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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS

TRANSCRIPTION

■

CHRISTOPHER C. MILLER

Case Number: 20210115-069052-CASE-01

March 12, 2021

Transcript Prepared by:

[REDACTED]

Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General
4800 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22350

[REDACTED]

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MILLER - March 12, 2021

PROCEEDING

1
2 [REDACTED]: Good morning. Today is March 12, 2021 and the time is 9:26/9:27. My name
3 is [REDACTED] with the DoD Office of Inspector General. With me is my colleague [REDACTED]
4 [REDACTED], Supervisor Investigator [REDACTED], and the witness Mr. Christopher Miller. We're
5 located within DoD OIG office space inside the Mark Center in Alexandria, Virginia. We're
6 conducting this interview as part of our review of DoD's involvement leading up to and during the
7 civil disturbances in the District of Columbia including at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Now,
8 sir, at this time I ask you to acknowledge that the interview is being recorded?

9 MR. MILLER: It's being recorded, yep.

10 [REDACTED]: Thank you, sir, and please acknowledge that I provided you a copy of the DoD
11 IG Privacy Act Notice and you've had an opportunity to ask us questions?

12 MR. MILLER: I acknowledge I've gotten it and reviewed it.

13 [REDACTED]: All Right, sir. You don't have any questions at this time?

14 MR. MILLER: Nope.

15 [REDACTED]: All right. Thank you. I'll now administer the oath. Please raise your right hand.
16 Whereupon:

17 CHRISTOPHER C. MILLER

18 was called as a witness, placed under oath, and provided the following testimony:

19 EXAMINATION

20 BY [REDACTED]:

21 Q: For the record please state your full name and spell your last name?

22 A: Christopher Charles Miller. Last name Miller, Mike-India-Lima-Lima-Echo-Romeo. M-I-L-
23 L-E-R.

MILLER - March 12, 2021

1 Q: Thank you, sir. And what was your official DoD duty position on January 6th?

2 A: Acting Secretary of Defense for the Department of Defense.

3 Q: That's a Presidentially appointed position?

4 A: No. The Presidentially appointed position was the Director of the National
5 Counterterrorism Center, but I was in the acting capacity after the firing of Mark Esper.

6 Q: All right. Thank you. When did you become Acting Secretary of Defense?

7 A: November the 9th, 2020.

8 Q: All right so and then of course you ended that position with change of administration in
9 January of '20?

10 A: Yep.

11 Q: Thank you, sir. Before we get into the core questions for our interview, is there anything
12 you'd like to tell us before we proceed with our questions?

13 A: Nope.

14 Q: Okay. Now, the first part of our interview is going to focus key general questions about
15 DoD's involvement on January 6th and then we'll transition to specific questions about --

16 A: Sure.

17 Q: -- DoD's preparations and request for assistance that DoD received from D.C.
18 government officials.

19 A: Yep.

20 Q: Before we get into that and we're not looking for the long answers and we're not trying
21 to get your back-up but just in general terms. How do you respond to comments in the media and
22 in Congressional hearings that DoD failed to deploy the D.C. National Guard in a timely manner on
23 January 6?

1 A: They're inaccurate.

2 Q: What about comments that it took the DoD over 3 hours to approve deployment --

3 A: It's not --

4 Q: -- of the D.C. National Guard?

5 A: It's not an accurate statement.

6 Q: Okay.

7 A: Doesn't match the facts.

8 Q: What can you tell us about comments that have surfaced in the media and
9 Congressional hearings that Army officials did not want to deploy D.C. National Guard personnel to
10 the Capitol because of "optics"?

11 A: What do you mean by that?

12 Q: The phrase or the word "optics" has come up in the media.

13 A: Yeah. It comes up all the time.

14 Q: Okay.

15 A: I was fully supportive of not putting U.S. military personnel at the Capitol on the 6th of
16 January.

17 Q: You were fully supportive of not putting them there?

18 A: Yeah, right. Absolutely.

19 Q: Okay. How do you respond to comments that you and/or the Secretary of the Army
20 stripped Major General Walker, the Commanding General of the D.C. National Guard of his
21 authority leading up to --

22 A: Oh, complete and utter bullshit. It's why I just -- I don't know what you want me to say. I
23 mean, it's not an accurate freaking statement.

1 Q: Okay. And how do you respond to the comments that Major General Walker had to
2 seek approval from the Secretary of the Army or DoD senior leaders just to move his personnel
3 from one traffic control point to another?

4 A: I -- how do I respond to his comments? I think they're pretty immature and not
5 reflective of the obligation he has as a two-star general in the District of Columbia National Guard
6 to -- as the Ground Tactical Commander to take action necessary to -- based on situation on the
7 ground. His comment that he could not deploy is technically correct, but in our United States
8 military where we give mission type orders and we expect our people, senior leaders on the
9 ground to use their best judgement. I have a bit of a problem with the fact that he is now of the --
10 has decided that he did not have the professional responsibility, technically speaking, absolutely
11 accurate. I wanted to be -- McCarthy and I wanted to be the ones that made decisions about
12 moving Reserve. That's kind of 101 in military operations. In this case, and say what you want,
13 McCarthy and I were in the chain of command. Now, that's a whole different discussion about the
14 ridiculousness of the setup of the D.C. National Guard and the chain of command, but we were. As
15 the senior level decision maker I wanted to have approval authority for movement. You'll notice I
16 did say -- I gave him a complete out that if -- based on the situation on the ground he could move
17 his reserve as necessary.

18 Q: Okay. All right. Yeah, I think we're going to bring out some of those points --

19 A: Okay. Go ahead.

20 Q: -- later on in the questioning.

21 A: Let's keep going.

22 Q: But one last question before we get into that is how do you respond to the comments
23 that the DoD may not have responded, hesitated to respond, or was directed by the White House

1 or White House officials not to respond because the protesters involved in --

2 A: That's completely, fundamentally 110 percent inaccurate and is not true.

3 Q: Okay. Thanks, sir. Let's turn our attention to the pre-January 6 period.

4 A: Okay.

5 Q: So, on December 19th, 2020 the President announced via Twitter that there was going
6 to be a rally on January 6th at D.C. and again on the 27th of December the President Tweeted
7 another invitation to his supports to come to D.C. and for a rally at the Ellipse on January 6th, and
8 in response to 2020 election results --

9 A: Yeah.

10 Q: -- where certification was scheduled for that day.

11 A: Yep.

12 Q: When did you first become aware of the scheduled January 6th rally?

13 A: I don't remember. I mean, we tracked. No idea. I knew January 6th was the key event. I
14 mean, we all knew that, but we tracked domestic disturbances daily. So, we were aware of it. I
15 don't know when we first talked about it. We being Chairman Milley and I.

16 Q: Do you recall any discussion say around December 19th, or around December 27th, I
17 mean, before or after Christmas about upcoming demonstrations on the 6th?

18 A: I don't recall any conversations. That doesn't mean we didn't have them, but I mean the
19 focus at that time there was a foreign threat that we were focused on.

20 Q: Okay. How would you normally have learned about that --

21 A: About what?

22 Q: -- did the -- the pending demonstrations? Is there a routine brief that you get, or is
23 there some particular source for information on domestic disturbances?

1 A: Yeah, we had a daily product. [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED] t. I
3 don't remember. I mean, we knew -- we knew January 6th was a big day.

4 Q: Okay. Would that be a, say a written product or --

5 A: Yeah.

6 Q: -- something else?

7 A: [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] So, but I don't -- I mean, we obviously knew June 6th, or January 6th was going to be an
12 important day.

13 Q: All right. Now, as Acting Secretary of Defense what authority did you have to alert and
14 dispatch National Guard personnel within the District of Columbia?

15 A: Within the District of Columbia I was -- I don't know exactly. I was going to respond to
16 requests from the legally dedicated folks, Mayor Bower, primarily the Mayor and/or requests from
17 the other federal agencies.

18 Q: Okay. But you're not aware of any, I'd say particular directives, or --

19 A: Oh, there's tons of all that crap. Support to civil law enforcement -- you know Defense
20 support to civil, all that stuff. I mean, there's tons of them, yeah. I mean I wasn't an expert on it,
21 but pretty, very -- I was familiar with them.

22 Q: All right. And where there any standing agreements or plans that specified what DoD
23 would do to support civil authorities if they requested DoD support within D.C.?

1 A: Yeah, I mean, kind of how we executed. The request comes in from the Mayor and I look
2 at it and approve, or deny, or coordinate.

3 Q: Well, yeah, we just want to make sure is there any like standing op plan or some other -
4 -

5 A: Not that I know I'm sure there is somewhere but it didn't come up during our
6 discussions on how we were going to support federal and local authorities.

7 Q: All right. Now can you please tell us in as much detail as possible what decisions you
8 made and the steps that you took prior to January 6 to prepare for DoD support a federal or local
9 officials before the January 6 rally?

10 A: Right. Solicited and you have the timeline. I'm not going to, you know, we produce the
11 timeline that I think you have. So, solicited input from local and federal elements in D.C. If they
12 needed any support. All of the support request came in from Mayor Bowser for whatever it was,
13 370, I can't remember the exact number. Then, that was kind of I think the 31 December I want to
14 say, somewhere in there, 30, 31st which then as in the week prior to the six we had a lot of
15 conversation internally, and I think we had one meeting, interagency meeting where, "Hey, does
16 anybody need anything?" And so I was basing my decision, the support we would provide on kind
17 of validated requests from those elements that could ask for DoD support.

18 Q: All right. So, when you say "solicited" I don't suppose you personally solicited?

19 A: Yeah, I talked to --

20 Q: Who does this for you or who did this for you?

21 A: A couple of things, for the civilian side it's the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
22 Homeland Security and whatever his long title is Ken Rapuano. His people are the node for that.
23 And then I'm sure once the request from Mayor Bowser came in the Army was primary responsible

1 for in the Pentagon for doing the coordination between D.C. National Guard. Then, when it came
2 down to the rest of the interagency synchronization and whatnot, that was -- I don't know, you
3 have better details than I do about what happened at the action officer level in Homeland Defense
4 for the Assistant Secretary of Defense in Policy, and the Army. I assume that in true Pentagon
5 fashion there was all sorts of cross talk back and forth to make sure that regulatory laws were
6 being followed. I don't have insight into the details who was talking to whom. I know that the -- my
7 queries about, "Okay. Do we have the requests that we need?" Were answered to the affirmative
8 that that's all we got. We've called out to other agencies and Homeland Defense, etcetera,
9 etcetera

10 Q: Did you receive any information, intelligence briefings, force protection briefings,
11 discussing threats of violence --

12 A: Yeah.

13 Q: -- from the civil disturbances that might happen on January 6?

14 A: Sure.

15 Q: And --

16 A: Let's be clear. About domestic intelligence. You know that as well as I do that we
17 weren't collecting, and I would be hesitant to call the information we were receiving intelligence,
18 and I know that's -- and you guys know this. I know it sounds like really kind of like how many
19 angels can stay stand at the head of a pin type argument, but there was a lot of information, and
20 frankly the majority of the information we were receiving was self-collected in watching the news,
21 watching what's going on online. So, yeah. We had pretty much a regular battle rhythm, "Okay.
22 What's going on?? I told you we got a morning -- we had a morning product.

