

Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community  
Intelligence Community Whistleblower and Source Protection Program  
Urgent Concern Disclosure Form

### DISCLOSURE OF URGENT CONCERN FORM

(Please print legibly or type and complete all pertinent items. Enter "N/A" (Not Applicable) or "Unknown" where appropriate.)

#### Part 1: Background Information

**1. Name of person seeking IC IG action ("Complainant"):**

Name of Complainant:

[Redacted]

**2. Contact information:**

Address:

[Redacted]

Telephone Number(s):

[Redacted] (Primary)

[Redacted] (Secondary)

Fax Number

[Redacted]

Email Address(s):

**3. Status:**

Current Federal Employee  
Former Federal employee  
Former IC Contractor  
Other (please specify)

Applicant for Federal Employment  
Current IC Contractor  
Military Service member

**4. Current position, title, series, and grade:**

[Redacted]

**5. Please identify any classification concerns regarding your identity or employer:**

None, although I hope the ICIG can take all reasonable measures to protect my identity from the White House, DOJ leadership (minus the DOJ IG), and the public.



**Part 2: Details of Your Disclosure**

**1. I know about the information I am disclosing here based on (check all that apply):**

- I have personal and/or direct knowledge of events or records involved
- Other employees have told me about events or records involved
- Other source(s) *(please explain)*

I do not have direct knowledge of private comments or communications by the President. However, I have direct knowledge of interagency discussions about Ukraine in which Presidential instructions and comments have been conveyed.

**2. Please identify the classification level of your disclosure:**

UNCLASSIFIED with [REDACTED] attchmt

**3. Please identify the U.S. Government department or agency involved in your disclosure:**

White House (and State Department)

**4. Please identify the organizational unit of the department or agency involved:**

n/a

**5. Please identify the type of agency wrongdoing that you are alleging (check all that apply).**

- A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or Executive Order, or deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or operations of an intelligence activity involving classified information, but does not include differences of opinion concerning public policy matters
- A false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity
- An action, including personnel action described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of Title 5, constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under section 7(c) of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, in response to an employee reporting an urgent concern
- Other *(explain below)*

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6. Please describe the agency wrongdoing that you are disclosing, indicating how the agency's actions fit within the type(s) of wrongdoing that you checked in item 5. (Be as specific as possible about dates, locations, and the identities and positions of all persons named. Your ability to succinctly identify the issue and supporting facts will assist in the processing of your disclosure. If you need to continue on a separate sheet of paper, provide a summary of your disclosure below with the remaining substance on the attached pages.)

(U) In the course of my official duties, I have received information from multiple U.S. Government officials that the President of the United States is using the power of his office to solicit interference from a foreign country in the 2020 U.S. elections. This interference includes, among other things, pressuring a foreign country--Ukraine--to investigate one of the President's main domestic political rivals, former Vice President Biden. The President's personal lawyer, Mr. Rudolph Giuliani, is a central figure in this effort. Attorney General Barr appears to be involved as well. I am deeply concerned that the actions I have become aware of constitute "a serious or flagrant problem, abuse, or violation of law or Executive Order...but do[es] not include differences of opinions concerning public policy matters."

(U) The attached document ("Statement of Urgent Concern") provides details on this concern, to include what I have learned about the President's 25 July phone call with the Ukrainian President, as well as events leading up to and since that call, which I believe are critical to understanding the context in which this abuse of power took place. Additional information that I know or have reason to believe is classified is included in a classified appendix ("Classified Appendix"). I also provide additional information about how why I was in a unique position to hear multiple, interlocking accounts of this wrongdoing based on my role in the interagency ("Cover Letter to the ICIG").

Attachments:



Total Pages Attached:

12 (3 docs)

**Part 3: Other Actions You Are Taking On Your Disclosure**

**1. I have previously disclosed (or am disclosing) the violations alleged here to (complete all that apply):**

- Inspector General of department / agency involved Date: \_\_\_\_\_
- Other office of department / agency involved Date: 8/26/19  
(please specify):  
CIA OGC, CIA's Election Security Mission Manager, NIO for Russia, Chair and Vice Chair of the NIC
- Department of Justice Date: \_\_\_\_\_
- Government Accountability Office (GAO) Date: \_\_\_\_\_
- Office of Special Counsel (OSC) Date: \_\_\_\_\_
- Other Executive Branch / department / agency Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
(please specify):  
\_\_\_\_\_
- Congress or congressional committee(s) Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
(please specify member(s) or committee(s)):  
\_\_\_\_\_
- Media / Advocacy Group(s) / Other Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
(please specify):  
\_\_\_\_\_

**2. If you disclosed the information reported here through any other channel described in question 1, above, what is the current status of the matter?**

\_\_\_\_\_ after which point NSC took steps to "lock down" the records. See "Cover Letter to the ICIG" for more details.

**Part 4: Confidentiality Consent and Certification**

**1. Confidentiality Consent**

The IC IG will maintain the confidentiality of your identity where possible. The disclosure of your identity may become necessary in order to fully investigate, or take other appropriate official action on the allegations contained within your disclosure or information. Do you consent to the disclosure of your name to others outside the IC IG, but still within official channels, if it becomes necessary in taking further action on this matter?

I <b>consent</b> to disclosure of my name:	
 Digitally signed by 	8/13/2019
 Date: 2019.08.13 09:40:07 -04'00'	
Signature	Date

I <b>do not consent</b> to disclosure of my name:	
Signature	Date

**2. Certification**

I certify that all of the statements made in this complaint (including any continuation pages) are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001, a false statement or concealment of a material fact is a criminal offense punishable by a fine of up to \$10,000, imprisonment for up to five years, or both.

 Digitally signed by 	8/13/2019
 Date: 2019.08.13 09:40:25 -04'00'	
Signature	Date

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY  
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

### PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974  
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
FOR PERSONAL INFORMATION TAKEN DURING  
INSPECTOR GENERAL WITNESS TESTIMONY  
AUTHORITY: Title 50 USC § 3033.

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S): Information is collected during an investigation to aid in determining facts and circumstances surrounding allegations/problems. The information is assembled in report format and presented to the official directing the inquiry/investigation as a basis for IC IG and DOJ decision-making. The information may be used as evidence in judicial or administrative proceedings or for other official purposes within the ODNI. Disclosure of Social Security Number, if requested, is used to further identify the individual providing the testimony.

ROUTINE USES:

- a. The information may be forwarded to Federal, State, or local law-enforcement agencies for their use.
- b. May be used as a basis for summaries, briefings, or responses to members of Congress or other agencies in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government.
- c. May be provided to Congress or other Federal, State, and local agencies when determined necessary by The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.

MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND THE EFFECT ON INDIVIDUALS FOR NOT PROVIDING THE INFORMATION:

For ODNI employees: The disclosure of Social Security Number is voluntary. However, failure to disclose other personal information in relation to your position or responsibilities may subject you to adverse personnel action.

For all other personnel: The disclosure of Social Security Number, where requested and other personal information is voluntary and no adverse action can be taken against you for refusing to provide information about yourself.



Employee Signature



Printed Name

8/20/2019

Date

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WASHINGTON, DC, 20511

**WARNINGS AND ASSURANCES TO EMPLOYEE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE  
INFORMATION ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS**

You are being asked to provide information as part of an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (ICIG), regarding potential misconduct and/or improper performance of official duties. In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, you are advised that the authority to conduct this interview is contained in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. Section 3033), and ODNI Instruction 10.34. The matter under review may also constitute a violation of law that could result in the criminal prosecution of responsible individuals.

Topic of Inquiry: URGENT MATTER

**This is a voluntary interview.** Accordingly, you do not have to answer questions. No disciplinary action will be taken against you solely for refusing to answer questions. However, your silence may be considered in an administrative proceeding for its evidentiary value if warranted by the facts surrounding your case.

Anything you say or any information or evidence gained by reason of your answers may be used as evidence in this or any administrative or criminal proceeding.

In accordance with applicable agency regulations, you may consult with a private lawyer regarding these allegations at your own expense.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I, [REDACTED], have read and understand the warnings and assurances stated above. I am willing to participate in the interview, make a statement, and answer questions posed by the IC IG. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.

