCP reported that an estimated 1,500 unauthorized individuals accessed the U.S. Capitol Building. These unauthorized individuals accessed numerous locations throughout the building to include, but not limited to the Senate Chamber, Senate Galleries, and Member offices. The House Chamber was not breached.

Numerous other law enforcement and military agencies provided mutual support to secure the access points and to remove individuals from the U.S. Capitol Building. The Mayor of DC issued a citywide curfew from 1800 hours on January 6, 2021 until 0600 hours on January 7, 2021. The Speaker of the House reconvened the joint session on January 6, 2021 at 2100 hours. The USCP with the assistance of the supporting entities cleared all internal and external threats before 0200 hours on January 7, 2021. The joint session concluded and the House adjourned at 0348 hours on January 7, 2021.

This incident resulted in the death of police personnel and the public, significant injuries, and widespread damage to the U.S. Capitol Building. In addition, this incident occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic which subsequently impacted USCP personnel.

STRENGTHS

Strength Observation 1: A unified command was successfully established for the RNC and DNC pipe bomb incidents.

Analysis: RNC/DNC turned into a multi-agency response to include FBI/ATF/MPD and Metro transit. The response was coordinated by a supervisory bomb technician that had the expertise and knowledge to relay information to these partner agencies while ensuring USCP bomb techs were focused on the current scene.

Strength Observation 2: After January 6, officers were working 12-plus hour shifts with no days off. The Department provided hotel rooms and food for officers working who wanted them.

Analysis: Providing officers with hotel rooms let the officers get more rest than having to drive home after being exhausted. Providing food to officers made it so the officers did not have to go out or bring food in from home.

Recommendation: Make it standard policy for future events of this magnitude to provide meals and hotel rooms to officers and civilians involved in recovery operations. A plan needs to be put in place for catering services in off hours if specific resources must be used.

Strength Observation 3: HMRT was able to augment OAP's triage efforts for officers through their basic emergency medical service training.

Analysis: Numerous injured and chemical sprayed officers went to HMRT decontamination stations in the Crypt Lobby of the Capitol. They had injuries ranging from concussions to facial plate injuries, eye injuries, and chemical burns and reactions. HMRT treated a lot of officers with the injuries along with OAP. In addition, they worked to decontaminate the pepper spray and other chemicals from their faces and skin.

Strength Observation 4: A restricted duty officer asked an HMRT technician if there was anything that he could do to help.

Analysis: HMRT stated that they needed more water to decon the officers. The restricted duty officer left and shortly came back with cases of water bottles along with assistance from the senate carryout employee carrying the water bottles to officers.

Strength Observation 5: Supplies of water bottles being brought out to the front line at the inaugural stage kept many of the officers in the fight.

Analysis: By having water available to decon the officers who were exposed to OC chemical spray they were able to recover quickly and rejoined the fight.

Recommendation: Ensure logistical planning is part of every operation and supplies are placed strategically based upon the operational plan.

Strength Observation 6: Once the insurgents were inside the building in significant numbers, most of Capitol Police were inside the building while Metropolitan Police Department and other agencies were outside the Capitol securing the perimeter.

Analysis: By having USCP inside the Capitol and outside agencies outside the Capitol securing the perimeter this divided the work and made it more effective in escorting members and staff to safety as well as clearing out the building.

Strength Observation 7: The Capitol Building was successfully cleared after the Capitol Breach so the certification of the election could continue.

Analysis: USCP and outside agencies were able to clear the Capitol building from insurgents. The HIRD, CERT, and Capitol Division officers were able to conduct sweeps of the building in order to deem the building safe and Congress was able to reconvene and certify the election.

Strength Observation 8: Fire extinguishers worked very well in stopping the rioters from gaining entry into one portion of the building.

Analysis: Several officers gathered fire extinguishers throughout the building in order to utilize them against rioters trying to gain access. The door in which the fire extinguishers was deployed it kept the rioters from gaining access.

Strength Observation 9: The breach was only slowed on the West Front once the crowd was forced to bottleneck at the steps to the upper west terrace.

Analysis: The bike racks were able to create a temporary barrier that slowed down the attack on the Capitol building.

ANALYSIS OF OBSERVATIONS & RECOMMENDED ACTION

1. Access Control and Physical Security

Refers to the securing of the perimeter for the U.S. Capitol and Capitol Grounds. This is inclusive of the crime scene and perimeter access security during demobilization.