23 Q: Yeah, is anybody else giving you information specific to the possibility of January 6

1 violence during this time frame?

2 A: What do you mean?

3 Q: Well, you said the morning product. I'm wondering if you're getting other briefers
4 telling you, "Hey, this is what we're hearing from the civilian side as to January 6, and this is what
5 we might be looking at?"

6 A: Yeah, that was a regular topic of conversation with the Chairman, with Secretary of the
7 Army, and Chief of Staff, and internal, yeah.

8 Q: Okay.

9 A: But in terms of like formal, daily briefings, no, [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED] but

11 [REDACTED]

12 Q: And --

13 A: Yeah, go ahead.

14 Q: Yeah what -- I guess what I want to get that is prior to January 6 what was the
15 impression you were getting from the information you receiving, self collected, daily brief,
16 whatever --

17 A: It was --

18 Q: -- as to what might happen on January 6?

19 A: Yeah, so the expectation was that there was going to be a replay of the November, was
20 it December or January? I can't remember when like one of these groups came into town and for a
21 small-scale demonstration. Was it November/December? Was it December/January? It was
22 December/January. You know, there were weekends where they came in and the expectation, and
23 it was also the expectation of what occurred in June. The thoughts were you would have local

1 demonstrations like in the past during the day, and then at night the crowd would disperse and
2 the violence factions would go out and start street fighting like they did in the past. So, that was
3 the expectation. I would describe that as our expected most likely course of action for the
4 opposition. I don't say enemy, the opposition, but those that were going to be prone to violence.
5 And, obviously when you looked at the overlay for January 6th something jumps off the paper at
6 you and the, I think the Department of Interior had approved a permit for the freaking Capitol, and
7 believe me the Chairman, and I, and others were like, when you looked at worst-case scenario that
8 jumped off of the page at you obviously. It didn't take Nostradamus to figure that one out.

9 Q: When you saw that did you think oh, "DoD might need to do something at the Capitol?"

10 A: There was absolutely -- there is absolutely no way I was putting U.S. military forces at
11 the Capitol period, and this is why. We had on, whatever it was January 18th or 19th where Flynn,
12 Giuliani, and Powell are at the White House, and the story was that they had briefed, I don't know
13 if this happened or not but I'm just telling you what factors were going on with my decision-
14 making. And the story was that the President was -- they were pushing the President to use -- to
15 declare martial law and use attorney forces to redo the election. That of course was troubling to
16 hear. I don't know the validity of that but that was what was in the press. Then you had this
17 constant drumbeat of, remember when I came in the story was that I was a stuffed suit that was a
18 Trump crony that was going to use the United States military to conduct a military coup to
19 overthrow the government, the elected government of the United States. So that is what was out
20 there in the Twitter sphere. That's what they're talking, right? So that's number two. Number
21 three, 10 former secretaries of defense whatever week that was before write a letter to the
22 Washington Post, basically a letter to those of us in the Department of Defense cautioning that
23 they were concerned that we were -- I was going to use the United States military in a way

1 antithetical to the Constitution. So, we had those elements going on. There was also a strong
2 feeling because I base from the Congressional leadership that the military was going to be
3 misutilized and was a coup for us. So, there was -- I had made the decision based on the request
4 that we would keep, but it was tied to an operational plan developed by the interagency and by
5 the people downtown. Like not me, but so I had made a very deliberate decision that I would not
6 put U.S. military people West, we decided East of the 9th Street, northwest. I think it was
7 northwest I can't remember. And the reason for that was I knew if the morning of the 6th or prior
8 if we put U.S. military personnel on the Capitol I would have created, go ahead, the greatest
9 Constitutional crisis probably since the Civil War because that would have been interpreted by the
10 press, by the punditry, but most importantly by the elected officials on the Hill as an effort by the
11 Trump administration to influence the Electoral College count. So those were the factors that were
12 playing into my mind that we were not putting U.S., and it's wrong for the United States military,
13 remember domestic law enforcement's got lead in this country. You guys know. We don't use their
14 military except as an absolute last case scenario, and that -- we were not even close to that. So, my
15 commitment to the institution, because remember how screwed up we did this in the 60s and the
16 70s? It was -- I wasn't going to do that again. So I was only -- United States military in my mind we
17 were only going to be used as an absolute last resort, and that's the way for domestic law
18 enforcement, I'll go to my grave saying that. It is not correct use of the United States military
19 except when law and order has completely collapsed. Eight to 10,000 cops on the street. [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED] What was the threat indications? It

1 started out the last weekend of the month, or last weekend of the year they were thinking five to
2 15. Now this is when you start getting freaky because you're watching. The numbers kept going up
3 indicating we did not have good intelligence. Not "we" because it's not my job to police the City of
4 Washington D.C. The final count demonstrators were I believe it was 10 to 35,000. When you see
5 that and you know we really don't -- they don't know what the hell's going on. So, the cops were
6 like, "Listen DoD we've got this. We handle up to 1 million people, regularly, that's kind of how our
7 force structure works." So you're like, "No problem." The operational plan was this, let's take the
8 D.C. National Guard, keep them away from the Capitol. Let's put -- the request, it wasn't my
9 request, Bowser and her Metropolitan Police Department were like, "Let's put D.C. National Guard
10 on traffic control points and at the Metro stations to free up credentialed law-enforcement
11 officers that can go out and arrest people." Or let's be perfectly clear and this came up, "So they
12 can go out and fight if they need to." So, the idea when everything -- what we expected was the
13 inner core would have their demonstrations and crap, and then like they did in the past they
14 would disperse out in small groups and start beating up people. So we wanted to have -- the cops
15 were like, "We want to have basically strike forces that can go around." Okay. Something's
16 happening on U Street. The cops go out they do that. We didn't want -- I don't want military
17 people fighting American citizens except when it really, really is like Detroit, Washington D.C.
18 1968/'69.

19 Q: Okay. You said up there that I think you use the phrase "we decided" that you were
20 going to deploy the National Guard.

21 A: Yeah I decided but I was in close contact -- go ahead. Finish your question. Sorry about
22 that.

23 Q: Well I'm just wondering is this a discussion that you had with -- who did you have this

1 discussion with as to this is why we're not putting people in the Capitol?

2 A: You know, Chairman, best military advice. McCarthy -- Secretary McCarthy. Chief of
3 Staff McConville, Deputy Secretary of Defense Norquist, Rapuano would be -- Ken Rapuano the
4 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense or whatever, Homeland Security. He would
5 be on the calls. You could get records of the people that were on there. But that was kind of the
6 key, remember they had been to all events -- all of them had been through June 2020 together, so
7 it was kind of that group.

8 BY [REDACTED]:

9 Q: [REDACTED] If I can say.

10 A: Yep.

11 Q: Sir, I wanted to show you these three --

12 A: Please.

13 Q: -- maps because you mentioned about --

14 A: Yeah. Got them.

15 Q: Having Soldiers at or near the Capitol. The first two we believe were generated by the
16 D.C. National Guard and then the third one obviously has got the Army's head on it.

17 A: Yeah.

18 Q: When you talk about your decision not to put Soldiers at the Capitol, are those maps of
19 where I guess they had the traffic control points, the TCP's. Is that about accurate?

20 A: Yep. That's it. Yeah and I got the same thing. I figured D.C. National Guard did the slides
21 and then in true Army fashion that just took it and put a new heading on it, yeah.

22 Q: Okay.

23 A: So that's what I was -- that was a sort of kind of the operational concept if you will for

1 what D.C. had requested and what we supported.

2 Q: What other, I know you mentioned the Capitol, were there any other areas in D.C. that
3 you deemed we're not putting --

4 A: No.

5 Q: -- U.S. Soldiers at? Just the Capitol?

6 A: Yeah, just the Capitol. Based on I hate to use the word optics because it's been used and
7 so prejudicially and negatively. It wasn't the optics. It was like there was would have been huge
8 political consequences that, because that's what I got paid to do. Is I had the factor in the politics
9 of this and that was my concern is the situation does not warrant at this time U.S. military forces.
10 Because remember, we specifically at, in one of the meetings I think we had one interagency
11 meeting prior we're like, "Okay." I think the Chairman brought it up, don't quote me on it, I'm
12 pretty sure the Chairman did when we're -- it was Park Police, Justice, FBI, Homeland Security. I
13 don't know if MPD, you probably have the notes. MPD might have been on the call because you
14 know how you have a call and there's all these other people listening. I don't know who all was on
15 there because for me Department of Homeland Security was the key interlocking because they do
16 this in their sleep. So that dude, and I forgot his name. A really good guy. He's like their [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED] they have a different name for him. [REDACTED] something or the other. I could look it
18 up. He had -- he was the guy who was looking at it domestically and looking at the threat, and he's
19 kind of the subject matter expert so he's talking. Everybody's like, "Did you talk to Capitol Hill
20 police?" "No. I didn't talk to the Capitol Hill. I'm not talking to the Capitol Hill Police. There are
21 other people." Rapuano's people, Homeland Security, Interior, Justice, FBI. So, we're like, "Fellows,
22 y'all really going to have a freaking -- allow a demonstration?" The Chairman kind of did this I'm
23 paraphrasing. "A demonstration on the Capitol grounds?" "Well, that's their constitutional right."

1 We're like, "How do you cancel that?" "Oh, we would not do that." Because our recommendation,
2 I'm telling you. Our recommendation was, I'm going to be very blunt, "Are you out of your freaking
3 mind? You're going to allow an element." Because that was your fourth column, right? It was so
4 predictable, right? And they're like, "You don't understand. We've got this." So the next thing was,
5 "You feel confident with the security posture at the Capitol?" We were told, "They've got it. They
6 got it. There are fences. They're going to have barriers the, there's fences." I think we have military
7 experience or DoD experience here. When your unit on the left, right, or behind you says that
8 they've got it you don't go inspect them. You take it that they are professionals, they know what
9 they're doing. So, of course then you see the TV that day and the barricades were flippant bike
10 racks that they used as weapons against the cops. So, we recognize that there was an issue,
11 potential issue at the Capitol. Our queries about, "Hey, you good? Do you think?" "We got it. We
12 got it." At that point I'm like got to trust. Got to trust the other elements.