[REDACTED]  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Employee Signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Witness Signature

[REDACTED]  
\_\_\_\_\_  
ICIG Official

8/20/2019  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

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**MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY**

CASE NUMBER: URGENT CONCERN\_PROTECT IDENTITY  
 ACTIVITY: INTERVIEW OF "COMPLAINANT"  
 DRAFTED BY: SA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]  
 DATE OF ACTIVITY: AUGUST 20, 2019  
 DATE PREPARED: AUGUST 22, 2019  
 LOCATION: MCLEAN, VA  
 ATTACHMENTS: 1A7 ORIGINAL NOTES OF INTERVIEW  
 1A8 PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
 1A9 GARRITY WARNING

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] protect identity, hereafter referred to as ("COMPLAINANT") was interviewed, by prior arrangement, in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Original Headquarters Building (OHB) conference room [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agent and [REDACTED] to the Office of the Inspector General for the Intelligence Community (ICIG), and the nature of the interview, COMPLAINANT voluntarily provided the following information:

(U//~~FOUO~~) *{Investigator Note: Prior to the interview, the ICIG had a copy of, among other things, the COMPLAINANT's statement of urgent concern and classified appendix. The ICIG did not ask COMPLAINANT to repeat the information contained in those documents.}*

**(U) Two White House Officials with Direct Knowledge of the Telephone Call:**

**NSC#1**

(U//~~FOUO~~) COMPLAINANT spoke with the first National Security Council (NSC) official (NSC #1) on July 26, 2019. COMPLAINANT attended a meeting at the White House as a [REDACTED]. Following the White House meeting, COMPLAINANT went to drop off [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] 10/03/2019  
 Prepared by: Special Agent  
 Approved by: Principal Deputy Inspector General

[REDACTED] 10/03/2019

**INSPECTOR GENERAL SENSITIVE INFORMATION**

This document is intended only for authorized recipients. Recipients may not further disseminate this information without the express permission of the signatory or other Office of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community personnel. This document may contain Inspector General information that is confidential, sensitive, work product or attorney-client privileged, or protected by Federal law, including protection from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Accordingly, the use, dissemination, distribution or reproduction of this information to or by unauthorized or unintended recipients may be unlawful.

CL BY: [REDACTED] DRV FM: [REDACTED]; DECL ON: [REDACTED]

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### MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

CASE NUMBER: URGENT CONCERN\_PROTECT IDENTITY  
ACTIVITY: INTERVIEW OF "COMPLAINANT"

██████████ materials, in furtherance of ██████ duties, with NSC staff. NSC #1 pulled COMPLAINANT aside during the delivery to speak about concerns related to President Trump's (PRESIDENT TRUMP) telephone call the previous day (July 25, 2019) with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY).

(U//~~FOUO~~) According to COMPLAINANT, NSC#1 is a subject matter expert (SME) on Ukraine and was listening, in real time, to the call between PRESIDENT TRUMP and PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY. COMPLAINANT did not know what time the call took place on July 25, 2019, or the location of the call, but believed the call was at 9:00 am and that PRESIDENT TRUMP likely took the call from his residence since it was early. COMPLAINANT believed that the call materialized quickly. ██████ stated that the NSC had been trying to get PRESIDENT TRUMP to speak with PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY for quite some time, but it was shortly after PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY's party swept the Ukrainian Parliament on July 21, 2019, that the call between PRESIDENT TRUMP and PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY materialized. COMPLAINANT stated that in addition to NSC#1, Charlie Kupperman (KUPPERMAN), Deputy National Security Advisor, Tim Morrison (MORRISON), Senior Director for Europe, and five to six NSC Policy people were in the room. There was likely also someone from NSC Press and Legal though COMPLAINANT did not know for sure.

(U//~~FOUO~~) COMPLAINANT also stated that T. Ulrich Brechbuhl (BRECHBUHL), Counselor to Secretary of State Pompeo also listened in on the call from a drop line at the Department of State. COMPLAINANT stated that it was out of the ordinary for a State Department official at BRECHBUHL's level to have a drop line on the call, and that this is ordinarily only done for the Secretary. COMPLAINANT stated that BRECHBUHL, who has had an evolving and amorphous roll within the Department of State, is a childhood friend of Secretary Pompeo. BRECHBUHL has interest in Ukraine and COMPLAINANT believed that BRECHBUHL was instrumental in recalling the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine back to the United States. COMPLAINANT believed that BRECHBUHL ordered the Diplomatic Security (DS) to investigate the Ambassador's emails to ensure that she was loyal to PRESIDENT TRUMP.

(U//~~FOUO~~) COMPLAINANT learned that BRECHBUHL was on the call from a colleague, a State Department employee, (No Further Information (NFI)), working Ukraine issues. This person worked for Kurt Volker (VOLKER) at the Department of State. COMPLAINT asked if VOLKER was on the call, to which the State Department employee stated that he was not on the call but received a read out of the call from BRECHBUHL, thus confirming for COMPLAINANT that BRECHBUHL was on the call.

Date of Activity: AUGUST 20, 2019  
Conducted by: SA ██████ and ██████

Conducted at: MCLEAN, VA  
Date prepared: AUGUST 22, 2019

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**MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY**

CASE NUMBER: URGENT CONCERN\_PROTECT IDENTITY  
ACTIVITY: INTERVIEW OF "COMPLAINANT"

**NSC#2**

(U//~~FOUO~~) COMPLAINANT stated that [REDACTED] spoke with the second NSC official (NSC#2) on Monday, July 29, 2019. NSC#2 is the main source of information contained within Section 2 of the complaint. NSC#2 is an NSA employee detailed to the NSC and is dual-hatted to the Intelligence Directorate. NSC#2 was covering Ukraine for NSC#1 while NSC#1 was out on leave for a couple weeks. NSC#2 came to have access to the transcript independently, in the course of NSC#2's duties while covering for NSC#1. NSC#2 was shown and read a hard-copy transcript by a senior person in the Intelligence Directorate (NFI), read it in that individual's presence, and returned the transcript to that individual. That individual questioned why the transcript was being housed within the "CODE WORD" system within the Intelligence Directorate, as the information did not contain covert action details, which is generally the type of information that would be held within the intelligence directorate and "CODE WORD" system. COMPLAINANT commented that in the former administration, the only reason to put information into the "CODE WORD" system was for joint covert action.

(U//~~FOUO~~) COMPLAINANT stated that NSC#2 might be open to meeting with officials from the ICIG. However, NSC#2 would rather be hands off and already feels like they are out on a limb.

(U//~~FOUO~~) COMPLAINANT did not believe that NSC#1 and NSC#2 spoke to each other about the call between PRESIDENT TRUMP and PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY. COMPLAINANT mentioned that the two individuals do not get along well and that NSC#2 was covering for NSC#1 while NSC#1 was out for a couple of weeks.

**(U) Others Aware of Complainant's Concern**

(S//~~FOUO~~) Upon COMPLAINANT's return from the White House on July 26, 2019, COMPLAINANT drafted a document, which was provided in hard copy to the ICIG, entitled "Memorandum of Conversation," dated July 26, 2019. On July 26, 2019, COMPLAINANT also told [REDACTED] National Intelligence Officer, [REDACTED] who is a CIA officer on detail to the NSC, and [REDACTED] who is the [REDACTED], about what [REDACTED] discussed with NSC#1. [REDACTED] told COMPLAINANT that COMPLAINANT needed to report the information to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Date of Activity: AUGUST 20, 2019  
Conducted by: SA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Conducted at: MCLEAN, VA  
Date prepared: AUGUST 22, 2019

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## MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

CASE NUMBER: URGENT CONCERN, PROTECT IDENTITY  
ACTIVITY: INTERVIEW OF "COMPLAINANT"

[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ COMPLAINANT commented that [REDACTED] generally considered EISENBERG to be an honest person, who generally tries to do the right thing. COMPLAINANT said, however, that [REDACTED] found EISENBERG'S Deputy, Michael Ellis (ELLIS), who formerly worked for HPSCI Ranking Member, Congressman Devin Nunes (NUNES), to be "slippery and untrustworthy." COMPLAINANT did not know exactly when or why, but heard from NSC #2 that the transcript was being handled sensitively. COMPLAINANT was not certain whether the CIA OGC conversation with EISENBERG resulted in the change in handling procedures related to the transcript, or whether someone was already moving it into "CODE WORD" channels for a different reason.