Observation 1.1: Deployment was hindered due to the Inaugural planning barriers.

Analysis: Inaugural fencing and the inability to exit from the Lower West Terrace Door due to the construction of the Inaugural platform was a hindrance to the CDU platoon being able to deploy in a quick and efficient manner.

Recommendation: CDU Field Force Commander and all CDU Platoon Commanders must conduct a review of the areas anticipated for the operation to identify potential issues in conjunction with the defined deployment strategies.

Observation 1.2: Physical security plan and deployment strategies must be interlinked and understood based upon the plan.

Analysis: The fence plan assumed compliance with the barrier and did not indicate specifically how manpower deployment would support this plan. A comprehensive plan would have created a clearer requirement for additional law enforcement support or the National Guard.

Recommendation: USCP must adopt a planning style that is specific and accounts for escalating incidents. Supporting officers must understand the components of the plan and how the assigned task supports these functions.

Observation 1.3: HIRD/HMRT did not have proper access to conduct sweeps of the US Capitol after the building was emptied.

Analysis: The Capitol has two Medco keys that are available to open doors to rooms in the Capitol. In order to complete sweeps in an expeditiously way access to rooms need to be immediate. The ability to access building space during and after a critical incident, whether to conduct security sweeps or provide lifesaving assistance, is essential to fulfill mission requirements.

Recommendation: Develop a strategy that ensures routine and emergency sweeps can be conducted without delay due to lack of accessibility. Medco keys/Master keys should be available to specialty units so that manpower will not be taken from the detail to escort USCP to sweep locations. Additionally, the need to provide all USCP officers prox-card access across the complex should be evaluated since in an emergency, any officer should be able to gain access to locations.

Observation 1.4: CERT did not have the proper access for quick entry during their sweeps of the Capitol.

Analysis: During one of the sweeps one of the building patrols broke off a key in the lock leaving only one person to assist with opening doors for CERT sweeps. Past plans to accomplish these tasks utilize the AOC to assist with building access during routine events; however, this assumption does not account for access during a critical incident when it is not safe to insert civilians into a potentially dangerous environment.

Recommendation: Access plans for secured spaces must be evaluated for a tiered approach accounting for exigent or unsafe conditions.

Observation 1.5: Building physical security did not perform as anticipate during the incident. Doors in the chambers did not secure properly. Doors within the Capitol were easily kicked in. Windows were broken by rioters on the first floor to gain access.

Analysis: The Senate wing first floor cornerstone door has no locking mechanism to secure the door. The windows on the first floor of the Capitol were not shatterproof. Access was easily gained from kicking in doors or breaking windows at ground level. Areas that have been designed for sheltering in place must be reinforced to meet the requirement, especially the House Chamber and Senate Chamber Doors, including galleries. Ornamental locking mechanisms proved insufficient to provide the necessary security at entry points and historically accurate windows did not provide the physical security necessary to protect Members of Congress during this event. These security measures must extend to the office buildings and/or additional security measures must be added at the tunnel entrances to allow the Capitol Building to be utilized as a safe-haven.

Recommendation: Have SSB and the AOC conduct a site survey of all the buildings to identify and mitigate security vulnerabilities.

Observation 1.6: Unauthorized personnel were utilizing the elevator to gain access to the fourth floor in the US Capitol.

Analysis: The armed services committee and the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies have offices on the fourth floor of the Capitol. This is a limited access area and should not be publically accessible.

Recommendation: Install a prox card reader in the elevator so that only those authorized and all sworn will have access to this area. This should be completed on any elevator without anticipated public use.

2. CDU Response

Refers to the specialized response from the Department to civil disturbance, to include capability, planning, command and control, and demobilization.

Observation 2.1: CDU squads did not respond in a timely manner.

Analysis: When the riot broke out, a CDU hard platoon stood by the Senate air shaft for several minutes as officers were on the Lower West Terrace fighting

Recommendation: Formally designate CDU staging areas near the anticipated event location for each CDU activation to facilitate timely responses and deploy resources as required.

Observation 2.2: CDU equipment is incompatible with effective radio use.