13 Q: Okay. So -- I'm sorry.

14 A: Go ahead.

15 Q: So DoD knew prior to January 6? You knew about the demonstration on or around the
16 Ellipse but you also knew that there was one at the Capitol?

17 A: Oh, yeah. I mean it was a good lay down in terms of -- I mean, we had a good lay down
18 and everything that was coming in. Situation? Yeah. Planned activities? We knew, I thought we
19 had a really good feel for what was going on. Yeah. But any of that I don't get paid to -- the
20 Department of Defense is not in the approval for domestic constitutionally sanctioned
21 demonstrations. We're not in the approval chain of that. That's D.C. and Department of Interior.

22 BY [REDACTED]:

23 Q: Okay. So let's run through the process of a request for D.C. support came in and --

1 A: Yep.

2 Q: -- all of the meetings and whatnot that lead up to the approval.

3 A: Sure.

4 Q: So, we've identified one. Well, are you aware of any request for assistance for January
5 6, from a federal agency or --

6 A: No. Nobody asked for anything. I'm not aware of any.

7 Q: Okay.

8 A: I didn't to me, no.

9 Q: All right, so then --

10 A: I talked to fellow Cabinet officials like, "You guys need anything?" That doesn't mean
11 that they knew what the hell they were doing, but that's who I talked to.

12 Q: So, on December 31 the Director of the D.C. Homeland Security Emergency
13 Management Agency --

14 A: Yeah.

15 Q: And the D.C. Mayor sent the request to General Walker?

16 A: Uh, huh [affirmative response].

17 Q: And, that was for D.C. National Guard support on January 6?

18 A: Yep.

19 Q: So, can you kind of track when you became aware of this request?

20 A: Yeah, 31st saw the initial request. Army got it. In typical staffing process they looked at
21 it and I knew of it, yeah. I didn't know the details but I knew the request was like 370, traffic
22 control points. That's the QRF, Headquarters element, and then there was the -- they had the
23 chem/bio thing which I was like, "Makes complete sense to me." That's kind of how I'd arrange it,

1 yeah.

2 Q: Okay. So they asked for traffic control points --

3 A: Uh, huh [affirmative response].

4 Q: -- and the Metro support --

5 A: Uh, huh [affirmative response].

6 Q: -- and the chem/bio, the CST?

7 A: Yeah, whatever they call it. Right,

8 Q: Civil Support Team?

9 A: Right.

10 Q: And you are aware --

11 A: And a Quick Reaction and a Headquarters element.

12 Q: Okay. And it sounds like somebody -- somebody informed you somehow almost as soon
13 as it came in on the 31st?

14 A: Yeah. Oh yeah. Yeah, I was aware on the 31st.

15 Q: And, when did it actually come to you for approval?

16 A: We talked about it, the Chairman and I, I can't remember McCarthy and whatnot. All
17 that weekend of the 31st, that long weekend we were having daily if not a couple of times daily
18 calls because there was a huge international threat that we can't talk about it here obviously. So,
19 we were at a really super heightened level of alert for potential enemy attacks against our forces.
20 So, we were talking at least once a day if not twice, if not three times a day on secure coms, and
21 this would come up. You know, this was not thing -- this was the number one priority but, you
22 know, "Hey, what's going on? What are you seeing? What's the intel say?" "Okay. I think we're
23 good." "What's your status?" "Hey, while we're on the net what else is going on?" "Hey, D.C.

1 National Guard requested for the 6th.” “Okay” And then the -- so Army got it too, and they’re
2 cranking their staff and we’re like, “Okay. Monday morning we’ll go ahead and have a talk.” I, by
3 the way had already made the decision that we were going to support it, let’s be perfectly clear,
4 but I had to let the machine -- you have the machine has to grind like, “ah, gee. Does this meet the
5 policy requirements, the legal requirements?” All of those people had to look at it before but I
6 obviously was like, “We have a valid request. We’re not going to say no.”

7 Q: Right. So you made that decision?

8 A: Oh, I made the decision as soon as it came to in. I looked at it. I was like, “Yeah. Should
9 this -- frankly I was like, “That’s all they want?” I was like okay.

10 Q: All right. Now, according to your calendar you held a secure call with Secretary the
11 Army, General Milley, and --

12 A: Okay.

13 Q: -- the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

14 A: Oh, yeah. That’s right.

15 Q: That was on January 2.

16 A: On what day?

17 Q: January 2nd.

18 A: Okay. That sounds about right.

19 Q: Do you recall you discussed concerning the 6th of January?

20 A: Yeah, with Dan Hokanson was on it was about this the request, but it was more than
21 that because I also felt pretty, you know, we had to look internationally because of the concern
22 that there might be requirements for other National Guard or federal troops because January 6 we
23 knew it was going to be a big day. So, yeah that was the discussion and we talked about this.

1 Q: Do you recall any particular decisions or --

2 A: No. You know, the Army was, "Well, we want to look at it some more." And, some
3 people were -- a lot of people were still pretty much scarred by the June events and I understood
4 that. So, it was kind of one of these classic senior leadership things at the Pentagon where you're
5 like, okay. You've got to pat everybody on the back give them a hug, it's going to be all right. Get
6 them to the right place, but I didn't want to be directed at that particular moment because I knew
7 that when people kind of backed out of their concerns that this was going to be an over
8 militarization, that we were going to somehow besmirch the integrity of the Army and the
9 National Guard. I realize that once people stepped back that everybody come to the right -- come
10 to the common conclusion like this is the right thing to do which is exactly what happened on the
11 4th.

12 Q: All right. So it sounds like the Army was maybe even more concerned that you were
13 about putting troops at the Capitol?

14 A: Yeah. Army was -- Army as an institution was very concerned because, and I respected
15 and I appreciated that because in true fashion when anything goes bad everybody wants the Army
16 and they love you until they don't, and they would get pushed under the bus. So I totally
17 understood what the Army's concerns were about and I think they kind of experience that
18 institutionally in previously.

19 BY [REDACTED]:

20 Q: Sir, was that -- I'm sorry [REDACTED]. Is there anybody in particular from the Army that was
21 really "we don't want to do this?"

22 A: You know, it's a great question, and I would not say that -- when I talk about the
23 institution of the Army everybody wants to like hyper -- like personalize this like, "It was Ryan

1 McCarthy. It was so and so.” Institutionally they were representing the Army writ large. So, and
2 the leadership McConville -- General McConville and Secretary McCarthy I felt merely representing
3 their concerns as an institution, not based on their staffs, and their work there, and their
4 experience in June.

5 BY [REDACTED]:

6 Q: Was there any, I guess memo, or meetings, or anything, or meetings? Memo, or
7 minutes, or something of that nature that came out of this meeting that document documented
8 what was discussed?

9 A: Oh, I don't know. One of the military aides might have taken notes. I don't recall.

10 Q: All right. So then on January 3rd it looks like you were in a secure meeting.

11 A: What day is that? Is that Sunday or Monday?

12 Q: January 3 is --

13 [REDACTED]: I think it's a Sunday.

14 A: Sunday, okay. I think it's Sunday. Monday was the 4th I think. Yeah, the 4th was
15 Monday. Okay. The 3rd.

16 BY [REDACTED]:

17 Q: So, that's all the military people we've discussed in the last meeting and then we've also
18 got cabinet members, Secretary of the Interior --

19 A: Oh, yeah, yeah. Right.

20 Q: DHS, DHS Operations Director?

21 A: Yep.

22 Q: That was the group you mentioned.

23 A: Yeah.

1 Q: Is that the interagency?

2 A: Yeah that was -- that was my effort to synchronize across the interagency to make sure
3 that everybody had a common operating picture as well as to make sure that we Department of
4 Defense -- had offered and had queried if there were any other additional requests for support or
5 projected. It wasn't just like current. It was like, "Okay. Do you guys think something? "We're
6 fine." So, I was very clear to them with them that we're here to support what do you got? Not just
7 right now but what you think is going to happen later in the in the week?"

8 Q: You mentioned earlier talking in interagency meeting when the subject of rallying the
9 Capitol came up and people were telling you okay we've got this. Is that from this meeting or was
10 that --

11 A: Yeah, that was the --

12 Q: -- summarizing a number of the meetings?

13 A: No. That was primarily this meeting and this was the kind of key meeting where we
14 talked through what was expected to transpire. And I'm almost positive, don't quote me on it but
15 I'm almost positive that's where Milley was like, you know Chairman Milley was like, "Hey, I see
16 this one at the Capitol. What are you thinking about that?"

17 Q: So, when you left that meeting what was your impression of, "Okay. DoD is expected to
18 do this?" Or, "DoD is going to provide that?"

19 A: We left that meeting, I left that meeting with I felt that we the Department of Defense
20 had done our due diligence on reaching out to the other elements that were responsible for law
21 enforcement that day and I felt like we had a good feel for where the heads of the cabinet officials
22 were as well as local law enforcement. I felt like, "Okay. It sounds like they've got it, and we've got
23 this one request, and we're not looking at anything else." And I'll leave it at that.

1 Q: All right, and again are you aware of any minutes, or memo, or other documentation or
2 anything else that was made?

3 A: No not aware. Somebody might have. I don't know if somebody did a summary or
4 whatnot. Probably somebody that I don't know whether that would be one of the military aides or
5 something.

6 Q: Your calendar shows that the following day January 4th you had what was described as
7 a follow-on meeting with DoD only attendees.

8 A: Yep.

9 Q: And, did that concern January 6th?

10 A: Yeah. That was -- that was the Army had done their staff estimate, and that was the
11 decision -- I would describe that for the Department as the decision brief, the formal decision brief
12 or whether DoD would support the request from the mayor.

13 Q: And did the Army actually present this document to you --

14 A: Yep.

15 Q: -- at that time?

16 A: Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. It was your standard here you go. Walk through it. I'm pretty sure
17 was this thing I bet.

18 Q: And you came up, would this be it? This is the document signed by --

19 A: Yeah, I mean that was the outcome. Yeah, but I think this was, I want this back
20 obviously, this was the op plan briefings. Yeah and that was the outcome. That was the outcome.
21 That was kind of the formal outcome of that, yeah.