~~(S//NF)~~ In addition, COMPLAINANT told [REDACTED] Deputy Chairman of the NIC, and Amy McAuliffe (MCAULIFFE), Chairman of the NIC, that [REDACTED] was filing the disclosure with the ICIG. COMPLAINANT allowed these individuals to read a copy of the statement of urgent concern [REDACTED] planned to submit, but did not give them copies. [REDACTED] also told [REDACTED] the Deputy Chief of Analysis for Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus Department (RUMBD), about [REDACTED] disclosure. COMPLAINANT heard that [REDACTED] was confused about a read out from PRESIDENT TRUMP'S call with PRESIDENT ZELENSKY that he received from MORRISON. MORRISON'S read out contradicted what [REDACTED] understood to be reality on the U.S. position related to Yuriy Lutsenko (LUTSENKO), Ukrainian Prosecutor General. COMPLAINANT said that MORRISON could have misunderstood the contents of the call.

### (U) Usual Practice of Staffing a Presidential Call and Subsequently Handling Transcripts

~~(U//FOUO)~~ While at the NSC, COMPLAINANT estimated that [REDACTED] staffed approximately 5-6 calls for President Obama, dozens of calls for Vice President Biden, and 12-18 phone calls for PRESIDENT TRUMP with foreign leaders. [REDACTED] stated that while General [REDACTED] was National Security Advisor, COMPLAINANT was not present in the Oval Office during the calls, but under General [REDACTED] COMPLAINANT did staff phone calls in the Oval Office. In staffing a phone call, one would typically provide background information and talking points for use during the call. After providing the information, one would go to the Oval Office before the call and brief the President for a few minutes, take as good of notes as possible during the call, and as subject matter experts, edit the initial transcript of the call. COMPLAINANT noted that during the call there would be several staff members in the Situation Room. One

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Conducted by: SA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Conducted at: MCLEAN, VA  
Date prepared: AUGUST 22, 2019

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## MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

CASE NUMBER: URGENT CONCERN, PROTECT IDENTITY  
ACTIVITY: INTERVIEW OF "COMPLAINANT"

individual in the Situation Room would voice record and dictate the conversation while others took notes. After the call was completed, the Situation Room would work together to create an initial draft transcript of the call. The transcript would then be emailed from the Situation Room to the NSC, which would load the word document of the transcript into a portal where it was tracked in real time, edited by subject matter experts, finalized, classified, and sent out.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In this situation, the transcript was pulled from the regular computer system and fed into a "CODE WORD" system.

### (U) Request for Nunes to not see the disclosure

(U//~~FOUO~~) COMPLAINANT stated there were two reasons that [REDACTED] did not want NUNES to view [REDACTED] disclosure. First, on April 28, 2019, COMPLAINANT heard from a State Department official (NFI) that the Ukrainian Interior Minister, Arsen Avakov (AVAKOV), pulled aside the State Department official and asked why NUNES was trying to come to Ukraine to meet with him. According to the State Department official, AVAKOV said that it did not sound like NUNES wanted to meet with him on official business. Second, in late May, COMPLAINANT heard from another NSC official (NSC#3) that Kash Patel (PATEL), a former HPSCI staffer for NUNES, who is now the Senior Director for Counterterrorism at the NSC, had inserted himself into conversations related to the Ukraine, and that PATEL was briefing Rudy Giuliani (GIULIANI) on the state of policy discussions with the Ukraine and, thereby, sharing information with someone (GIULIANI) who does not have the appropriate clearance. NSC#3 also stated that he had heard that PRESIDENT TRUMP wanted to thank PATEL for his work on Ukraine. NSC#3 spoke to EISENBERG about PATEL's involvement and since that time, John Bolton (BOLTON), has also reached out to EISENBERG to state for the record that BOLTON wants and has nothing to do with PATEL and GIULIANI.

### (U) Potential for bias

(U//~~FOUO~~) ICIG interviewing officials asked COMPLAINANT what information there might be as evidence of COMPLAINANT's potential bias against PRESIDENT TRUMP. COMPLAINANT listed three potential ways people might allege bias though [REDACTED] is certain [REDACTED] disclosure is free from political influence. First, COMPLAINANT worked closely with Vice President Biden (BIDEN) as an expert on Ukraine. [REDACTED] travelled with BIDEN to Ukraine and was part of conversations where LUTSENKO corruption was discussed. Second, COMPLAINANT worked for the PRESIDENT TRUMP White House for [REDACTED] as an [REDACTED] was then asked by [REDACTED] to be [REDACTED] COMPLAINANT said this was a very stressful job and [REDACTED] became the target of right-wing bloggers, such as [REDACTED] and conspiracy theorists, and later received

Date of Activity: AUGUST 20, 2019  
Conducted by: SA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Conducted at: MCLEAN, VA  
Date prepared: AUGUST 22, 2019

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**MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY**

CASE NUMBER: URGENT CONCERN PROTECT IDENTITY  
ACTIVITY: INTERVIEW OF "COMPLAINANT"

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death threats, which caused [REDACTED] to leave [REDACTED] White House position and return to CIA. [REDACTED] then accepted [REDACTED]. COMPLAINANT believes that [REDACTED] a former colleague at the NSC and current HPSCI staffer for NUNES, provided [REDACTED] with information about COMPLAINANT for use in his threatening blogs. Finally, COMPLAINANT is a registered democrat.

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Date of Activity: AUGUST 20, 2019  
Conducted by: SA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Conducted at: MCLEAN, VA  
Date prepared: AUGUST 22, 2019

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY**

CASE NUMBER: URGENT CONCERN\_PROTECT IDENTITY  
ACTIVITY: 2<sup>ND</sup> INTERVIEW COMPLAINANT  
DRAFTED BY: SA [redacted] and [redacted]  
DATE OF ACTIVITY: AUGUST 21, 2019  
DATE PREPARED: AUGUST 22, 2019  
LOCATION: RESTON, VA  
ATTACHMENTS: 1A13 ORIGINAL NOTES OF TELEPHONIC INTERVIEW

(U//~~FOUO~~) COMPLAINANT, previously identified, was interviewed via secure telephone call on August 21, 2019 at approximately 10:13 am, in follow-up to an in person interview conducted the evening before. COMPLAINANT, who was already aware of the identities of the interviewing Investigator and [redacted] to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (ICIG), and the nature of the interview, voluntarily provided the following information:

(U//~~FOUO~~) COMPLAINANT spoke with his/her colleague previously identified as NSC#2 (National Security Council #2), regarding NSC#2's willingness to speak with the ICIG. NSC#2 was reluctantly willing to interview with the ICIG, however NSC#2 was concerned about exposure as NSC#2 works on the White House on a daily basis. NSC#2 desired to orchestrate the interview via formal channels, and to have a formal request sent to [redacted] so that [redacted] could properly detail to [redacted] management both at the NSC and [redacted] home agency, the National Security Agency (NSA), in the event he/she was questioned as to why he/she was interviewed. NSC#2 preferred a written interview request be sent to him/her. NSC#2 was also concerned of his/her obligations to notify the NSA or the NSC of the interview. NSC#2 is on Joint Duty Assignment to the NSC from the NSA and works in the Europe and Intel Programs at the NSC as a "Russia expert."

[redacted]  
Prepared by: Special Agent

10/05/2019

[Signature]  
Approved by: Principal Deputy Inspector General

[redacted]

10/03/2019

**INSPECTOR GENERAL SENSITIVE INFORMATION**

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**MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY**

CASE NUMBER: URGENT CONCERN, PROTECT IDENTITY  
ACTIVITY: 2<sup>ND</sup> INTERVIEW OF COMPLAINANT

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(U//~~FOUO~~) COMPLAINANT provided NSC#2's name and contact information to the interviewing Investigator per NSC#2's consent, as [REDACTED], email address [REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) COMPLAINANT did not want to comment on NSC#2's feelings after seeing the transcript in question, and thought NSC#2 would need to speak for himself/herself on that topic.