Analysis: The CDU gear does not have a microphone loop to attach the hand microphone to the issued gear. In addition, officers must utilize a separate duty belt for CDU activation, which does not have a duplicate of the issued equipment carried daily. Not all officers are issued voice amplifiers for the gas mask, which prevent effective communication when the gas mask is donned; officers must choose to expose themselves to irritants by removing their mask in order to effectively communicate.

Recommendation: Evaluate CDU helmet equipment capabilities/requirements to improve communication capabilities as necessary.

Observation 2.3: The CDU plan did not specify to what level the CDU platoons would be equipped prior to deployment. CDU platoon officers had difficulty deploying their hard gear before responding due to location the officer or equipment was staged.

Analysis: CDU equipment was stored in locations that were difficult to access which led to slower response times. There were also officers that deployed in their "uniform of the day" with their CDU equipment stored on the buses; upon retrieval attempts, they learned that the buses were locked and did not have the keys to open the bus. In addition, storing equipment at the detail office does not make it accessible for emergency deployment and storing the personal gear separate from the shields does not allow for expedited response.

Recommendation: Ensure the CDU operational plans clearly specify the level of deployment (to include what these levels require – e.g. equipment needs) and the responsibilities of the assigned officers. These plans should also specify procedures to facilitate the need to increase/decrease response levels as necessary.

Observation 2.4: Current CDU training focuses on an urban environment and operating in areas with defined barriers that assist in deployment (e.g. city streets). The USCP deploys on an open campus, making it difficult to utilize the trained tactics.

Analysis: CDU commanders should work on better tactics for the open environment of the Capitol Grounds as opposed to narrow streets in the middle of a major city.

Recommendation: Ensure CDU training and operational plans are developed to include strategies that focus on tactics and deployments that utilize geography and hard barriers to assist with crowd control. Conduct table top exercises to validate the adopted strategies.

Observation 2.5: CDU has not updated their planning and staffing structure for future events similar to this event.

Analysis: Since this event, no CDU officers from other shifts have received plans for future similar events. The Department has continued to staff the same 8-12 hour day shifts without further discussion or training.

Recommendation: Update the CDU operational plans to provide a comprehensive plan for each activation, ensuring officers are provided detailed briefings on the plan and their responsibilities.

Observation 2.6: There were not enough hard platoons deployed for the day.

Analysis: There were only 1.5 platoons that responded to the Capitol and that was not enough. The rest of the respondents were not CDU hard squad officers, and, therefore, did not have adequate equipment (helmets, gas masks, PR24s, etc.) to protect against the incident.

Recommendation: Ensure CDU activations and the associated level of response are based on the available intelligence. Identify shortfalls in equipment that was previously issued to all USCP Officers as part of the overall crowd management and CDU response plan for the department.

Observation 2.7: CDU hard squad members were pulled to cover soft squad positions as soft squad was pulled to cover routine staffing shortages.

Analysis: Prior to the event on January 6, 2021 there was a shortage of officers on routine posts. CDU soft squad members were pulled from their squad to cover interior posts. CDU hard squad officers were pulled without their gear to cover soft squad posts leaving a shortage of hard squad officers.

Recommendation: Officers assigned to CDU activations should not be reassigned to cover staffing shortages for routine operations. Routine post shortages must be identified before the outgoing shift has departed or need to be prioritized with remaining routine staffing (e.g. building patrols, supervisors, etc.)

Observation 2.8: CDU did not have enough less than lethal officers trained to handle the incident on January 6, 2021 and the ammunition that was immediately available was insufficient.

Analysis: The USCP has less than 15 less than lethal trained officers on the CDU. The less than lethal officers tried to hold back the crowd with their ammunitions, but that proved to be ineffective as there was only one small team deployed to dispense less than lethal. The rioters wore goggles, masks, and other makeshift face protection. There was not enough less than lethal equipment deployed and on several occasions officers had to retrieve additional ammunitions for the less than lethal from the Fairchild building. There should be an increase in less than lethal training and a specific deployment ratio for each assigned hard platoon. In addition, all hard squad trained CDU should be familiar with the equipment for operation in exigent circumstances and strategies to defeat protective measures deployed by protestors.

Recommendation: CDU should evaluate the need to increase the number of less than lethal trained personnel and develop plans to improve deployment strategies.

Observation 2.9: The CDU equipment issued to the hard squad is outdated and is not conducive to long duration deployment.

Analysis: The CDU equipment that is currently issued is outdated. Officers have stated they had broken straps on their hard gear before deploying. The gear is extremely bulky and difficult to move around in.