22 Q: Okay. Just out of curiosity I've got another one.

23 A: Yeah, go ahead.

1 Q: For Secretary of Defense, Secretary the Army offered it titled info memo.

2 A: Yeah, right.

3 Q: Did you ever see this one?

4 A: Is that the unsigned one? What's the date on this? It's undated.

5 Q: Yeah, it's --

6 A: I knew --

7 Q: Yeah I think that's where I give it my mistake.

8 A: Okay. So this one is from McCarthy to me.

9 Q: Yeah, and just to do you have any recollection of ever seeing it?

10 A: I don't remember this exact one. To tell you the truth. I might have seen it. It doesn't

11 jump off the -- Yeah, I mean this is kind of what we discussed, and this is this one is from Ken

12 Rapuano.

13 Q: Now, did that come with Secretary McCarthy's signed January --

14 A: Yeah, I don't remember it. I don't remember it. Yeah I -- just -- so yeah, I'm sure those

15 came in the packet and I'm sure that they were -- no, I can't say for sure. It would seem to me that

16 those were the memos that were attached to the staff and package that I had to sign. Now, is

17 there a signed version because there's personally signed and then there's autopens sign. So I know

18 the difference because for autopen I did something slightly different to make sure I can tell when

19 people are auto penning my signature. But, that looks like what would be in the staffing package.

20 Q: Okay. Yeah, your memo we'll get to you in a couple of minutes, but I just want to run

21 through some of the meetings.

22 A: Okay.

23 Q: So, but anyhow -- so this follow-on meeting on January 4th was --

1 A: It's not a follow-on meeting. It's a decision meeting. It's a decision brief.

2 Q: Okay. But it was specifically held to talk about --

3 A: Yes. It was so focused was the 6 Jan request from the Mayor.

4 Q: Okay. All right. Your calendar shows that later on January 4 you had a sync, a meeting
5 moving described as "sync with Cabinet members."

6 A: Okay.

7 Q: Is that another interagency meeting on the 4th --

8 A: Yeah. Yeah.

9 Q: Okay.

10 A: And that might have been where Milley called -- those meetings Milley called them out
11 like, I can't remember which one. It was probably that one because the first meeting on the
12 Sunday was your classic interagency meeting, right? Where they're like, "What? There's going to
13 be protests and demonstrations?" We're like, "Yes." "So the purpose of this meeting." And it was
14 really a rough typical interagency meeting. I mean I've run hundreds of them in my life. It was very
15 typical because they were like it hadn't risen available cabinet officials level attention that was the
16 purpose of me hosting the meeting which is, in many ways appropriate for the Secretary of
17 Defense to host interagency meeting about domestic law enforcement, but I obviously recognize
18 like this thing isn't knitted together very well. So that's why I did that and then the second day, so
19 that was kind of the storming meeting where everybody was angry, the other interagency
20 members, and of course DoD is like, "I can't believe that there's no agenda for this and we should
21 have PowerPoint process." I was like, "No. This is the first meeting." The second meeting was
22 when we were probably where we were like, "Hey y'all." That was probably the meeting.

23 Q: All right. The second meeting didn't have an agenda and the PowerPoint presentation?

1 A: Oh we had a -- no, that's not how the way the freaking interagency works. And that's
2 kind of obviously a twitchy issue the way I responded because there's this arrogance in the
3 Pentagon that if they don't do it our way it's screwed up. And were like, "No, the interagency looks
4 at the world differently so we have to facilitate. We have to help them." So, we had things that we
5 wanted to get done, and the key thing that we wanted to get down there on that meeting was, "All
6 right. Let's go ahead and make sure everybody understands that Department of Justice is lead for
7 domestic issues in the District of Columbia for the federal government. Let's make sure we get that
8 one out there. That is objective one, and objective two was to try to get a common operating
9 picture by all the other -- by key members and the third thing was, again to one more time, "Do
10 you all need anything? Department of Defense is here. Do you guys need anything?" So those
11 were the three objectives that we had internally. I can't remember I noted those at the beginning
12 of the meeting or not.

13 Q: All right. And did anyone request anything from the DoD?

14 A: No. Again, again. It was very much like we've got this. Thank you for your interest in
15 national security. We got this.

16 Q: Okay, and then this meeting also established the DOJ, the Department of Justice was
17 the lead agency for January 6?

18 A: What do you mean by established?

19 Q: Well, established people --

20 A: For a national --

21 Q: Yeah just have -- All right. So we agreed, or maybe not established Department of
22 Justice is the lead agency

23 A: Yes.

1 Q: So, what exactly did that mean to you?

2 A: What does that mean to me is their the lead decision maker in authority for use of
3 federal assets going forward and you have what NMSE, national -- and NSSE, National Security
4 Special Events which is what happened Super Bowl, you know all this crap. That it wasn't decreed,
5 then it's easy, right? It's like, "You're in charge." This was not a national security special events,
6 however, we just wanted to make sure that everyone understood kind of the chain of command
7 when you're in interagency. You have unity of effort. So, we wanted to make sure everyone knew
8 that the belly button for DOJ, and so that meeting was just a highlight ok. My goal was to make
9 sure everyone understood that DoD is in a supporting role. Supporting because everybody's
10 proclivity in the interagency, not everyone's, that's hyperbole. The vast majority of people love it
11 when like DoD will do this. DoD will do this. We're like, "You guys this is law enforcement. Law
12 enforcement. Law enforcement." That was we're just hammering home. This is a law enforcement
13 matter not a Defense Department matter.

14 Q: Just curious, was there a particular DOJ official who was --

15 A: Yes. The Acting Attorney General.

16 Q: The Acting Attorney General?

17 A: Yeah. It's Rosen. I think Rosen is his name, yeah. Jeffrey Rosen.

18 Q: Okay. So later on January 4, 1745 it appears you had a telephone call with Mr. Rosen.

19 A: Yep.

20 Q: And then senior officials DoD and Army officials including Major General Walker were
21 on the phone as well. Is that correct?

22 A: Oh, good. Yeah. Sure, I don't know.

23 Q: Do you recall anything about that phone call --

1 A: Yeah, again, like again this was part of like reinforcing, "Do you anything? Are you
2 good?" "Hey, you know you're in charge, right?" "Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah." So, just kind of continuing
3 the interagency process to guarantee that everybody kind of understood who was in charge.

4 Q: All right, so --

5 A: You have better notes than I do. Good.

6 Q: So of these -- anyhow, and all of these meetings you or someone on the half of the DoD
7 was asking --

8 A: I am.

9 Q: -- about the assembled crowd --

10 A: I am.

11 Q: -- who you need further support from DoD?

12 A: I am.

13 Q: The answer was negative?

14 A: The answer every time was negative. I am emphatically asking the question. Now I don't
15 know how far back you go because I can't speculate, but there was, I believe in the past there had
16 been resistance by Department of Defense to support provide support. I don't know that for a fact
17 but they had come to me from little birds. They're like, they don't trust the interagency. And so I
18 had to be very clear like, "Listen. We will -- if you have a validated -- if you have a need we need to
19 talk about it." And there was a concerned that it was going to be like they were going to have to
20 pay. That was a big thing. I was like, "We got it. We got this. This isn't about like we're going to
21 send -- could you MIPR us \$10,000.00 which was funny. They actually had to MIPR money the
22 night of the 6th for the fence but that's another issue. That wasn't the -- I was like, "You got it. Just
23 ask." So I had to agree, I felt like my key role in these deliberations with interagency was to make

1 sure they understood the genuine nature of our desire to help them.

2 Q: Okay. All right. So, after the approval process --

3 A: Yep.

4 Q: -- for the D.C. request --

5 A: Yep.

6 Q: -- we come up with this memo.

7 A: Yeah.

8 Q: Employment guidance for the District of Columbia National Guard.

9 A: Love it.

10 Q: So you approve D.C. National Guard support but you stated they couldn't --

11 A: Yeah.

12 Q: -- carry out certain functions without their permission?

13 A: In paragraph three of an operations order, coordinating instructions. That's all that is.

14 Q: Yeah. So specific to say weapons, munitions --

15 A: Yeah.

16 Q: -- bayonets.

17 A: Right.

18 Q: These particular restrictions, why did you impose those restrictions?

19 A: Those, why did I impose those restrictions or provided the guidance on coordinating
20 instructions for what they would use? Because, based on the nature of the operations, for -- so we
21 wanted to do tiered response. You don't want to go in heavy right away because then you have no
22 ability to increase your force protection posture because there's a psychological component
23 required when you're doing domestic and crowd control. So, let's go in light initially and if we need

1 layer in additional capabilities that sends a strong signal that the situation is changed. That's
2 number one. Number two I was concerned of our Soldiers being provoked if they had weapons. To
3 be provoked and to use -- be put in a situation where they had to use lethal force, because I was
4 concerned that with the demonstrators that there was going to be an element that was hyper
5 focused on provoking a response from our military to create -- to support their narrative that the
6 government was corrupt, that even the military now was in support of a corrupt process, and that
7 now the military was also the enemy. So, what I'm really talking about is Boston Massacre. I was
8 concerned that my overly arming up front we would put them in a situation where one of two
9 things could happen. One is an element uses lethal force and then we've got a whole other
10 situation. Or number two that dedicated force of the opposition would use this as an excuse,
11 because you know they're not going to have -- they're not going to be loaded weapons it's not to
12 start that way. So now we're putting dudes in the street, men and women on the street with
13 weapons that are automatic, or semiautomatic and automatic weapons. If I was -- when I did my
14 worst-case scenario thinking, which I'm paid to do. I was like, "You know what I'd do? I get
15 restocked with automatic weapons because I know exactly how they're going to be postured." So I
16 didn't put them in a situation where they were going to get the shit beat out of them to get their
17 weapons taken away from them, or number two was that they would end up using lethal force and
18 killing someone that would be played back as supporting this narrative of the extremist. That was
19 the justification on the arming piece.

20 Q: All right. When you signed this memo on January 4th, did you contemplate it was
21 possible that they were going to ask for some of these things and you needed to be in a position to
22 respond to it?

23 A: Of course, right.

1 Q: Yeah, and in the last paragraph you talk to the QRF, Quick Reaction Force.

2 A: Sure.

3 Q: So what was your vision for the QRF? What was the QRF supposed to do on January 6th
4 if it was needed?

5 A: It goes without saying, quick reaction force. Respond to situation requiring additional
6 personnel or capability.

7 Q: All right, and please feel free to read it again if you need to.

8 A: Okay.

9 Q: Based on this last paragraph about the QRF, what authority did you give the Secretary
10 the Army to deploy the QRF?

11 A: What authority did I give him?

12 Q: Yes.

13 A: Like in terms of his approval to launch the QRF?

14 Q: Correct.

15 A: I don't think we specifically talked about the details of that but essentially he became
16 the operational level of war. Walker's tactical. McCarthy's operational. I'm strategic policy. I'm
17 back in the palace headquarters whatever. So, I did not give him specific guidance on launching the
18 -- on the QRF.