(U//~~FOUO~~) During COMPLAINANT's telephone call with NSC#2 in advance of submitting the urgent concern, COMPLAINANT gathered the salient points from NSC#2 regarding the transcript, which confirmed what COMPLAINANT heard from NSC#1. NSC#2 described that the rest of the call consisted of rambling on a rant about the servers, former Vice President Joe Biden, Attorney General Barr and Rudy Giuliani. NSC#2 mentioned to COMPLAINANT that his/her initial concern was with the procedures of how the transcript was being treated strangely and that he/she had not seen the actual contents at first. After seeing the contents, and putting pieces together with what COMPLAINANT knew, NSC#2 believed the information in the transcript to be "politically explosive." NSC#2 attended meetings which Tim Morrison also attended, and during those meetings, the call and transcript were discussed.

(U//~~FOUO~~) COMPLAINANT did not believe that NSC#1 or NSC#2 spoke about the call, nor did they transition the details of the call from NSC#1 to NSC#2 very well in preparation for NSC#1 to be out of the office for annual leave.

(U//~~FOUO~~) COMPLAINANT felt confident that he/she did not color NSC#2's view of the call. Though COMPLAINANT filled in the back story and connected some dots for NSC#2, COMPLAINANT was confident NSC#2 independently came to the same conclusions as COMPLAINANT regarding the call and that something was not right.

(U//~~FOUO~~) NSC#2 was open to meeting with the ICIG either at Liberty Crossing or at the Central Intelligence Agency as needed.

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Date of Activity: AUGUST 21,  
2019 AUGUST 21,  
2019  
Conducted by: SA [REDACTED]

Conducted at: RESTON, VA

Date prepared: AUGUST 22, 2019

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY**

CASE NUMBER: URGENT CONCERN PROTECT IDENTITY  
ACTIVITY: 3<sup>RD</sup> INTERVIEW OF COMPLAINANT - TELEPHONIC  
DRAFTED BY: SA [REDACTED]  
DATE OF ACTIVITY: OCTOBER 8, 2019  
DATE PREPARED: OCTOBER 18, 2019  
LOCATION: RESTON, VA  
ATTACHMENTS: 1A14 – ORIGINAL NOTES OF INTERVIEW

(U//~~FOUO~~) COMPLAINANT, previously identified, contacted the interviewing Agent via telephone on October 8, 2019, at approximately 7:51 a.m. COMPLAINANT, who was already aware of the identity of the interviewing Agent, voluntarily provided the following information:

(U//~~FOUO~~) The interview the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) is attempting to schedule has not been finalized. The date and time of when that interview, or secure telephone conference, will take place is not clear. COMPLAINANT believed that much of the information provided by him/her at the time of the urgent concern disclosure has now been overcome by more detailed information coming out in the press, or recent text message releases, which are beyond his/her original knowledge. Some of the dates of information being disclosed in the news do not match up with COMPLAINANT's urgent concern disclosure. COMPLAINANT does not wish to testify in person before the SSCI or the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). Rather, he/she would prefer to answer written interrogatory questions. COMPLAINANT does not believe there was any point for him/her to come forward given all that has come out in the news. He/she is not interested in being part of a political show.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In regard to the news reports and questions regarding how the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (ICIG) Hotline forms were completed, and specifically that COMPLAINANT did not check that he/she had reported the matter to Intelligence Committees as had been reported in the news, was because no substance was given

[REDACTED]

10/28/2019

*[Signature]* 10/29/19

Prepared by: Special Agent

Approved by: Principal Deputy Inspector General

Prepared by: N/A

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**MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY**

CASE NUMBER: URGENT CONCERN\_PROTECT IDENTITY  
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to the Intelligence Committees. COMPLAINANT did not feel it was necessary to check that particular box because he/she had not provided any substantive information. His/her questions were only procedural in nature, asking how to submit the concern. The person COMPLAINANT asked told him/her to, "Do it right, hire a lawyer, and contact the ICIG." So, that is what the COMPLAINANT did. At the time, COMPLAINANT did not even know what the ICIG was. Based on getting guidance on a procedural question, and that no substance of the actual disclosure was discussed, COMPLAINANT did not feel, based on the way the form question was worded, that it was necessary to check that box. COMPLAINANT advised he/she was sorry for any problems caused for Mr. Atkinson due to the way he/she answered that question, as it was certainly not his/her intent.

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Date of Activity: OCTOBER 8, 2019  
Conducted by: SA [REDACTED]

Conducted at: RESTON, VA  
Date prepared: OCTOBER 18, 2019  
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**MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY**

CASE NUMBER: URGENT CONCERN PROTECT IDENTITY  
ACTIVITY: INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]  
DRAFTED BY: SA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]  
DATE OF ACTIVITY: AUGUST 20, 2019  
DATE PREPARED: AUGUST 22, 2019  
LOCATION: MCLEAN, VA  
ATTACHMENTS: 1A1 ORIGINAL NOTES OF INTERVIEW  
1A2 PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
1A3 GARRITY WARNING

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] AIN [REDACTED] [REDACTED], secure telephone number [REDACTED] was interviewed by prior arrangement at Liberty Crossing 2 (LX2), in the satellite office for the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (ICIG), room [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Investigator and ICIG [REDACTED], and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] voluntarily provided the following information:

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED] has known [REDACTED] protect identity, hereafter known as ("COMPLAINANT") for approximately two years, when COMPLAINANT joined [REDACTED] on a [REDACTED] COMPLAINANT is a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee. COMPLAINANT's [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] s group has asked COMPLAINANT to [REDACTED] COMPLAINANT is one of the top [REDACTED] performers in [REDACTED] out of approximately [REDACTED] people. [REDACTED] described COMPLAINANT as a "star performer" with "good and deep knowledge" regarding Russia and Ukraine in particular, and as someone who is very detail oriented and a "sophisticated thinker". COMPLAINANT is [REDACTED] s best [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] boss, Amy McAuliffe (MCAULIFFE) nominated COMPLAINANT for the [REDACTED] award. [REDACTED] believes COMPLAINANT to be credible and trustworthy, a very

[REDACTED]  
Prepared by: Special Agent

10/08/2019

Approved by: Principal Deputy Inspector General

[REDACTED]

10/08/2019

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CL BY: [REDACTED] DRV FM: [REDACTED]; DECL ON: [REDACTED]  
ICIG ISV Form 501

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### MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

CASE NUMBER: URGENT CONCERN PROTECT IDENTITY  
ACTIVITY: INTERVIEW OF ██████████

dependable person, and someone whose work is always sound and very well done. ██████████ stated that COMPLAINANT is "deliberate, methodical, and very squared away."

(U//FOUO) ██████████ was aware that COMPLAINANT had submitted an urgent concern through to the ICIG. COMPLAINANT advised both ██████████ and MCAULIFFE, as a courtesy and "heads up" near the end of the process, just before submitting the documents. COMPLAINANT advised ██████████ that COMPLAINANT had legal representation. ██████████ scanned the urgent concern submission authored by COMPLAINANT at the time COMPLAINANT advised of the decision to submit. ██████████ believed the information contained in the urgent concern write up appeared to be credible as COMPLAINANT had access to the information and articulated the concern clearly. COMPLAINANT knows people and "parts" inside of the National Security Council (NSC) and is still engaged with the NSC. ██████████ stated ██████████ "would bet ██████████'s paycheck" on COMPLAINANT. COMPLAINANT had great anxiety about filing the urgent concern. ██████████ commented that COMPLAINANT was "nervous but feels compelled to report."