Recommendation: Establish a diverse committee of CDU employees that are actively involved in activations to research hard gear for the Department. Initiate more training and exercises in full CDU gear to train the unit in donning and doffing equipment and maneuvering in full equipment.

Observation 2.10: CDU staging locations were not conducive to the deployment strategy.

Analysis: Officers were staged at the CVC detail office and the Botanic Gardens. Other locations may have provided a better tactical advantage.

Recommendation: Ensure the operational plan account for strategic staging areas within the defined perimeters for appropriate response.

3. Communications

Refers to timely and interoperable communications through various channels (radio, phone, etc.); both internally and with external partners.

Observation 3.1: There was a lack of communication and direction over the radio.

Analysis: Due to radio confusion, communications were unclear for fellow officers. In addition, directions were not provided over the radio clearly due to command being overwhelmed by rioters and the volume of radio traffic. Officers had to devolve to cell phone communications which led to slower response times, lack of common operating picture, and diminished communication capability as not everyone was issued a phone at the time.

Recommendation: Establish a working group to identify/evaluate communications needs and deconfliction issues associated with large-scale significant incidents.

Observation 3.2: There was confusion about the channel designations for the day due to planned events.

Analysis: The dispatchers had to remind officers multiple times of the channel designations due to the change in designations from normal operations.

Recommendation: Establish a working group to identify/evaluate communications needs and deconfliction issues associated with large-scale significant incidents.

Observation 3.3: Officers did not know the locations of decontamination sites the day of the incident or the decontamination procedures during the event.

Analysis: Officers were unable to respond to the designated decontamination sites as the officers did not know the location. Operational plans must be specific and. It must clearly define the decon procedures or any established procedures to support CDU. Plans must be designed so officers have digestible and specific information tailored to the assignment for the operational period. HMRT should review these plans and provide regular references for eye wash stations and aid locations across the hill. When possible, static locations should be permanently identified to ensure the locations are known regardless of the operation.

Recommendation: Ensure officers are briefed on all details of the operational plans and specifically officer safety plans.

Observation 3.4: High-priority calls over the radio made communications outside of the protest difficult.

Analysis: The high priority calls made it nearly impossible to use the radio to locate units. Officers relied on cell phone calls, texts, and emails for communications. This made communications and response times slower. The radio was also very difficult to use and hear for plain clothes officers operating during the event.

Recommendation: OIS supplies ear pieces for officers and it should be required as part of the operational plan to be utilized at all times (or at least specific operational periods). In addition, Communications should be prepared to expand the use of available radio channels during complex incidents.

Observation 3.5: Interoperability mutual aid channels were not established for outside response agencies to use.

Analysis: Mutual aid partners did not have access to USCP radio frequencies, causing them to be unaware of where to check in and receive incident briefing in order to effectively respond to the evolving incident. This made notifying the IC of actions difficult, and it made use of 10-codes a challenge for non-local responding entities. Representatives from mutual support agencies needed to be issued USCP radios to facilitate communications between agencies.

Recommendation: Evaluate/implement technological solutions and codify procedures to improve communication with mutual aid partners responding with their department-issued radios.

4. Equipment

Refers to the usability and quality of equipment in use during incident response. This also includes equipment in need of repair and replacement.

Observation 4.1: Radios could not be used without removing masks that were in place to protect against irritants.

Analysis: The deficiency in equipment placed the Department at a disadvantage because the microphone detached from gear when officers improvised to keep it in place. In order for officials/officers to communicate officers had to break the seals from masks, this, in turn, allowed irritants to get into their faces and to be breathed in.

Recommendation: Conduct a review of available CDU equipment that provide solutions to this issue.

Observation 4.2: The current HIRD response vehicle platform is inadequate to handle multiple calls for service simultaneously.

Analysis: Due to lack of vehicles some response personnel could not quickly arrive in their needed place. One of the vehicles with response equipment had to be used to transport personnel to a different geographic location losing the equipment's use.

Recommendation: Specialty units should include in their operational planning whether proper relief can occur if the outgoing shift is engaged in activity (or if a recall of additional officers is require). If the special event has an increased requirement over daily activity, a supplemental vehicle supplied by VMD or a rental should be included in the operational plan. The yearly vehicle summit gives an opportunity to raise these issues.