19 Q: Did anyone discuss at the time, well, here's what we see foresee the QRF doing --

20 A: Uh, huh [affirmative response].

21 Q: -- if it's called out?

22 A: Yeah.

23 Q: I mean what was the necessity for the QRF to do then?

1 A: Its fundamental principle of all military operations is it's your reserve. You have a
2 reserve. So what it was a 40 people or something out at Andrews and the idea was you have a
3 little -- if you need to throw something at a situation you've got the QRF available, and so yes. I've
4 heard subsequently McCarthy gave other instructions to Walker. I don't know -- I felt like I gave
5 clear instructions but I don't know what happened after that.

6 Q: So you didn't communicate directly with General Walker that day?

7 A: I did not talk directly to him because that McCarthy and -- McCarthy kind of was the
8 interface directly. He was kind of chain command wise.

9 BY [REDACTED]:

10 Q: Sir, was that throughout the whole process leading up to --

11 A: What's that?

12 Q: -- and on the 6th that you didn't have a discussions with General Walker?

13 A: I think I -- I can't remember if I talked to him or not. I certainly didn't talk to him about
14 employment of the QRF and whatnot. I can't remember if I talked to him or not. I've talked to him
15 a bunch but I mean, he's on the phone calls. Put it this way I don't recall having a one-on-one
16 conversation with him.

17 Q: Okay. This is again leading up to the 6th and I think in a memo you mentioned in there
18 about the Guardsmen that was in D.C., they were on TCPs but also but it also addresses riot gear --

19 A: Yep.

20 Q: -- shields, that type of thing. Based on what you saw the threat being, what you saw,
21 okay. This could go, was there any thought given to making sure okay they have some level of
22 protection like riot shields or something like that while they were out there?

23 A: The TCPs?

1 Q: Yes, sir.

2 Q: I believe they did. They had body armor and helmets in the vehicles. Anything else I
3 don't know.

4 Q: Yeah that's --

5 A: Did I put thought into it? Yes.

6 Q: Okay.

7 A: To answer your question, but -- you know another fundamental element of mission
8 command I did a few years in the military is to be the, you know, don't be -- the way we win and
9 the way we operate we learned from Vietnam is like platoon leader on the ground doesn't need to
10 have a company commander in a helicopter above them, with the battalion commander, with the
11 brigade commander, with the division commander, with the corps commander. Give mission type
12 guidance. Let them to do their job.

13 BY [REDACTED]:

14 Q: I think you said you never saw the guidance that Secretary McCarthy gave to --

15 A: I've heard through the press that he gave, or I heard from General Walker on or last
16 week, or whenever he was up on the Hill. I heard something about that I gave the guidance with a
17 pretty wide open like let's see about the QRF I thought there were something in there about them.
18 Last resort. I mean, come on. Y'all, that's code for you can do whatever the hell you want. I mean,
19 I'm giving you -- you get paid to do that. Now, I've heard subsequently that McCarthy put in
20 further restrictions. I didn't. I don't know about that.

21 BY [REDACTED]:

22 Q: Okay. So based, and just going off of what you put in your memo "the last resort" that's
23 given General Walker and his crew, "Hey, if things really go bad you can --

1 A: You -- yeah. Exactly. That's like the classic military or DoD thing. Like you've got -- all
2 right. Wink wink. You get paid to make decisions on the ground based -- because you're much
3 closer. You don't want me sitting there watching the news and getting phone calls, getting yelled
4 at by everybody. You're on the ground. You have better coms than I do. You have the ability to
5 deploy your QRF if you think it's necessary, but ideally the other factors that are playing into your
6 decision here, my decision making at the time are, "Holy shit." First off. "Like there's bombs?" It
7 was, first reports are always wrong. Number one fundamental thing. First reports are always
8 wrong. So, and then the concern is two things. One is not is this a rouse, but all right. Is this a set
9 up to do something really bigger someplace else? And then you have the flipping bombs. This
10 bomb scare. You're like there is a lot going on. Don't commit your reserve until you know what the
11 heck the situation is. Number two is, I'll guard everything within limits of my post and quit my post
12 only when properly relieved. General Order One in the United States Army, you can't just pull.
13 You've got 74 however many people were traffic control points. You're just not going to pull them
14 off without coordinating, synchronizing, with local law enforcement either to backfill them. So,
15 those are the factors that are going on with the QRF but hey, I'll tell you what I've launched QRF
16 on my authority when I was a young man with my boss saying don't do it and I knew it was the
17 right thing to do. So, you're kind of like yeah, that's what you get paid to do. That's what the
18 nation pays you to do is to make a decision when you're on the ground and you're feeling it and so
19 that was kind of the thought in the memo.

20 Q: Sir, before we -- I just have one more question.

21 A: Please.

22 Q: We really -- because I want to ensure that we get to this point on January the 6th. Prior
23 to January 6 when all of this planning and stuff is going on what discussions or conversations did

1 you have with anyone from the White House about what DoD was going to do?

2 A: Yeah, talk to -- told the President what the request was and what we were planning to
3 do. I think the last discussion -- it's in the notes whatever -- I think it was the third or whatever.
4 Now, no. It was earlier than that. I can't remember, and then talked to him again on the 5th when
5 you know whatever group came in to Freedom Plaza he called that night and said, "Hey you
6 watching this?" And I'm like, "Yeah." And frankly it looked like a whole bunch of nothing, bunch of
7 morons out there. At that point I definitely was not concerned that there was going to be a
8 mobilization of violence it was all this -- all the people I forgot the various personalities. So we
9 talked that night too.

10 Q: What guidance did he give you, sir, as far as --

11 A: Do what's required to protect the American people. It was pretty -- can't ask for better
12 guidance than that. You've got it. Okay. Whatever you think. Because the way the President roles,
13 right? The President's like, "Hey you're the experts on this stuff."

14 Q: Okay. Any discussions with anybody else at the White House about it that may have
15 given you any other guidance or --

16 A: No.

17 Q: -- follow on?

18 A: No. Only to take -- no. I don't recall any other conversations with the National Security
19 Advisor or anybody else like that.

20 [REDACTED]: Okay. [REDACTED], for the sake of time let's move to January 6th. That way we make
21 sure we cover that.

22 BY [REDACTED]:

23 Q: So, I think we've established, all right, you expected rallies?

1 A: Demonstrations I called them demonstrations.

2 Q: Demonstrations?

3 A: Yeah.

4 Q: And you were -- they were expecting I guess big demonstrations during the day.

5 A: Not big. 35,000 tops is not a big demonstration. In D.C. I saw those and they were
6 segregated out into a bunch of different areas. I think it was six or eight different locations. The
7 concern obviously was that they would merge but 35,000 based on an assessment of the local law
8 enforcement was we've got this.

9 Q: All right. So, what were you doing that morning the 6th?

10 A: Working. Doing my thing. Intel brief, you've got my schedule some I can't remember
11 what I was doing. Remember that we were also very focused on the foreign threat. Sal Amani was
12 killed the year prior. There was a lot of concern that there was going to be retribution. So, pretty
13 focused on that in the morning. I don't know what else was I was doing in the morning.

14 Q: All right. Were you following the events at the Ellipse?

15 A: Yeah.

16 Q: All right. How were you following those events?

17 A: Watching the news, looking at my window.

18 Q: You even had people coming and telling you what was going on?

19 A: Yeah, sure.

20 Q: Okay.

21 A: I mean I -- everyone was like, "Did you listen to the President's speech?" I'm like, "The
22 guy speak for 90 minutes it's like Castro or something. No. I've got work to do. The American
23 people expect us." So, it was on and I never have my TV on by the way when I was in that position I

1 never had the TV on because I find it obnoxious for people to come in, but that day that was the
2 first time like quad screen let's get our feed, talking to Milley we're all kind of like, "Okay. The
3 expectation was this thing -- we'll know if this thing goes bad, but it wasn't like let's just listen past
4 the graveyard, "Everything is fine. Don't lie about it." Yeah, extremely focused.

5 Q: All right. So you're in your office?

6 A: Right. Staying in my office because I need to be at a place where I can command and
7 control. I was not in walk around day. It was like we're staying here all freaking day.

8 Q: Okay. When did you actually learn that a crowd was moving from the Ellipse towards
9 the Capitol?

10 A: I mean you saw it on TV. It's kind of -- it's one of those -- it's hard to discern exactly size
11 and what's going on, but and whenever -- I'll tell you what I cannot get a solid timeline on anything
12 up on the Hill. Definitely when protesters demonstrators started the photo -- the thing where they
13 had the bike rack and they're pushing the dudes, and then they're on the Capitol and you're like,
14 "Okay. Stuff just changed dramatically. And I mean I can't tell what time that was and I frankly
15 have got other things to do with my life so I haven't got the time line precisely. But at that point it
16 was pretty obvious like, okay. Situation's fundamentally changed. Get ready. We're going to have
17 to gear up. We're going to have to absolutely -- and that was kind of -- the decision point for me
18 that we were going to have to go bigger was the shots fired at the Capitol. Whatever time that was
19 that was like, "Okay. The National Guard is getting mobilized. We're going big. It's now -- it now
20 has triggered that worst-case scenario." It didn't take freaking MacArthur or Patton to figure that
21 one out. It's like, "Okay. Get ready. We're going to have to -- DoD is going to have to get hell of a
22 lot more involved now.

23 Q: Okay. So it sounds like you're saying at the time you see the breach is starting to occur,

1 they're going through the Capitol --

2 A: Oh, you knew it was game on then.

3 Q: So your attention is focused on the Capitol?

4 A: Yeah.

5 Q: And you said --

6 A: Well, no. My focus isn't to put focus on the Capitol. My intention is D.C., and nationally,
7 and internationally. Like I can't -- so my thing is do not get target lock on one thing. What I'm
8 concerned about is what's happening on the periphery, what's happening nationally because when
9 we start putting in force flow and putting in forces, I don't want that to be like a set up if
10 something else is going on in Idaho or something like that. So I've got -- that's where my focus
11 was. It's like we have plenty of people that were focused on the Capitol. My job was to be like look
12 around a little bit more. Don't get targeted locked. I don't know if you guys have been in combat
13 that way that's the way it is. Everybody gets right there and then you get slammed from the other
14 side and everyone's like, "I didn't know." So I'm not that commander who has to be withdrawn
15 and I don't like to say I was the commander because I was a civilian leader, right? So don't
16 misperceive that all I wanted to do was I wanted to put my guns on and go too. No. But in this case
17 I mean that's really how the thing was set up. So I needed to be back out of it to be able to take on
18 360 view.