(U//FOUO) ██████████'s understanding was the COMPLAINANT left the NSC for personal reasons. COMPLAINANT was a CIA detailee to NSC and was ██████████ for the ██████████ within NSC. Upon the arrival of ██████████ ██████████, COMPLAINANT was pulled to be ██████████'s ██████████. Sometime after taking that job, COMPLAINANT became the "target" of conspiracy theorists and the right wing media, such as AM talk radio hosts, and vilified ██████████ as someone who undermined President Trump (PRESIDENT TRUMP) and that COMPLAINANT was a "leaker." COMPLAINANT curtailed the JDA based on the threats being received, to include death threats, and reported to ██████████. In regard to comments made about COMPLAINANT, ██████████ did not believe them, and thought the allegations would not be true given what ██████████ knows of COMPLAINANT. ██████████ stated that COMPLAINANT was just "in the wrong place at the wrong time." ██████████ was not sure if the JDA to the NSC from CIA was supposed to be longer than a two year assignment. COMPLAINANT is very nervous to proceed with the urgent concern process based on these prior experiences.

(U//FOUO) ██████████ is not aware of any biases COMPLAINANT may have that would discredit the details provided in the urgent concern submission. In ██████████'s experience, COMPLAINANT looks at information objectively, and COMPLAINANT's views are consistent with the Intelligence Community as a whole in regard to Russia and Ukraine. ██████████ did not believe the prior events causing COMPLAINANT to leave NSC created a bias that carried over into the current job, or was the reason COMPLAINANT wrote the urgent concern. ██████████ reiterated that COMPLAINANT is very objective and produces sound work.

(U//FOUO) COMPLAINANT is an expert on Ukraine. COMPLAINANT led the work on ██████████

Date of Activity: AUGUST 20, 2019  
Conducted by: SA ██████████ and ██████████

Conducted at: MCLEAN, VA  
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MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

CASE NUMBER: URGENT CONCERN PROTECT IDENTITY  
ACTIVITY: INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] related to [REDACTED] COMPLAINANT is well versed in Russia and affiliated sanctions, Russia's interactions with the Ukraine, and the leadership and foreign policies of the Ukraine.

~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]'s understanding was that in addition to [REDACTED] self and MCAULIFFE, COMPLAINANT also told a few other people that the urgent concern was going to be filed. Specifically, [REDACTED] knew that [REDACTED], another CIA officer [REDACTED] who is COMPLAINANT's [REDACTED] at the CIA, was in the room at the same time COMPLAINANT advised [REDACTED] of the urgent concern. COMPLAINANT also mentioned that [REDACTED] had been told. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Additionally, [REDACTED] learned just last night when COMPLAINANT provided an update, that COMPLAINANT also told [REDACTED] the Head of [REDACTED] and former CIA "Russia Hand." [REDACTED] purportedly then told CIA Director Gina Haspel and CIA Deputy Director Vaughn Bishop. [REDACTED] has not mentioned the urgent concern to anyone else.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ COMPLAINANT did not mention any details to [REDACTED] as to the sources of information outlined in the urgent concern and had not mentioned any names of those individuals with direct knowledge of the alleged activity. [REDACTED]'s understanding of why COMPLAINANT listed the actual name of T. Ulrich Brechbuhl (BRECHBUHL) in the urgent concern was because BRECHBUHL had already been attributed to knowing the information, or had already gone on the record related to information. [REDACTED]'s impression was that because BRECHBUHL's name was already public, COMPLAINANT was comfortable listing his name in the urgent concern.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ COMPLAINANT and [REDACTED] are both [REDACTED]

Date of Activity: AUGUST 20, 2019  
Conducted by: SA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Conducted at: MCLEAN, VA  
Date prepared: AUGUST 22, 2019

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**MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY**

CASE NUMBER: URGENT CONCERN\_PROTECT IDENTITY  
ACTIVITY: INTERVIEW OF AMY MCAULIFFE  
DRAFTED BY: SA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]  
DATE OF ACTIVITY: AUGUST 20, 2019  
DATE PREPARED: AUGUST 22, 2019  
LOCATION: MCLEAN, VA  
ATTACHMENTS: 1A4 ORIGINAL NOTES OF INTERVIEW  
1A5 PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
1A6 GARRITY WARNING

(U//~~FOUO~~) Amy McAuliffe (MCAULIFFE), AIN [REDACTED], Chair of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), secure telephone number [REDACTED] was interviewed at Liberty Crossing 2 (LX2), in the satellite office of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (ICIG), room [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and [REDACTED] for the ICIG, and the nature of the interview, MCAULIFFE voluntarily provided the following information:

(U//~~FOUO~~) MCAULIFFE is the Chair of the NIC. MCAULIFFE has known [REDACTED] protect identity, hereafter referred to as ("COMPLAINANT") since COMPLAINANT [REDACTED] which was approximately [REDACTED] months ago, though MCAULIFFE is very bad with time frames. COMPLAINANT is the [REDACTED] and works for [REDACTED]. COMPLAINANT is an expert on Russia and Eurasia.

(U//~~FOUO~~) MCAULIFFE described COMPLAINANT as an excellent employee and a "deep expert" with credibility across the intelligence community as "an analytic thought leader" with

[REDACTED]

10/03/2019

*[Signature]* 10/3/19  
Approved by: Principal Deputy Inspector General

[REDACTED]

10/03/2019

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CL BY: [REDACTED] DRV FN: [REDACTED]; DECL ON: [REDACTED]

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**MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY**

CASE NUMBER: URGENT CONCERN PROTECT IDENTITY  
ACTIVITY: INTERVIEW OF AMY MCAULIFFE

excellent writing and thinking skills. MCAULIFFE believed COMPLAINANT to be a credible person.

(U//FOUO) MCAULIFFE did not like how COMPLAINANT handled the filing of the urgent concern and this situation. COMPLAINANT waited until the last minute to tell MCAULIFFE what [REDACTED] was doing, and did so on a day in which she was very busy. MCAULIFFE looped in [REDACTED], the [REDACTED]. MCAULIFFE scanned the copy of the urgent concern document COMPLAINANT planned to submit, but did not read it thoroughly. MCAULIFFE provided COMPLAINANT with some pieces of advice, including that she thought [REDACTED] should see the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Office of General Counsel (OGC). COMPLAINANT did not think that was necessary, as [REDACTED] had already looped in [REDACTED]. MCAULIFFE would never tell an employee to stop or not see Equal Employment Office or OGC if the employee thought it was right. She advised COMPLAINANT to do what [REDACTED] thought was right. MCAULIFFE wished she had more time to think about things to help give the best advice. MCAULIFFE felt a little like she was being looped in to the issue late, like "being looped in right at the time of the crash."

(U//FOUO) COMPLAINANT was very stressed about this issue and said it was time "to hit send."

(S//NF) COMPLAINANT is a credible person. When COMPLAINANT worked at the White House as [REDACTED] within the National Security Council (NSC) there was some tension that [REDACTED] was perceived as "anti-Russian and pro-Ukrainian." MCAULIFFE did not know the details, but wanted to be sure she mentioned it. MCAULIFFE thought COMPLAINANT was probably unfairly portrayed one way or the other. MCAULIFFE was not sure why COMPLAINANT left the NSC. [REDACTED] In regard to COMPLAINANT's credibility, and what was claimed in the urgent concern, MCAULIFFE found the information to be credible because of the COMPLAINANT, but also because of her own experience with seeing read outs from Presidential telephone calls. In one instance, MCAULIFFE read reporting from NSC regarding China's President Xi (XI). The reporting detailed a telephone call between PRESIDENT TRUMP and PRESIDENT XI and reported PRESIDENT XI's views on PRESIDENT TRUMP. In the call, PRESIDENT TRUMP reportedly asked PRESIDENT XI to help out with the American farmers in the United States in trade negotiations [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] Having read this material in the past made the information COMPLAINANT was filing more credible because of the similar type of conversation PRESIDENT TRUMP had with another world leader.

Date of Activity: AUGUST 20, 2019  
Conducted by: SA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Conducted at: MCLEAN, VA  
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### MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

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ACTIVITY: INTERVIEW OF AMY MCAULIFFE

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(U//~~FOUO~~) MCAULIFFE has not observed COMPLAINANT have any biases. COMPLAINANT is neutral in [REDACTED] work. MCAULIFFE has observed biases in others, but never in the COMPLAINANT.