Observation 4.3: The current CERT response vehicle platform is inadequate to handle multiple calls for service simultaneously.

Analysis: Due to lack of vehicles some response personnel could not quickly arrive in their needed place. One of the vehicles with response equipment had to be used to transport personnel to a different geographic location losing the equipment's use.

Recommendation: Section vehicle requirements need to include response during an expanded incident. In addition, the deployment strategies for CERT need to factor in whether the entire team should abandon a vehicle during a critical incident or if the vehicle needs to remain in service. This may alter staffing, requiring a SOD officer to assist CERT during special events to augment the mobility of the team.

Observation 4.4: Decontamination tent stations were not conducive to an event like January 6.

Analysis: HIRD has decontamination tents that it deploys in the event of a need during operations. This was not practical for a riot as there were too many people occupying space where the tents would be deployed. Improvised decontamination stations had to be implemented.

Recommendation: HIRD needs to create a holistic plan for decontamination during CDU activations, which is different from the decon required

Observation 4.5: Officer equipment and uniforms were not decontaminated for up to six days after the event.

Analysis: Officers asked the process for getting their CDU clothes and equipment decontaminated without response for six days. This would have led to officers reusing this equipment if another incident had occurred during this time.

Recommendation: PAMD must create a procedure for mass decontamination or replacement of equipment in conjunction with the safety office. It must be determined which equipment can be physically decontaminated and which equipment should be replaced. These plans must include a scalable approach and the plan must be known or posted for reference.

Observation 4.6: Cell phones were a good tool to fill the communications gaps.

Analysis: Cell phones were helpful in getting the information out on January 6th. While it was not as easy to check phones in the midst of fighting, not everyone within USCP has access to radio communications; cell phones worked as an intermediary for those who don't have radios or who missed a communication through the radio.

Recommendation: Issuing mobile devices to all employees will ensure consistent availability of information.

5. Incident Command

Refers to the command and control structure used to operate the incident. This includes the use of incident command system and incident management system for USCP in response to notice and no-notice events and incidents that require immediate response.

Observation 5.1: Incident Command System and NIMS procedures were not followed during the planning or implementation of the events on January 6, 2021. No incident command post was established when additional resources were requested.

Analysis: The CDU Plan was completed for the event, but no Joint Session Plan was completed for the event. There was a failure to clearly define who was in charge prior to the incident escalating and no attempt to manage the incident or define areas of responsibility after escalation. After the 10-33 call (officer in trouble) went over the radio, MPD responded to the incident on the Hill. There was no established command post to which respondents could report.

Recommendation: Event planning must be conducted utilizing best practices, to include identifying multiple tasks requiring execution during an operational period and defining incident command, area command, and unified command as part of the planning process. This will ensure roles and responsibilities are defined for escalating incidents and there is clarity to command.

Observation 5.2: Command staff was unable to provide direction to officers on-scene due to active engagement with rioters.

Analysis: If command staff is actively engaged with active demonstrations, protest, and riots, they are unable to give the proper direction and/or control the event to maximize an effective outcome. The effective decision making and direction is lost.

Recommendation: Utilizing ICS in conjunction with appropriate planning would have enabled more effective responses from field supervisors and would have retained the command and control capabilities for Command staff. Areas of responsibility were not defined and appropriate use of channel designations for command and control were not implemented. Additional supervisor training in the established incident management system employed by the department must occur.

Observation 5.3: The department does not utilize any force tracking software to assist commanders with resource deployment.

Analysis: Force tracking software can be utilized to build a common operating picture for commanders, especially those in a fixed command center. An incident monitor with corresponding map that geolocates/tracks key assets, combines cameras and equips operational personnel and key decision makers, regardless of location, will provide the appropriate information to project, evaluate, plan, execute, and monitor events in both a day to day and incident scenario. This information can then be utilized to direct resources and emergency response.

6. Intelligence

Refers to the pre-event information and analysis flow from the Department's divisions and external departments and agencies' intelligence sharing. This includes information sharing and response actions with the intelligence.

Observation 6.1: Intelligence products must be updated and disseminated for appropriate planning and officer readiness.

Analysis: Operational planning and information flow did not extend down to the level of the field supervisor or officer. This information is necessary for officers to mentally prepare for the threats that are faced and for supervisors to brief and prepare deployment strategies.