19 Q: All right. So, when decisions started to be made okay DoD is going to do this, is this you
20 calling people and telling them or was this people coming to you with recommendations?

21 A: A little bit of both. Chairman, all the key players, Chairman, I don't remember if Dan
22 Hokanson of the National Guard was there. McCarthy, McConville, Norquist, my office kind of
23 become the ops center if you will in a lot of ways which is not a bad thing because I've got all the

1 coms.

2 Q: Right.

3 A: So McCarthy's down. McCarthy popping in and out but we knew it was game on that
4 point. So, I know you've probably talk to Secretary McCarthy. I just know that he was working it,
5 Army was working it. Subsequently you hear all this stuff, oh we don't -- you know Walt Piatt,
6 General Piatt, and Flynn. I wasn't aware of all of that. I just knew -- I'd love to see the timeline that
7 I just knew like we're going to have to go heavy, much heavier, and then that final decision -- they
8 finally came to me at 3:00 o'clock and we're like okay. We're ready. Coordinated, synchronized,
9 let's go, and that was the call like, "All right. Activate, notify, activate all National Guard. Get
10 people moving to the Capitol."

11 Q: All right. So basically then from the time you saw the breach occur to the time you're
12 saying around 3:00 o'clock --

13 A: Three o'clock was when --

14 A: -- when this decision --

15 A: -- McCarthy came in and said -- I had already made the decision but that was 3:04 on
16 the timeline was when the formal "go."

17 Q: Okay. And what exactly did you tell Secretary McCarthy to do at that point?

18 A: Mobilize the D.C. National Guard. Not the Army National Guard, D.C. National Guard, all
19 of it and get moving to the Capitol and reinforce -- and provide support of Capitol Hill Police and
20 law enforcement.

21 Q: Right. What did you understand at that time, 1504, was going to happen with the QRF?
22 Do you know where the QRF was?

23 A: Launch. I assume they were -- well, I knew they were at Andrews, and everybody was

1 like, "Why would you put them at Andrews?" "Well because remember, one, they're air assets,
2 and didn't want them sitting on trucks and having to move through the streets. We wanted to
3 have air assets." [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED]
5 [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED] So, you're like, "Be near air
7 assets." I did not know exactly where the QRF was at that point. And remember there were only
8 [REDACTED] people. Everything was, "Oh, my gosh. Why did it take so long?" First off it didn't take -- what
9 did we hit -- they hit the ground at 5:20 I think, 1720.

10 BY [REDACTED]:

11 Q: Okay somewhere around there.

12 A: Yeah. You've got to, principle one is first reports are already bad. Principle two is, take a
13 moment to coordinate, synchronized, and make sure your people know what the hell is going on
14 because and I've been in plenty of shit shows where you throw people into the fight, pell-mell, and
15 it ends up costing time and it ends up costing people. So, it's like let's make sure. We're not going
16 to have like squads flowing into the Capitol. When the D.C. National Guard shows up its like ho --, I
17 talked about psychological component here earlier. It's like, holy shit. Game changer. Okay. You
18 know, 12 people showing up isn't what we're looking for. So I think they put 120 in at 5:20. So that
19 was the thought process of, "Okay. Get them back." And also you have to swear them in. This isn't
20 like you're just throwing Soldiers into it. They have to be sworn in as kind of deputy or whatever
21 they call it law enforcement officers. So that was kind of the thought process on what's going on at
22 that point. But I gave the order, "Let's go." And McCarthy took that on and I think he -- he said,
23 "I've got to go downtown." And I was like, "Absolutely got to go downtown." I think that was, I

1 can't remember what time he launches downtown because it was quite clear at that point that
2 there was -- we needed leadership and I knew who it was going to be, because I've worked with
3 him before. I knew it was going to be the Deputy Director of the FBI, Bowdich. I knew it was going
4 to be the Deputy AG, Fitzgerald, I forgot his name. Great guy. And I knew McCarthy. I said, "Those
5 three are going to go down there and they're essentially going to." And this is exactly what
6 happened. "They're going to go down there, and they're going to bring order from the chaos." And
7 that's exactly what they did. So McCarthy launches. At that point I'm like, "We've got this because
8 I worked with McCarthy in Afghanistan. I met him back in the day in '01. I know the guy. I know
9 how he thinks. I'm like, "Okay. We're in good shape now things are going to start happening."

10 BY [REDACTED]:

11 Q: All right, so it was you -- 150?-

12 A: Four.

13 Q: D.C. National Guard is going to be mobilize.

14 A: Uh, huh [affirmative response].

15 Q: And so your expectation was the QRF was going to head towards the Capitol? Was it
16 going to be engaged at that time, or was it -- what was the plan?

17 A: I was not prescriptive in that use because once again you have a two star general who is
18 in charge of this force. I gave the guidance, provide support to entities at the Capitol. I don't know
19 how he's going to do it that's when McCarthy went down there to sort that out.

20 Q: All right. As far as then the people on traffic points and the Metro stations did you have
21 a particular expectation or did someone express okay this is what was going to happen with that?

22 A: Yeah, somewhere in there was like, "Okay. We're pulling people off the traffic control
23 points, pushing them back to the Armory to refit and do quick planning session. While that's going

1 on I assume, I don't know this because once again I'm not going to delve into the tactical details
2 because that's what we pay other people for and that's the way we design our military to operate
3 and I wasn't going to violate the fundamentals of those things, but I knew that they were pulling
4 off the traffic control points, indicating me that this is coordinated and synchronized. Okay. We're
5 going to the right direction and we're going to mass forces, get them -- go to D.C. Armory, mass
6 forces, get them equipped as necessary, and also do quick planning while you're doing
7 coordination because you're just not going -- you know you guys know this. You just don't roll in in
8 a chaotic situation. You want to coordinate to make sure the people on the ground know what's
9 happening so that they can start thinking about, "Okay. We're going to hardline here. Whatever
10 the case may be. We know National Guard is coming in from the west or whatever they decided."
11 So, that's what's going on.

12 Q: All right. And once you made that decision what did you do after that?

13 A: I can't remember. I mean, what's it say? I don't know. It's like okay. Game on. At that
14 point my job in many ways is I'm sure I started calling or coordinating with other people but at that
15 point I had made the decision that I have to make and now it's time to implement. So, kind of
16 tracking what's going on. McCarthy's calling regularly as he's downtown. I mean there's back and
17 forth, Hokanson, Milley, everybody's moving around on the phone talking to people. There's just
18 constant information coming in. At that point, you know, the schedule's out the window. We're
19 focused on this piece, and so we're on -- my head at this point is I'm like I'm not in the tactical fight
20 now. I've got to be thinking 24, 48, 72, 96 hours. Where I really need to be thinking out is father
21 than that. So that's my job. My job is not to be like hey we've got people that know how to do this
22 shit. Let them do their jobs you now need to get your head out of your near term fight and start
23 thinking really, really bigger. So my job is up and out. I'm thinking I'm sure we had an interagency

1 call. I'm calling around, listening, getting calls, constantly getting calls from House members and
2 Senators. So my job at this point, up and out and thinking forward because the current fight I know
3 we're not supposed to say "fight". The current operation is taking care of itself. Giving the
4 necessary guidance let them go and do their job and think out further. Which is like, "Shit. We're
5 going to need a hell of a lot more people." So let's --

6 BY [REDACTED] ?

7 Q: I'm sorry.

8 A: Go ahead.

9 Q: Can I ask a quick question?

10 A: Go ahead.

11 Q: I just want to make sure, from a timeline perspective because, so you mentioned that
12 morning you're office. This is the first day that that you had your TV screens on.

13 A: Yeah.

14 Q: You're watching, kind of see what's going on.

15 A: Uh, huh [affirmative response].

16 Q: You see the movement going toward the Capitol.

17 A: Sure.

18 Q: And you said for you the trigger point for you was when you got word that, or you saw
19 that shots had been fired.

20 A: No, once they breached I knew that the situation, when I say "breached" when they're
21 on the steps of the Capitol and you're seeing the dudes climbing, you see them beating on stuff,
22 I'm like okay. Game on. The first indication though is when you saw them breach the outer
23 perimeter and they just start flooding in up the steps and you're like, "Okay. Situation's changed

1 dramatically now. We need to get ready to respond.” But at that point you’re still like, I mean,
2 you’re like come on. We’ve got a lot of cops out there, got eight to 10,000 on the street, better
3 coms than D.C. National Guard has and you’re like come on. But at that point we knew the
4 situation had changed dramatically and that we were going to have to do something with
5 reinforcement.

6 Q: Right, and when the shots were fired I think you said that -- that’s when you said,
7 “Okay. Get the D.C. National Guard mobilized?”

8 A: Yeah, that was really, I would say looking back that was the trigger event for me that,
9 “Holy Cow. We’ve got -- this has gone to a different level of not violence but of complexity that’s
10 going to require additional -- is going to require DoD augmentation.”

11 Q: Okay. Now, at the time that you gave your order to Secretary McCarthy, do you know
12 when that order got transmitted down to Secretary McCarthy?

13 A: No, I heard that Walker’s like, “Oh, I didn’t hear anything until 5:05.” I have no idea. I
14 find that really, maybe he didn’t know. I don’t know. You guys will have to find that one out. I
15 wasn’t tracking like, “Hey, is TCP 2 been alerted?” I’m fascinated to learn about how that worked
16 when they pulled off but I don’t know. I don’t know.

17 Q: Okay.

18 A: I found that pretty troubling if the Commander of the District of Columbia National
19 Guard wasn’t notified that his -- because I bet -- I guarantee you people were moving well before
20 5:05 because yeah, they have to be. Because they hit the Capitol at 5:20 I want to say. So, I don’t
21 know what was going on with the D.C. National Guard. I can’t help you.

22 Q: Yeah. But from your level you gave the order to mobilize and get going --

23 A: Yeah.

1 Q: -- like you say around 3:00 o'clock?

2 A: 1702 departure of 154 D.C. -- all right. So, that was the other thing was Cash Patel, the
3 Chief of Staff immediately said, "Let's make sure we have a stenographer keeping track of all of
4 this." I'm so glad he did because I'm looking at it, I don't think anybody else did that. Everybody's
5 look at their cell phones like, "When did I make this call?" So, Major General Walker he's the guy
6 on the ground I don't know what the hell but clearly 1705 somebody -- and 1702 154 D.C. National
7 Guard departed the Armory. So I don't know the timeline, maybe he's I don't. I mean that's what I
8 was tracking. I was tracking like, "Okay. Things are going the right direction."