(S//NF) In addition to telling MCAULIFFE of the urgent concern, COMPLAINANT also told [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] who were both in the room at the same time. COMPLAINANT also told [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] at the CIA, which COMPLAINANT mentioned to MCAULIFFE yesterday. MCAULIFFE speculated [REDACTED] probably also told Gina Haspel, the CIA Director. MCAULIFFE did not take any other action on this information, nor did she repeat it to anyone.

(U//~~FOUO~~) MCAULIFFE thought COMPLAINANT's sources of information for the urgent concern were White House read outs of the telephone conversation, press reporting regarding Hunter Biden, and details regarding the United States Ambassador to the Ukraine. It is not out of the norm to see read outs of White House telephone calls. A read out is only a summary and is not the same as a transcript. MCAULIFFE thought COMPLAINANT's urgent concern was very well sourced and written, as one would expect from [REDACTED]. If one wanted to see a transcript of the telephone call in question, it may be in COMPLAINANT's email or in the email from the person who may have sent it to him from the NSC. MCAULIFFE was not certain COMPLAINANT had a copy of the transcript.

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Date of Activity: AUGUST 20, 2019  
Conducted by: SA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Conducted at: MCLEAN, VA  
Date prepared: AUGUST 22, 2019

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**MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY**

CASE NUMBER: URGENT CONCERN PROTECT IDENTITY  
ACTIVITY: INTERVIEW OF "WITNESS 2"  
DRAFTED BY: SA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]  
DATE OF ACTIVITY: AUGUST 21, 2019  
DATE PREPARED: AUGUST 22, 2019  
LOCATION: MCLEAN, VA  
ATTACHMENTS: 1A10 ORIGINAL NOTES OF INTERVIEW  
1A11 PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT  
1A12 GARRITY WARNING

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED], protect identity, hereafter referred to as ("WITNESS 2"), was interviewed by prior arrangement at Liberty Crossing 2 (LX2), in the satellite office of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (ICIG), room [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identity of the Interviewing Agent and [REDACTED], and the nature of the interview, WITNESS 2 voluntarily provided the following information:

(U//~~FOUO~~) Since September 2018, WITNESS 2 has been on a joint duty assignment to the National Security Council (NSC) from WITNESS 2's home agency, the National Security Agency (NSA). WITNESS 2 is dual-hatted between Directorates, working for the Directorate of Intelligence and for the European/Russian Affairs Directorate. WITNESS 2 is currently serving as the Director for Intelligence Programs, but his portfolio includes Russia, Baltic, and South Caucasus, meaning Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

(U) TRANSCRIPT OF WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE CALL

(U//~~FOUO~~) WITNESS 2 first saw the transcript of the White House telephone call between President Trump (PRESIDENT TRUMP) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy

[REDACTED] 10/03/2019  
Prepared by: Special Agent [REDACTED]  
Approved by: Principal Deputy Inspector General [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 10/03/2019

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ACTIVITY: INTERVIEW OF "WITNESS 2"

(PRESIDENT ZELENSKY) referenced in a statement of urgent concern filed with the ICIG by another individual, within a week of when the actual call occurred. At the time of the interview, WITNESS 2 could not recall the specific date of the call. *{Investigator Note: The ICIG did not provide a copy of the statement of urgent concern, or any other documents, to WITNESS 2}.* WITNESS 2 described that when a White House call is made, the Situation Room creates a transcript of the call, which is then entered into the "system" and is routed to those who were listening to the call, and to "Legal" for review and clearance. WITNESS 2 saw the transcript while it was going through this process. The version WITNESS 2 saw was not the finalized, completed version, as it was still in the review process.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ WITNESS 2 reviewed the transcript in order to have situational awareness of the circumstances surrounding the call, and the discussions of the call, as he was covering for the [REDACTED], hereafter referred to as ("[REDACTED]"), while [REDACTED] was out of the office. WITNESS 2 was generally aware of the call because there was a bunch of activity surrounding the call in the days following, including closed door meetings and whispered conversations. WITNESS 2 wanted to be sure he could answer necessary questions while covering for [REDACTED].

~~(U//FOUO)~~ WITNESS 2's understanding was that the transcript had been placed into a heavily compartmented system at NSC, which is typically reserved for "CODE WORD" material dealing with covert actions, SSRP, or compartmented material that is highly classified. WITNESS 2 commented that JWICS could not hold this level of material. WITNESS 2's understanding was that the transcript did not include highly classified information. The transcript went into the compartmented, "CODE WORD" system called "NICE" (no further information (NFI)) while it was going through the clearance review process. The document goes through the clearance process via email to various groups. The Deputy Senior Director for the Intelligence Directorate, [REDACTED], who is on detail to the NSC from the CIA and is within the Directorate which, the Directorate of Intelligence, which maintains day to day control over the "NICE" system, responded to one of the clearance emails stating, "I don't know why this is in the "NICE" system because there is no "CODE WORD" material." Based on seeing this email and wanting to be situationally aware while covering for [REDACTED], WITNESS 2 asked [REDACTED] if WITNESS 2 could review the transcript. [REDACTED] is in WITNESS 2's chain of command. [REDACTED] provided WITNESS 2 with a hard copy of the transcript, which WITNESS 2 reviewed and immediately returned to [REDACTED]. WITNESS 2 recalled [REDACTED] made a similar comment to that above "I don't know why this is in the "NICE" system because there is no "CODE WORD" material" to him in person when he reviewed the document in [REDACTED] presence.

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**MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY**

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ACTIVITY: INTERVIEW OF "WITNESS 2"

(U//~~FOUO~~) WITNESS 2 recalled that at some point in the process of reviewing the transcript, and learning of it being moved to the "NICE" system, that the decision to move it to the "NICE" system was made by NSC Legal. WITNESS 2 could not recall the origin of that information; whether [REDACTED] saw it in the email from [REDACTED] or heard it directly from [REDACTED] or perhaps from [REDACTED].

(U//~~FOUO~~) WITNESS 2 was aware of the telephone call between PRESIDENT TRUMP and PRESIDENT ZELENSKYI shortly after the call happened. WITNESS 2 overheard [REDACTED] talking about the call, and reiterated the closed door meetings that took place, and stress in the Eurasia Directorate regarding the call. WITNESS 2 knew before [REDACTED] went on vacation of "politically charged" conversations that were happening, and was aware of the "swirl" of information and stories about "Biden, Ukraine and Giuliani." WITNESS 2 was trying to keep an "arm's length" from everything. WITNESS 2 knew there were other political forces bigger than those trying to work the issue. Given that WITNESS 2 was going to be covering for [REDACTED], [REDACTED] wanted to educate and insulate [REDACTED] self to understand what [REDACTED] was getting into, and to be best prepared.

(U//~~FOUO~~) WITNESS 2 presumed the finalized version of the transcript is in the "NICE" system. Oral briefing read outs regarding Presidential telephone calls are given all the time. Nothing prevents those who overhear the telephone calls from briefing them to others. WITNESS 2 believed [REDACTED] gave COMPLAINANT a read out of the call. WITNESS 2 did not have a copy of the transcript and did not know of a way to obtain a copy without having access to, and need to know, for the "NICE" system.

(U//~~FOUO~~) WITNESS 2 recalled reading in the transcript discussions between PRESIDENT TRUMP and PRESIDENT ZELENSKYI regarding: CrowdStrike servers housed in the Ukraine; the unfair or poor treatment of Prosecutor Lutsenko (LUTSENKO), or that LUTSENKO was being treated poorly; that LUTSENKO was privy to information regarding family members of former Vice President Biden (BIDEN), specifically Hunter Biden (HUNTER); that PRESIDENT TRUMP was going to send Attorney General Barr (BARR) and Rudy Giuliani (GIULIANI) to speak with LUTSENKO, and possibly to also meet with others from ZELENSKYI's administration. WITNESS 2 could not recall if there was a specific mention of BIDEN, beyond the reference to BIDEN's family.