Recommendation: Disseminate information below the command staff level and conduct appropriate briefings during roll calls leading up to events. This can also be conducted through virtual methods such as conference calls, increasing the ability to disseminate information. Providing this information will instill confidence that the officer's safety is paramount.

Observation 6.2: Individuals with the most experience extrapolating open source material were not tasked with reviewing social media to glean intel related to the event.

Analysis: The social media unit was immediately and essentially dismantled under the new leadership. New office reassignments and steering away from the concepts of having subject matter experts may have contributed to the tragedy.

Recommendation: Conduct a review of the job functions and organization of IICD to determine opportunities for enhancement.

Observation 6.3: IICD was urged in an email, to be sure that a Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF) was on all their documents. This is put into an assessment to express urgency or concerns.

Analysis: The assessment for 1/6 contained a BLUF that did not express the severity of the threat or the fact that USCP actually had knowledge of a plan in place. The statement that protesters may be armed was included, but it was never expressed with the urgency that they planned to overtake the Capitol and target Members of Congress. A generic, all-encompassing quote was put in the assessment.

Recommendation: When a BLUF is put into the IICD with the inference that there is a possibility of violence it should be make sure that it is clear that violence may occur. The type of violence and what is expected should be included. Significant updates to the intelligence assessment must also be reflected in the "BLUF" section.

Observation 6.4: The intelligence briefing that HIRD received differed from the official intelligence reports, causing confusion in preparation, postings, and overall response at the Capitol.

Analysis: Official intelligence given for January 6, 2021, did not highlight the potential for violence during the protests and the desire to breach police lines. The HIRD briefing highlighted this potential and called for a day of protests, which is what altered the deployment strategy to keep all HIRD units in the outer perimeter to ensure they were not trapped within any crowds focused on the Capitol building.

Recommendation: Intelligence products must be consistent and the messaging must not be left to individual interpretation. This information should inform operational planning, to include preparations for escalating incidents beyond the stated assessment. A broader dissemination of this information to departmental personnel should occur.

Observation 6.5: Minimal updates were provided by units in the field assigned to monitor demonstration activity prior to the arrival on U.S. Capitol Grounds.

Analysis: During previous marches, plain clothes officers were in the field giving updates on location of the march and if there was any civil disturbance occurring. The size of the group and direction of travel was also provided. None of this information was provided over the radio before the protestors arrived at the Capitol.

Recommendation: The plan must clearly articulate the deployment strategy and reporting requirements. Both uniformed and plain clothed units should be tasked with monitoring outside the primary jurisdiction. In addition, those assigned to interagency command posts (i.e. MPD JOCC) should ensure they relay this information to the Command Center for distribution to field units as necessary.

7. Personnel Identification and Safety

Refers to identification security of USCP personnel during incident response, and to the physical protection of the scene during the incident.

Observation 7.1: Officer uniforms use first and last names presently.

Analysis: In the aftermath, officers were experiencing personal information leaks online (doxing). This would have been more difficult to accomplish without access to first and last names.

Recommendation: Take entire names off of CDU uniforms and replace them with pin numbers. This will provide adequate identification for the Department purposes without giving information that can be used for doxing. For non CDU uniforms only last names should be on the uniform and first letter or pin number. This will help keep officers safer from having their information released.

Observation 7.2: USCP operational civilians had challenges getting in and out of the Capitol due to the appearance being indistinguishable from nonoperational civilians.

Analysis: The current civilian uniform does not properly identify USCP civilian employees who have a valid reason to access emergency locations/crime scenes. All uniform apparel and equipment needs to be evaluated and updated so that it is easily identifiable at all operational levels and throughout all apparel layers.

Recommendation: Identify who is considered an operational civilian. Once you identify who is an operational civilian change their uniforms so that they are easily identified by officers when responding to scene and educate officers on the difference as well as roles of these employees. This will ensure unimpeded access for essential support personnel.

Observation 7.3: Operational civilians do not have means of protecting themselves on-scene.

Analysis: The department has transitioned tasks and responsibilities previously assigned to sworn personnel to civilian personnel. They are required to respond into threat zones to perform their essential functions.

Recommendation: The department should assess the decision to shift all specialized functions that are required to respond into threat zones to civilian personnel as well as the deployment strategies for these employees. Operational civilians could be provided with OC spray, ASP batons, self-defense training, and additional protective equipment to mitigate this risk.