9 BY [REDACTED]:

10 Q: You know, I know what people said and I think Mr. Salesses is the current Acting --

11 A: Yeah.

12 Q: -- Assistant Secretary of Defense said someone came to you for decision, to employ the
13 national D.C. National Guard at 1632 or thereabouts.

14 A: 1632? Or 1432? It was 1432. 1632 the National Guard was activated at 1504 and boots
15 on ground at departed the Armory and 1702, hit the perimeter, were sworn and I think
16 1720ish/1722. So, that's -- so I have done a little research because I'm trying to figure out the
17 timeline and Walker said that as well on the Hill. Now I don't know where he got that from but he
18 said 1432 was when we got the formal, can I take my mask off? I'm completely --

19 Q: Go ahead.

20 A: I completely inoculated. So you get all this talk about like, "Chief Sund just called
21 Walker." I have no flippant idea. What I heard from Walker was that at 1432 or 1434 finally
22 everybody got their shit in one basket and everybody kind of got to the panic and realized okay
23 this is what we need. It wasn't lightly said. "Help." I appreciate, complete respect and gratitude for

1 law enforcement, and the chaos, and the fight that their experience, but a request for help now is
2 not something we can deal, operate on. "What do you need? Where do you need them? How
3 much do you need? What role do you want them to play?" So my understanding from listening to
4 Walker's testimony is 1432 was when it finally came to like we need this. That's my understanding.
5 1432 so something's happening down at the Army Ops Center. I have no idea what the hell but
6 they're doing their thing and then McCarthy comes up to me at 1500 and goes, "Okay. We're
7 ready. Let's go National Guard. It's ready." And I'm like, this is probably it wasn't like, "I hereby
8 decree." It was like, "Go. Launch. Get the National Guard activated. Anything you need you got it.
9 Get the hell out of here." He goes, "I've got to go down there." I'm like, "You do, go. Get the hell
10 out of here." And game on. So I don't -- I think back to your point I'm thinking it's 1430ish/1430
11 somewhere in there is when everyone finally, when I say everybody and like the key players have
12 decided, when I say key players Capitol Hill Police, MPD, D.C. National Guard. I don't know the role
13 of DHS in this frankly at this point, but the people that were in the close fight FBI might have been
14 involved. That was like, "Okay. We know what we want, let's go."

15 Q: All right. So when you made the decision and communicated that to Secretary McCarthy
16 --

17 A: Yep.

18 Q: -- at 1504, to your mind was anything else required in terms of decision by you before
19 National Guard could show up on the line?

20 A: I didn't think there was anything else that was required. I mean I felt that I had met my
21 requirements to give guidance and prove more important than requirements was the necessary
22 approvals to mobilize and move.

23 Q: All right. On the 6th did you have any discussion with the President --

1 A: No.

2 Q: -- or the White House?

3 A: White House, yes.

4 Q: Who at the White House?

5 A: National Security Advisor O'Brien and I think, I don't know who all was up from the
6 Pentagon or from the White House. I don't know when we did a couple calls or one call I can't
7 remember, and DOJ was on -- it was a typical -- it was like an interagency call, and I think the
8 White House was actually on some of the other calls. I think [REDACTED] who is the President's
9 attorney, I don't think Chief of Staff Meadows was on. O'Brien was on. [REDACTED] were the key
10 ones that I remember being on, and they're ones who are next to the President so I was very
11 comfortable with that.

12 Q: All right. So, on the 6th when you're talking to them do recall if you talk to them before
13 or after you made the decision?

14 A: I don't recall.

15 Q: And --

16 A: Probably after.

17 Q: What was the nature of the discussion?

18 A: Like, okay. We want to make sure people are once again informed of what's going on,
19 cross level, and looking at what else is required.

20 Q: Okay. Did you get any direction --

21 A: No.

22 Q: -- or recommendations from the White House?

23 A: Oh no, no, no, no. The key thing was reinforce the DOJ was lead. That was the key thing

1 that came out of that meeting was from the White House not directed at the Department of
2 Defense but it was very -- it was directed at DOJ. Just a reminder this is you. It's not DoD.

3 Q: Did you talk to anyone at the White House before making the decision --

4 A: No.

5 Q: -- to employ?

6 A: No. I had all the authority and all the guidance that I needed from the President and
7 didn't need any clarifying guidance. That's not the way I roll. I'm a career Special Operator and I
8 was like don't call the boss if you don't need anything. So didn't even for a moment think I needed
9 to call downtown. I knew exactly what we needed to do.

10 Q: Do you have any discussions with governors from other states concerning their National
11 Guard?

12 A: No. That came later on. I did not. I don't know if Secretary McCarthy did or not. That
13 came later on in the day. Initially it was just get D.C. And then Dan Hokanson, General Hokanson
14 you have to ask him. I know he was working behind the scenes during a really great job by the way.
15 And he was -- I'm sure he was in communications with -- because Hokanson came in I can't
16 remember what time and says, "Okay. Virginia is pushing. Maryland's going to push some folks in."
17 And I don't remember when that was but it was definitely in the later in the afternoon. I did not --
18 the only governor I talked to was Hogan and that was like a day later two days later when he was
19 politicking on something.

20 Q: Did you have a direct discussions on the sixth with D.C. officials, the Mayor, Deputy
21 Mayor --

22 A: No. No.

23 Q: -- Chief of Police?

1 A: No. McCarthy was taken lead on that because he was down there. And he knew how to
2 the whole thing was wired together from June. So, he was calling back, "Hey, I talked to the
3 Mayor. I talked to all of these people." I was up and out and he was down and in.

4 Q: Right. You know, apart from the Capitol Police and the D.C. requesting support on the
5 six were there any federal agencies that made particular request for particular support?

6 A: No.

7 Q: And, I think you mentioned you got calls from the Members of Congress. Do you recall
8 what that was and who you spoke to?

9 A: Yeah, it's in the timeline.

10 Q: And what did you talk to Members of Congress about?

11 A: I didn't talk to them about anything. They were talking to me.

12 Q: What do they want? What were they --

13 A: Complete panic. "Send troops now, Mr. Secretary." Complete and my impression I'm
14 not a politician maybe that's just the way they work. So I would characterize the first call as out-of-
15 control panic, unhinged but that happened after. And when I can get a word in edgewise I didn't
16 think it was necessary for me to say anything. I was like, "National Guard's been mobilized. They're
17 on the way." End of story.

18 Q: Did you have any discussions with the Vice President while he was --

19 A: Yeah.

20 Q: -- at the Capitol?

21 A: Yep. He called. It's in the timeline. He calls. I'm like, "Mr. Vice President? Where are
22 you?" He's like, "I'm in the Capitol." Because I know the guy, you know? And I'm like, "What?" He
23 goes, "Yeah. I didn't leave." I'm like, "You've lost -- Mr. Vice President are you insane?" He goes,

1 "No. I'm staying here. I don't care." He goes, and there was this story like he directed the
2 mobilization like he ordered the mobilization of the National Guard. I think he called like it was
3 well after that. Same thing I was like, "Hey, Mr. Vice President." I gave him basically a SITREP. "Mr.
4 Vice President here's what's going on. The D.C. National Guard's been mobilized. Forces are being
5 brought together and will come in to reinforce as soon as we can." He's like, "Okay. Keep moving."
6 He was like -- he was in the zone and he's like, "Okay. Yeah, keep going." But he gave absolutely
7 no, I mean, he knows his role. He didn't give any orders or direction. It was a coordination call,
8 "Hey, do you need anything, Mr. Vice President?" "I'm good."

9 Q: All right. So you talked to him twice?

10 A: No, I just talked to him once.

11 Q: Okay.

12 A: Yeah, I just talked to him once.

13 Q: Okay. Now, we're coming up on 11:00 o'clock right now. [REDACTED] do you have any -- [REDACTED] or
14 [REDACTED] do you have anything we need to fire in at the last minute?

15 BY [REDACTED]:

16 Q: Let's see. What about any calls or kind of discussions with either the Sergeant at Arms
17 over at the Capitol --

18 A: Never talked. I never talked to them. And don't take this the wrong way because this
19 will come. You guys understand what I'm saying when I say this and I don't -- this can't go -- you
20 know this isn't like, "I was much too senior and important." But back to how we do operations like,
21 that was kind of, you know, that was kind of Walker. That was kind of his level, ground tactical
22 commander issue, you know? I'm talking to Pelosi, Schumer, McConnell, that's who I talked to. So,
23 no I didn't talk. You know that sounds like arrogant you know what I'm saying. It's not arrogant.

1 We have --

2 Q: You're talking to the senior leaders?

3 A: Right, right. So I was not talking to Chief Sund. I didn't even know who -- that was not
4 my -- that was not my appropriate interlocutor. Not as an arrogant elitist person, just as how
5 things work on the field. That was how I describe it.

6 Q: All right. What about, and there's been information floating around about active duty
7 forces responding to D.C.

8 A: Yeah.

9 Q: Were there any active duty --

10 A: No.

11 Q: -- have active duty forces?

12 A: No. [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED] -- I definitely talk about force posture and what was available, hell, yeah. I
14 mean that's my job. But did not at that point think it was necessary to use federal troops.

15 Q: Okay. All right. I'm just trying to make sure we covered because I know you have --

16 A: You guys can, I mean go through your notes and I can come back if I need to. Yeah, I
17 don't mind that.

18 BY [REDACTED]:

19 Q: Okay, yeah I think --

20 A: Go ahead. We got time. We can go little longer?

21 A: I mean you might as well run it up. We can go five -- 1105, yeah that will be fine. It's up
22 to you guys. I don't care.

23 BY [REDACTED]:

1 Q: Was there any discussion or any use of any other, I know the D.C. National Guard was
2 there which is Secretary McCarthy of the Army. Anything from the Navy, Air Force, Marines?

3 A: Well, D.C. National Guard has an Air component, Air Force component.

4 Q: Yeah, they got an Air component.

5 A: But no.

6 Q: What about requirements. What can you tell us about requirements the DoD have for
7 responding to or protecting federal buildings, federal facilities, federal complexes inside the
8 District? Are there any set policy, set requirements that DoD, for example the federal complex, the
9 Capitol complex, or the White House complex that DoD has said, "Hey, we will go do X?"

10 A: I was not aware of any standing plans --

11 Q: If it comes to that.

12 A: -- or standing orders of anything of that nature. [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED]

16 Q: Okay. All right.

17 A: Well, how many people do we got in Capitol, 800? 800 I think.

18 Q: Yeah.

19 A: [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED]

21 Q: What issues or obstacles did you experience in deploying the National Guard? Was
22 there anything that happened that caused a delay or anything like that?