(U//~~FOUO~~) WITNESS 2 stated that the implicit message from these references read somewhat as a "request for assistance." In hindsight, it became clear to WITNESS 2 that there was a "quid pro quo" situation happening due to the sudden freezing of foreign military and congressional

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**MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY**

CASE NUMBER: URGENT CONCERN, PROTECT IDENTITY  
ACTIVITY: INTERVIEW OF "WITNESS 2"

assistance to the Ukraine without explanation. It was clear to WITNESS 2 from reading the transcript that PRESIDENT TRUMP wanted something, that PRESIDENT TRUMP wanted PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY to ensure LUTSENKO was treated deferentially, and that PRESIDENT TRUMP wanted PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY's administration to provide information on the Crowdstrike Servers or on HUNTER to BARR and GIULIANI. It was clear to WITNESS 2 that PRESIDENT TRUMP wanted LUTSENKO to remain in place as the Prosecutor General. WITNESS 2 had no recollection of an explicit reference to the 2020 Presidential elections, but it seemed implicit when WITNESS 2 "read between the lines" of what was said. There was not an "if you want X, I need Y" type of framework to what was said but it was implicit.

(U//~~FOUO~~) WITNESS 2 was later made aware by a Department of State colleague (NFI) that GIULIANI had made a trip to Madrid to meet with PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY representatives earlier this month.

(U//~~FOUO~~) After reading the transcript of the call, WITNESS 2 had a strong feeling of deep disappointment. WITNESS 2 also had a feeling of dejection and helplessness. One of the jobs WITNESS 2 is engaged in is to secure the election in 2020. In aggregate, after reading the transcript and learning the context related to the Ukraine, PRESIDENT TRUMP's statements to PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY seemed to be politically motivated solicitations. WITNESS 2 stated that [REDACTED] is not a cop or a lawyer and said there is not much [REDACTED] can do to influence those actions. WITNESS 2 has become accustomed to feeling disappointed daily by statements or policy decisions which [REDACTED] has no control over. [REDACTED] can only swallow [REDACTED] personal thoughts and get back to work "my job is to salute smartly". WITNESS 2 stated that [REDACTED] is disappointed everyday on policy decisions and statements made by political figures. [REDACTED] has become more indifferent over time, and is now basically "apolitical" because [REDACTED] does not have the "bandwidth" to be concerned one way or the other. In spite of those feelings, WITNESS 2 has tried to help COMPLAINANT in the most ethical and legal manner possible, to not run afoul of WITNESS 2's obligations to NSC or NSA. [REDACTED] stated that he believed this was "an affront to truth, justice and the American way."

(U//~~FOUO~~) WITNESS 2 made it clear that [REDACTED] would not have taken independent action on the information [REDACTED] read in the transcript for two reasons: first that [REDACTED] routinely deals with issues on a daily basis that are contrary to [REDACTED] personal beliefs; and second that [REDACTED] did not have the level of granular insight of details related to the Ukraine that COMPLAINANT had. WITNESS 2 could not connect the same dots that COMPLAINANT did into the impact of what was said during the telephone call.

Date of Activity: AUGUST 21, 2019  
Conducted by: SA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Conducted at: MCLEAN, VA  
Date prepared: AUGUST 22, 2019

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY**

CASE NUMBER: URGENT CONCERN, PROTECT IDENTITY  
ACTIVITY: INTERVIEW OF "WITNESS 2"

(U//~~FOUO~~) WITNESS 2's impression of what PRESIDENT TRUMP said during the telephone call was out of the norm and was an affront. WITNESS 2 opined that "it was not okay" to say what PRESIDENT TRUMP said during the call.

(U//~~FOUO~~) WITNESS 2 questioned [REDACTED] self whether there was a degree of desensitization to this sort of thing happening. Given the climate today, there was not much WITNESS 2 could do to bring it forward. Maybe if WITNESS 2 had heard of this happening a few years ago, or if it was a local official, or someone in his immediate chain making these statements, [REDACTED] would have "kicked the dust up or called the FBI, but not now." WITNESS 2 commented that there is "not a name we are talking about that couldn't ruin him" and believed [REDACTED]'s "too small" to do anything and like an "ant hill, [REDACTED] would get crushed." WITNESS 2 worked with Peter Stroz, and WITNESS 2 knew how it would play out if [REDACTED] said anything. "If I unilaterally try to make an issue out of it the only person impacted is me and not for the better."

(U//~~FOUO~~) However politically or ethically distasteful the information was in the transcript, WITNESS 2 did not have one explicit thing to point to in order to bring forward. WITNESS 2 mentioned again the lack of granular detail that COMPLAINANT had to bring the urgent concern forward. WITNESS 2 would not have been able to get from "point A to Z" the way COMPLAINANT did. WITNESS 2 commented that what COMPLAINANT put together is a concerning set of circumstances. What was in the transcript, however, rubs WITNESS 2 the wrong way as both a citizen and as a voter. WITNESS 2 mentioned the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

(U//~~FOUO~~) WITNESS 2 is assisting COMPLAINANT in regard to the urgent concern because WITNESS 2 wants to be able to sleep at night, and [REDACTED] wants to help COMPLAINANT sleep at night, by registering how concerning this whole thing was. WITNESS 2 stated [REDACTED] feels a moral and patriotic duty to help COMPLAINANT due what is right" and hopes [REDACTED] is able to "in some way register how concerning this was. WITNESS 2 wanted to "sleep the sleep of the just."

**(U) POTENTIAL FOR BIASES OR TO BE DISCREDITED**

(U//~~FOUO~~) If someone were to try to discredit information provided by WITNESS 2, they might focus on WITNESS 2 being the co-author of the 2017 ICA (Intelligence Community Assessment) on Russian Interference on the 2016 election. In addition, WITNESS 2 has been interviewed by the HPSCI and SSCI staff, during which WITNESS 2 has tried to be professional and apolitical at all times. The ICA could have been, or could be looked at, as negative towards PRESIDENT TRUMP. WITNESS 2 is confident in how [REDACTED] has represented [REDACTED] self in the past.

Date of Activity: AUGUST 21, 2019  
Conducted by: SA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Conducted at: MCLEAN, VA  
Date prepared: AUGUST 22, 2019

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY**

CASE NUMBER: URGENT CONCERN\_PROTECT IDENTITY  
ACTIVITY: INTERVIEW OF "WITNESS 2"

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**(U) MISCELLANEOUS**

(U//~~FOUO~~) WITNESS 2 got the sense that [REDACTED] would like the opportunity to unburden himself of the information he is aware of, but for self-preservation purposes, he probably wouldn't.

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Date of Activity: AUGUST 21, 2019  
Conducted by: SA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Conducted at: MCLEAN, VA  
Date prepared: AUGUST 22, 2019

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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

To BE FORMATED  
AND CLASSIFIED

~~INSPECTOR GENERAL SENSITIVE INFORMATION~~

**MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY**

CASE NUMBER: (i.e. 19-0000-IN/PR)  
ACTIVITY: ACTIVITY (i.e. INTERVIEW OF JANE DOE)  
DRAFTED BY: [INVESTIGATOR(S)] (i.e. IA/INV/SA JANE DOE and JOHN DOE)  
DATE OF ACTIVITY: [DATE OF ACTIVITY] (i.e. JANUARY 1, 2019)  
DATE PREPARED: [DATE PREPARED]  
LOCATION: [LOCATION OF ACTIVITY] (i.e. RESTON, VA)  
ATTACHMENTS: [ATTACHMENTS] (i.e. IAs (IA1 - PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT, IA2 - GARRITY WARNING))

The following investigative activity was conducted by writer on August 21, 2019 in Reston, Virginia, unless otherwise noted.

On August 21, 2019 at approximately 10:15 a.m., writer telephonically contacted COMPLAINANT at approximately 10:15 am via secure telephone to follow-up on the interview conducted the day before. Information provided is documented in a separate MOIA.

On August 23, 2019, at approximately 2:35 p.m., writer telephonically contacted COMPLAINANT via COMPLAINANT's cellular telephone. COMPLAINANT was advised that the DNI had been briefed on the contents of the urgent concern and that a transmittal with determination as to credibility and urgency would be produced on Monday. COMPLAINANT advised [REDACTED] learned in the past few days, but notified COMPLAINANT this morning, that [REDACTED] (No Further Information [NFI]) regarding COMPLAINANT's urgent concern submission. COMPLAINANT also advised he/she would be out of the office [REDACTED] and that his/her communications might be spotty based on where he/she would be located.

