In a tense March 2020 meeting just months before the presidential election, the National Security Agency’s (NSA) deputy director blocked the release of a long-delayed report on foreign targeting of U.S. elections—not because the intelligence was flawed, but because he feared it would brand the agency as part of the “deep state.”​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

The memo states: “DDIR explained that he was concerned that releasing the [report] at this time – in the current political climate, with an acting ODNI who had been tasked (according to DDIR) to ‘clean house’ in the intelligence community, and with an administration that is suspicious of the IC and aggressive in removing anyone who stands in their way – would damage NSA’s credibility. He believed that questions would be asked as to why the NSA was choosing to release this information, most obviously pertinent to the 2016 election, now, more than a year after the election, and that NSA would be accused of releasing it for political purposes.

"The documents show that DDIR perceived that ODNI, CIA, and to an extent the FBI had been tarred as hosting or being part of the ‘deep state’, but that NSA thus far had not been associated with the deep state and was trusted; he felt that publishing this report would destroy that trust. He felt that the questioning of NSA that would ensue would have ramifications on the credibility of NSA reporting overall and would result in morale problems among the broader NSA workforce. He repeatedly said that he wanted to protect our ability to be who we are at NSA: 'nonpartisan, objective, speaking truth to power.'”

The recently declassified document is a contemporaneous, written account by an NSA analyst of a meeting that day about whether, and how, to release a long-delayed intelligence report, at a time when President Donald Trump had levied sharp criticism about the intelligence community (IC) and had questioned the security of elections.

It was released Tuesday by the White House Government Transparency Task Force.

You can read it here:

The memo was part of the evidence reviewed by Barry Zulauf, the Intelligence Community Ombudsman, before he wrote a scathing report published in 2021 alleging spy agencies engaged in the politicization of intelligence on foreign election interference during the 2020 election, an administration official told reporters.

The memo, dated March 13, 2020, and declassified on Aug. 12, 2026, by White House Counsel David Warrington, was written by one of the analysts who had produced the report. The author repeatedly refers to “we, the analysts” and notes personal frustration that higher-ups had delayed the product for 16 months while the analytic work itself had been completed in a timely manner.

The report in question had been proposed for release in December 2018 and concerned foreign targeting of the United States that began in 2014. The report also included activity related to the 2016 election. 

An earlier, more limited version of the reporting had already been published, but the fuller version was held up for two main reasons, according to the document: it would unavoidably contextually identify members of Congress (even with names removed), which triggered the need for pre-approval under the Gates Procedures; and some of the 2016 election details were judged “sensational” and therefore required a more restricted distribution.

According to the document, higher levels, including ODNI, had repeatedly failed to make timely decisions for roughly 16 months. 

By February 2020, the distribution list had finally been approved. The report was pushed for release pending approval by the NSA director, General Paul Nakasone, and the then deputy director, George Barnes, objected to releasing it “as-is at this time.”

Releasing a "watered-down" summary considered

Barnes proposed several alternatives, including releasing a watered-down summary instead of the full assessment. The analyst pushed back, noting that amalgamating the material would still contextually identify members of Congress (especially regarding the 2016 Democratic field of Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders) and would look even more selective—and therefore more political—if only Republican-field analysis were retained. 

The analyst also argued there was lasting foreign-intelligence value in the original analytic language and in policy preferences expressed by the foreign actors that remained relevant beyond 2016.

The same meeting also addressed a then-draft report on the Russian Internet Research Agency’s (IRA) preferences and strategy for the 2020 Democratic primary—another product that faced identical Gates Procedures problems of unavoidably identifying members of Congress. Barnes floated the idea of folding some 2016 material into the new 2020 product or even exploring a non-serialized sharing process so that only selected analysts could see the information without a formal, broadly distributed report.

Intelligence community fractures

These 2020-era IC fights over election interference reporting and subsequent fears of politicization are not isolated. 

U.S. intel analysts reportedly hid evidence of Chinese 2020 election meddling from Trump because they opposed his China policies, per a 2021 analytic ombudsman report. One China analyst refused to send intel to “that vulgarian in the Oval Office.” 

This produced a majority IC assessment downplaying Chinese influence, while a minority view (backed by then-DNI Ratcliffe) concluded Beijing did try to undermine Trump.

The newly declassified NSA memo and the ombudsman’s findings show parallel internal struggles inside the intelligence community in 2020 and the surrounding years: one in which senior NSA leadership delayed a foreign-targeting product out of explicit fear of being labeled “deep state,” and another in which working-level China analysts suppressed inconvenient reporting out of personal policy opposition to the sitting president.