23 A: See I don't -- I do not, I mean I'm all about learning organization and I reviewed

1 decision-making and I've literally got, I'm like no. The thing worked. Of course the issue of what
2 the Army's role was and the Army staff role I'm not going to comment on that because I don't
3 know. It's just what I've read, but you hear the story of these initial calls come in 1:15ish
4 something, and Piatt, and the Army staff, and the G3 of the Army were like, "We don't like the
5 optics of this." Nobody brought that to my attention at the time. I still -- so what I'm really focus,
6 what I'm really intrigued by is this argument that the QRF could have somehow changed the
7 outcome. And I think if we look at the timeline because Walker said it would take 25 minutes to
8 get his QRF. That's bullshit by the way. You know that. If they're at Andrews to get down to the
9 Capitol, okay let's give it 25 minutes. Let's go ahead and say that -- he's the guy on the ground, 25
10 minutes he said that in his testimony. The question I'm trying to determine is at what point did
11 they hit the west steps or whatever the Capitol and you're like, "Okay?" That would be the obvious
12 trigger, right? Like, "Oh shit. Okay. QRF, go." Between then and when they breached the Capitol I
13 don't even know how much time that was. My sense is that when they actually look at all of this it
14 will be determined that even if the QRF launched the moment the first foot hit the Capitol steps
15 you still wouldn't have been able to have an impact. Then you could say, "Well why didn't you
16 position and closer to the Capitol?" And my response would be, "I already told you because you
17 wanted to be close to air assets and you didn't know where you were going to have to employ
18 your QRF." The QRF could have been employed who knows, maybe Fort Belvoir gets it or Fort
19 Myers gets a team. Who knows what's going on because the whole you asked about Intel at the
20 beginning it's like we knew something was going to happen we just didn't know exactly where. So,
21 that's why you know I think the timeline will show hey even if you've launched the QRF and I'll
22 leave this. If I would have put troops on the Capitol on the morning of the sixth or any time prior to
23 that I would have created a constitutional crisis. I guarantee it. That that would have been seen as

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1 a raw play by the military, by me to have -- try to influence the Electoral College vote as well as it
2 would have been seen as a potential coup for us in being and I wasn't going to do that. So, this
3 whole like, "Oh, my gosh. Why didn't you have people on the Hill?" Is completely a historic and is
4 not even close to understanding the entirety of the nature of all the things that were going on at
5 that time.

6 Q: Okay. Sir, if I can two quick questions.

7 A: Go ahead.

8 Q: Information came out about FBI Norfolk that sent an e-mail out the night --

9 A: Yeah.

10 Q: -- before. Did you see that?

11 A: Absolutely not. Hey, I was the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center for a
12 couple months and I was the Head of Counterterrorism at the National Security Council. And I saw
13 -- no we did not receive that. Yes, you know it's real fun, "Well, we e-mailed it." For the National
14 Counterterrorism Center we reviewed 10,000 pieces of information a day. We boil it down to 200
15 potential threat reports and then we further boil it down to your threat matrix of 20 reports. I
16 don't know if it was in there or not, but I suspect somebody doing really good work caught
17 something and did their thing and sent it out, did the right thing, but that didn't get fed into the
18 machine the gungalator. So I did not see that.

19 Q: Okay. All right. And my final question is, hindsight being what it is how would you
20 improve the approval process of from cradle to grave looking at what happened, okay. We get a
21 request on the 31st. They move out, everything that we got everything will go down on the 6th. Is
22 there anything that you can think of that you would improve in that process whether it be through
23 Army to DoD?

1 A: Internal?

2 Q: Yes, sir.

3 A: No. And I'm the most critical self-critical person. So I'm not doing the CYA thing. We're
4 talking just DoD internal to the Pentagon. The real issue we all know is the interagency process for
5 the District of Columbia is completely flawed and was a direct -- the failure of local law
6 enforcement to protect key installations and respond effectively is based on the amalgamation
7 and bifurcation responsibility for the District of Columbia. The mayor requested support. We gave
8 the support required, and knowing other federal agencies asked for any support. I would have
9 gladly provided it. I felt I did the due diligence on that internal to the Pentagon. You heard General
10 Walker, "Well, Secretary McCarthy in June sat next to me the whole time." We're not in June
11 anymore. I would definitely, I'm very comfortable. Everybody's like, "You know the conspiracy
12 people think that this whole, that memo I wrote was some sort of like design to undermine the
13 ability to respond. Remember the helicopter incident in June. I highlighted to you my concerns
14 about what could happen by having National Guard on the street. We were absolutely trying to
15 present a nonthreatening posture, and that was -- remember that was based on what had
16 occurred in the past was during the day D.C. National Guard is going to be, "Stay on the sidewalk.
17 Stay on the sidewalk." They had their protective gear if they needed it in their vehicles, but we
18 didn't expect an outbreak of violence on the TCP's or the Metro stations. So, you kind of, you're
19 like I think internal to DoD I'm like oh obviously it would have been great to have a battle drill,
20 done a table top exercise before where we're all there, that would probably be the one thing like,
21 "Hey, maybe we should have done a talk through internal." You can make that valid argument,
22 sure.

23 Q: [REDACTED]?

1 BY [REDACTED]:

2 Q: All right. Before I do the read out I do have one question I just thought of.

3 A: Yep. Go ahead.

4 Q: So this January 4th memo that you signed.

5 A: Yeah.

6 Q: Did you, because you probably get request for support from the District all the time. Did
7 you have an occasion to sign a similar memo in the past with --

8 A: No. I never. That was the first request for support I experienced was at the Pentagon,
9 and I thought this was a direct result. I thought it was the right thing to do to provide information
10 and I think that might not have occurred I'm guessing in June, and that was a lesson learned. As I
11 always like that's coordinated instructions of paragraph three of the operation order. It's nothing
12 more than that but they were like, "Oh my God." "No. That's what we do. That's good business
13 practices. Make sure your people know what the left and right limits are."

14 Q: All right. All right, Sir. So now I've got the read out and our standard notifications.

15 A: Go ahead.

16 Q: And our standard questions. First, is there anything that you thought we would ask that
17 we didn't ask you?

18 A: No.

19 Q: What additional information would you like to provide before we conclude?

20 A: Let me know if you need anything.

21 Q: All right. Apart from persons we've already mentioned who do you think we should talk
22 to about January 6 and why?

23 A: I don't know who all you've talk to so I can't comment.

1 Q: All right. Do you have any questions for us?

2 A: No. Yeah, we do a next with this? What's the plan? How does this work?

3 BY [REDACTED]:

4 Q: So, right now were in what we call our field we work stage.

5 A: Yeah.

6 Q: Talking to people, gathering, getting documents, we'll eventually put our report
7 together.

8 A: Uh, huh [affirmative response].

9 Q: That will lay out, "Okay. Here's all of the things that we found." One of the big areas
10 that were looking at is trying to make sure that we've got a tight timeline.

11 A: Yeah, good luck.

12 Q: Which is why we asked you a lot of questions about that but the timeline. And then
13 once we do that actually a report will be generated here --

14 A: Okay.

15 Q: -- in my shop and then it will filter up to the Inspector General Mr. O'Donnell and he's
16 the one who's actually approval authority.

17 A: Okay. What do you think the next couple of months?

18 Q: Yes, we're hoping. We're hoping.

19 A: Okay. I know you guys. I'm not prying.

20 Q: Yeah, yeah, yeah. We understand.

21 A: No. Isn't it amazing? I know you've got somebody at the door.

22 Q: Now, don't worry about it.

23 A: It's so amazing and I, you know I'm knee-deep in this crap because my name just gets

1 thrown out like, "Ah." I'm so gratified that we had our timeline, and that wasn't my idea because I
2 can't get a straight answer. And you hear that crap on the Hill it changes every time somebody
3 gets up there. So that's why I'm like I'm really -- my key thing is this argument that if you would
4 have lunch the QRF that would have had an impact on the outcome. My contention, and I think it
5 will show, and I can't wait for you guys to get done is like geez man no. I don't know. That's a
6 stretch to think that -- because QRF is like 40 people, right?

7 Q: Correct, yeah.

8 A: It was horrible event, don't get me wrong. But I really feel like DoD, I'm very
9 comfortable. I have not lost a moment sleep waking up going, "I screwed that up." Not even once.

10 Q: You did mention that your Chief of Staff had a stenographer --

11 A: Yes.

12 Q: -- that got called in. Do you know who that person?

13 A: It rotated around. It started we had a -- because it was busy. There were a couple of
14 them. One was the [REDACTED] I think is his name, [REDACTED] There were
15 constant rotation of people that were keeping and notes on what went down. You know you look
16 back in your like I wish we would have tape-recorded everything but obviously you're in the mix at
17 that time and it wasn't available.

18 BY [REDACTED]:

19 Q: All right, sir. Do you have any comments or concerns about the way we conducted this
20 interview?

21 A: No. You guys keep doing your job. Sorry to be so --

22 Q: About that, yeah.

23 A: Sorry for being so ranting and raving. You're the first people who actually asked good

1 questions. I appreciate that.

2 Q: Well, sir if you remember anything else that you believe may be relevant to our inquiry
3 please contact any of us. I think you have e-mail addresses at least for all of us.

4 A: You've got my phone number now too feel free to reach out as you delve into it.

5 Q: Yeah. We do appreciate your offer to come back if necessary.

6 A: Sure.

7 [REDACTED]: We may take you up on that. Finally, in order to protect the integrity of our
8 inquiry we ask that you not discuss the matter under review or the questions we've asked you
9 during this interview with anyone other than your personal attorney, and of course I'm not trying to
10 or restrict your right to contact a Member of Congress or another IG. If anyone asks you about your
11 testimony or our inquiry please inform them that we've has asked you not to discuss our questions
12 or your responses. If anybody persists in asking about your testimony, or our inquiry, or if you feel
13 threatened in any manner because you provided testimony please contact us.

14 MR. MILLER: How do you want me to handle the Hill when I get called up there?

15 [REDACTED]: The Hill, sir, you can testify.

16 MR. MILLER: All right. You guys, I mean, we'll talk more when that goes down.

17 [REDACTED]: Yeah, something like a subpoena I think you've got to respond to that.

18 MR. MILLER: Yeah.

19 [REDACTED]: All right. Thanks for your time. We appreciate your --

20 MR. MILLER: Yeah, right. All right. Good luck with everything.

21 [REDACTED]: -- patience and everything.

22 MR. MILLER: Thanks. Friday. Sorry.

23 [REDACTED]: Okay. The time is now 11:12 and our interview is concluded.

1 [The interview terminated at 11:12 a.m., March 12, 2021.]

2 [END OF PAGE]