8. Staffing

Refers to the identification of any issues in reference to the availability of personnel from division, covering post assignments, providing notices of the event, coordination of schedules, and return to normal operations.

Observation 8.1: There was not adequate numbers for CDU response numbers.

Analysis: Some of the hard platoons ended up being turned soft platoons to fill the staffing gap with soft platoons. In addition, CERT officers were used to augment CDU platoons, and they are not trained to handle CDU-level response. The impacts of COVID-19 related staffing shortages must be assessed into the overall picture during the operational period.

Recommendation: Ensure that risk assessments are conducted to define the appropriate staffing and operational plans include a plan for an escalation of the event. Concept of Operations for CDU must be assessed for the inclusion of supporting elements and these requirements must be supported by training and policy.

Observation 8.2: The Department did not have enough officers to effectively stop the riot without assistance from other law enforcement agencies.

Analysis: The department faces continuing challenges maintaining its full time employees at authorized levels.

Recommendation 8.2a: Conduct a comprehensive review of the staffing requirements for the Department to identify increased or new needs as well as potential realignments and reductions.

Recommendation 8.2b: Evaluate the need to establish a dedicated CDU section that conducts roving patrols/response units when not activated or conducting training.

Recommendation 8.2c: Ensure that when additional staffing requirements are identified/implemented, that authorized staffing levels are approved and included in future budget requests. Ensure new post assignments drive the adjustment of overall full time employee requirements.

Recommendation 8.2d: Assess current operations and determine methods to shift sworn personnel towards operational response and away from non-law enforcement functions. Additionally, assess officer retention bonuses and rehiring annuitants to balance deficits in staffing.

Observation 8.3: The staffing in the IICD is insufficient to handle the intelligence that needs to be analyzed.

Analysis: Currently the Department has 15 people assigned to Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (IICD). The division is not staffed appropriately to balance the department's requirement, especially during exigent circumstances.

Recommendation: The Concept of Operations for IICD must be defined in order to determine the appropriate staffing to meet this mission. USCP should ensure vacancy announcements for new hires align with the defined skillsets necessary for the

requirements. During this assessment, an integration of the sworn intelligence section into the IICD should be evaluated.

Observation 8.4: The staffing in Communications is insufficient to handle multiple events at once without overwhelming the communications operators.

Analysis: On January 6, 2021 communications utilized three radio channels for 3 separate events without leaving a channel for routine traffic i.e. duress alarms. Currently communication is severely under staffed. Retention of newly hired dispatchers is dismal. Dispatchers are overworked due to the excessive amount of overtime worked in the communication centers. The safety of all the officers communicating thru our radios is orchestrated by the dispatchers.

Recommendation: Conduct a review of staffing requirements and responsibilities of the Communications sections to ensure capabilities exist to handle multiple events/channels as necessary. Ensure operational plans must account for appropriate communications and radio channel requirement, to include the potential for an escalating incident.

Observation 8.5: Officer recall did not occur to augment understaffing during the riot.

Analysis: The only officers that were "recalled" for the incident self-deployed. There is no process in place to recall officers to the Hill. The only recourse is for Sgts. to call individual officers to request them to return to work if they have personal phone numbers or contact the command center to obtain individual officers phone numbers to recall. Prior to January 6, most officers did not have work-issued cell phones.

Recommendation: Review/establish criteria and procedures for the recall of officers not currently at work during critical incidents.

Observation 8.6: The HMRT is severely understaffed.

Analysis: HMRT staffing numbers are below the 50% staffing mark. HDS personnel are being pulled to fill required roles and responsibilities, limiting that unit's staffing.

Recommendation: Conduct a review of staffing requirements and responsibilities of the HMRT to ensure operational capabilities exist.

Observation 8.7: Due to the threat level, HIRD broke from usual protocol for staffing at the Capitol. The teams were told expressly to not enter the Capitol unless directed while there is normally a team stationed in the building for joint sessions and Vice President VIP visits.

Analysis: USCP has capable specialty units, but limited resources to cover the requirements for special events and daily deployments. An increase of FTE or mutual aid requests should be assessed.

Recommendation: During complex events, holistic planning must occur to ensure that planning requirements are met and appropriate mutual aid is requested if warranted. Detailed planning and acceptance of mutual aid requirements will ensure we avoid choices that impede deployment. This same decision matrix should be applied for tactical response and other specialty responses.