Prepared by: Choose an item.

Approved by: Acting Assistant Inspector General for Investigations

Prepared by: N/A

**INSPECTOR GENERAL SENSITIVE INFORMATION**

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## MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

CASE NUMBER:  
ACTIVITY:

On August 27, 2019 at approximately 2:30 p.m., COMPLAINANT was telephonically contacted by writer and A/GC to ICIG via secure telephone. COMPLAINANT was advised the urgent concern had been briefed to ODNI GC, and the GC went to the White House to determine any classification redactions necessary, along with executive privilege scenarios. COMPLAINANT further advised the desires of who to direct the urgent concern to had been relayed, but that ICIG had no control over that process once the urgent concern was transmitted to the DNI. COMPLAINANT had questions regarding next steps and his ability to go to congressional committees on [REDACTED] own if the information transmitted was change to the point of altering meaning or his initial disclosure. COMPLAINANT also wanted to know if [REDACTED] was able to give a copy of the urgent concern to [REDACTED] counsel, citing concerns over classifications.

On August 29, 2019 at approximately 6:45 p.m., writer and A/GC to ICIG attempted to telephonically contact COMPLAINANT via unclassified teleconference. COMPLAINANT sent an email to A/GC stating that due to his/her location while [REDACTED] he/she was unable to connect via cellular telephone and that he/she would need to try to reconnect the next day.

On August 30, 2019, at approximately 2:00 p.m., writer and A/GC to ICIG telephonically contacted COMPLAINANT via cellular telephone. COMPLAINANT was provided an update as to status of the urgent concern in accordance with statutory requirements. COMPLAINANT was told that the ICIG determined the urgent concern to be both credible and urgent on 08/26/2019 and that the same information was transmitted to the DNI, along with an exact copy of COMPLAINANT's original urgent concern. COMPLAINANT advised [REDACTED] was in [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED] would be back in the office on [REDACTED] 2019. COMPLAINANT also advised that [REDACTED] learned from NSC#2 on Tuesday (08/27/2019) night that a preservation notice had been received by the WH and NSC regarding the issue and country at question in the urgent concern.

On September 3, 2019 at approximately 2:40 p.m., COMPLAINANT was telephonically contacted by writer and A/GC to ICIG via secure telephone. COMPLAINANT gave permission for the IG to provide a copy of the statement of urgent concern to the IG's of DOJ, DoD and DoS for purposes of deconflicting potential investigative activity across multiple areas of responsibility and jurisdiction, however pleaded that all information be very close hold due to compilation of information potentially being able to identify [REDACTED]. COMPLAINANT inquired as to working with his counsel to notify congressional committees of the fact of [REDACTED] submission. COMPLAINANT asked if issue of executive privilege had ever come up before. COMPLAINANT also advised [REDACTED] was still following issues in the news and noted the U.S. Security assistance to the Ukraine was a topic of multiple stories and had many people "rialed up." In addition, COMPLAINANT read a twitter feed and other articles indicating Rudy Giuliani had attended an oval office meeting with President Trump, which seemed odd, especially given the timing of the President canceling his trip to Poland.

Date of Activity: [DATE OF ACTIVITY]  
Conducted by: [INVESTIGATOR(S)]

Conducted at: [LOCATION OF ACTIVITY]  
Date prepared: [DATE PREPARED]  
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## MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

CASE NUMBER:  
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On September 4, 2019, at approximately 2:17 p.m., writer and A/GC attempted to contact COMPLAINANT but were unsuccessful.

On September 5, 2019, at approximately 3:10 p.m., writer and A/GC telephonically contacted COMPLAINANT via secure telephone call. COMPLAINANT was advised that: the overall classification of COMPLAINANT's letter was S//NF; that the DNI did not transmit the urgent concern to the intelligence committees citing that it was outside of the requisite statute; that the matter was referred to the FBI, but no identifying information about the COMPLAINANT or any witnesses was disclosed and that the IG was attempting to identify necessary next steps. COMPLAINANT wanted to know who determined the classification of the document and when the referral went to the FBI. COMPLAINANT also advised that it might be okay for the FBI to know his/her identity if they wanted to speak with him/her, but that he/she would want to confirm that waiver of confidentiality, or the passing of name to the FBI for an interview before he/she agreed to it. COMPLAINANT was leaning toward allowing that to happen if the FBI wanted to conduct an interview. COMPLAINANT also wanted to know if he/she could send a copy of the letter to his/her attorney given classification concerns. COMPLAINANT wanted something from the ICIG in writing explaining why the urgent concern was not transmitted and also wanted his/her documents back if the urgent concern was not moving forward. If the documents remained in a review process, he/she wanted to know why and what privilege issues were at hand. COMPLAINANT also wanted a copy of the classified version of documents so that he/she could see who classified them. COMPLAINANT also asked if there was anything barring him/her from going to the HPSCI on his/her own. COMPLAINANT asked if there has ever been an urgent concern in the past which was considered to be outside of statute and who interprets the laws in this regard. COMPLAINANT had faith in how the process was supposed to work, but all seems to be out control at this point.

On September 6, 2019 at approximately 10:00 a.m., writer and A/GC attempted to contact COMPLAINANT's attorney, had to leave a voice message.

On September 10, 2019, at approximately 11:38 a.m., writer and A/GC to ICIG telephonically contacted COMPLAINANT and advised him/her of the notifications made by the ICIG to both intelligence committees of the fact that an urgent concern was received, of the determination that was made, and that the DNI did not transmit.

On September 20, 2019 at approximately 12:35 p.m., writer and A/GC telephonically contacted COMPLAINANT via secure line. COMPLAINANT advised that he/she is hearing from counsel that his/her name is going to be released in the media very soon. COMPLAINANT has also been getting calls from news outlets and reporters, including [REDACTED] from the Washington Post, who may know COMPLAINANT from issues of a few years ago. COMPLAINANT has not spoken with any reporter, has not answered his/her phone and allows calls to go to voice mail. [REDACTED] texted COMPLAINANT on his/her cell phone, but he/she does not know how

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Date of Activity: [DATE OF ACTIVITY]  
Conducted by: [INVESTIGATORS]

Conducted at: [LOCATION OF ACTIVITY]  
Date prepared: [DATE PREPARED]  
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## MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

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specific to "indicia of arguable political bias." COMPLAINANT expressed concern that he/she had someone indicated to writer during interview of support for a particular political candidate, which would not have been correct or intentional. COMPLAINANT also want to know if any information about him/her or any other witnesses in regard to identities had been given out to anyone, or if ICIG letter gave any detail away that might identify who they were.

On September 30, 2019, at approximately 10:50 a.m., writer spoke with COMPLAINANT regarding desire to remain confidential. COMPLAINANT confirmed he/she wished to remain confidential and to not have ID released, in the form of documents or otherwise. COMPLAINANT was concerned over press reporting over the weekend, specifically that COMPLAINANT had not agreed to testify to the intelligence committees, nor that [REDACTED] had federal protection in place, which gave [REDACTED] parents great cause for concern. COMPLAINANT suggested his/her attorney may contact ICIG to inquire as to assistance with setting up anonymous SVTC if necessary to testify for the HPSCI. COMPLAINANT also agreed to contact NSC#2 to have that person contact writer to confirm desire to remain confidential or not.

On October 1, 2019 at approximately 10:45 a.m., writer spoke with NSC#2 who confirmed he/she wished to remain confidential and that he/she is concerned over release of identity because the "Hunt was on" at the White House for how the whistleblower got information. NSC#2 wants to be told if it is believed his/her identity might be disclosed. NSC#2 appreciates all the ICIG is doing in this process.

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Date of Activity: [DATE OF ACTIVITY]  
Conducted by: [INVESTIGATOR(S)]

Conducted at: [LOCATION OF ACTIVITY]  
Date prepared: [DATE PREPARED]  
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**MEMORANDUM OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY**

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ACTIVITY:



Date of Activity: [DATE OF ACTIVITY]  
Conducted by: [INVESTIGATOR(S)]

Conducted at: [LOCATION OF ACTIVITY]  
Date prepared: [DATE PREPARED]  
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