Observation 8.8: The Department released the midnight shift in order to have sufficient staffing for the next operational period. While this appeared to be a challenge for the staffing numbers for the event, this was a necessity in order to have uniformed officers available to cover all necessary shifts for the first shift of the following day. This is especially a needed consideration when the assumption could be made that 12-hour shifts were to be implemented.

Analysis: The department does not have a standard methodology for increasing staffing for special events that accounts for the various options.

Recommendation: Ensure commanders have the tools necessary to make appropriate manpower decisions for both the current operational period and the following operational periods. This will create greater fidelity for outside agency support requests.

9. Training

Refers to the capability and knowledge of USCP workforce. This comes from the institution preparing employees to respond in all hazards.

Observation 9.1: Officers were unclear on less than lethal and use of force policies.

Analysis: The officers identified that they were unclear on what they were allowed to do in terms of less than lethal force. In addition, there have been comments that stated officers did not feel like they would be authorized to use force in response to this event.

Recommendation: Use of force training must ensure that officers understand Use of Force principles remain consistent for all law enforcement activities. CDU training must include a Use of Force component.

Observation 9.2: CDU needs more tactical training.

Analysis: CDU struggled with formation, transitions from soft to hard platoon status (i.e. armor up drills), tactical movements inside buildings and in open areas, and arrest team training. Not every officer in the unit is trained in less than lethal force response which hindered the ability to use specialized equipment against the rioters. In addition, there was not enough equipment for less than lethal force response, and there was not enough less than lethal ammunition onsite.

Recommendation: Conduct training on formation, going from soft to hard like armor up drills, tactical movements for inside buildings, tactics for large open areas, and arrest team training.

Observation 9.3: Mass arrest protocols were not discussed during the planning phase for violent mass demonstration.

Analysis: There was no discussion about mass arrest that was filtered down to officers. Prisoner processing can handle about 15 complaint prisoners. The demonstrators outnumbered the number of officers on-scene making mass arrests a major challenge.

Recommendation: Operational plans must provide specific details on how critical components will be deployed. The plans must specifically assign functions and alternate functions for critical components.

Observation 9.4: The officers are not EMT-trained, and could not provide basic medical assistance.

Analysis: Officers do not have basic emergency medical technician certification or training. There is no established program to ensure Department EMTs meet national standards, nor is there a program that ensures recertification when they expire. Prior to January 6, 2021, there was no medical entity sponsor for the EMT program.

Recommendation: The department must assess the ability to provide "care under fire" and determine how to best increase the medical response capabilities of the department beyond the current TCCC program

Observation 9.5: Officers were unaware of the position they were expected to hold once the Building went into lockdown.

Analysis: After building went into lockdown, the officers retreated to the rotunda door. This left those retreated officers trapped without any safe exit or tactical advantage. This caused a situation in which officers had to be evacuated safely.

Recommendation: The guidance needs to be reviewed for lockdown response for officers. If there is no guidance, policies need to be published to drive training on what positions officers are expected to maintain during a life safety lockdown.

Observation 9.6: The event log created by the command center was insufficient and had referenced the suspicious packages and made little to no mention of the riot. Command Center assistants need to be retrained on the expectations of what is to be entered into an event log for an incident.

Analysis: Command Center specialists must continue to initiate a separate incident log for *each incident* being monitored by the command center. Command Division needs to assess additional procedures for this requirement during expanding events, allowing the creating and monitoring of multiple incident logs.

Recommendations: Assess the capabilities of the Command Center to use all sections to assist in an expanding incident. Offsite locations may be better tasked with certain requirements that can be managed from outside the command center.

10. Additional Observations

The following observations did not fall into the category of strength or area for improvement, but they were noteworthy to the event and the execution of future events.

Additional Observation 10.1: COVID-19 impacted the planning and execution during the operational period.

Analysis: The department and Congressional community were operating at reduced capacity prior to January 6, 2021. This minimized the focus on standard walk-throughs and meetings associated with the Joint Session.

Recommendation: Formalize operational responses to known event parameters to ensure proper planning occurs. The department should respond consistently to events such as Head of State Visits, Joint Sessions, etc. in a consistent manner. These should be documented in a consistent manner that ensures a detailed level of planning is available for each assignment dedicated to the special event.